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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: QUEERING SHAKESPEREAN PRAXIS 
 
 This dissertation is about the relationship between normativity and non-
normativity, and the ways in which the performative process of rehabilitation produces 
queer subjectivity as a byproduct of this relationship. Queer subjectivity, as I define it 
here, is not homologous with the senses of self experienced by individuals or 
communities who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or other non-normative modes of 
sexually based identification. Indeed, attempting to tether together multiple forms of non-
normatively identified persons to make a singular theoretical claim seems unproductive at 
best, if not politically apathetic. My use of the term queer, and by extension queer 
subjectivity, is informed and inflected by socio-cultural politics operating today. More 
specifically, it is means of understanding the ways in which the figure of Shakespeare 
circulates in the present moment, and the cultural fantasies and anxieties toward which 
the circulation of its cultural iconicity gestures. In this dissertation, queer subjectivity 
signifies a performatively strategic sense of self, one that aggressively works to occupy 
multivalent identity categories without faithfully inhabiting any one in particular. In 
attending to contemporary understandings of the use values that possibly arises from the 
intrinsic value associated with Shakespeare, I argue, we can effectively witness the 
representation of queer subjectivity. And in witnessing this event, we might also watch as 
the seemingly discreet boundaries of the normative and the non-normative collide and 
coincide, if only briefly and fleetingly.   
2 
 Foundational to this dissertation, I argue that we are in midst of an emergent 
cultural phenomenon. In the present moment Shakespeare has emerged as a new 
commodity for cultural consumption, which is to say the commodity of Shakespeare has 
taken on a new and highly nuanced cultural import today.1 Over the past decade, the 
figure of Shakespeare—both as a historical figure as well as the works attributed to that 
historical figure—has emerged and continues to emerge as a paradigm for rehabilitation, 
or what I characterize as a cultural performance predicated on the desire to restore a 
subject to a former capacity in order to ensure a more socially successful future for that 
subject, as well as for particular cultures more generally. Various types of rehabilitation 
programs appropriate the name of Shakespeare with the goal of effecting new 
possibilities for traditionally marginalized communities. 
 In this dissertation, I adopt an interdisciplinary and performance-based approach 
to understanding the cultural and political effects and ideologies of the queer byproducts 
that result from today’s obsession with rehabilitation as an effectual mode of 
Shakespearean praxis. In many ways, my understandings of queer and queer subjectivity 
fail to synchronize with many current understanding and uses of the term within queer 
theory, which I confront throughout this dissertation though more directly in the 
conclusion.2 In this dissertation, queerness signifies a processual activity, and queer, or 
                                                
1 This should not suggest that Shakespeare’s cultural import as a paradigm for social and cultural 
identification itself is new. In Meaning by Shakespeare (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 
Terrence Hawkes offers the pithy aphorism, “Shakespeare doesn’t mean: we mean by Shakespeare” (6). 
This point is a well established one. The emergent quality of Shakespeare today lies in the ways in which 
we use Shakespeare to mean differently. 
2 Although the model of queerness I introduce here and develop throughout this dissertation differs, for the 
most part in substantial ways, from many theoretical deployments of queer today, my understanding of 
queerness as a performative process finds affinity with the work of José Esteban Muñoz and Thomas A. 
King. See: Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics 
(London/Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, and especially “Cruising the Toilet: LeRoi 
Jones/Amiri Baraka, Radical Black Traditions and Queer Futurity.” GLQ 13.2-3 (2007): 353-67; and King, 
3 
that which yields from queerness as a performative condition, refers to those singular and 
momentary events that signify as indeterminate, disruptive, and not yet socially legible. 
 In conceptualizing the queerness of rehabilitative Shakespearean praxis, I take a 
cue from performance theorist Richard Schechner’s concept of “restored behavior,” 
which he loosely defines as a particular mode of living or daily and embodied activity. To 
describe this concept further, he draws an analogy to the work of a film editor. We can 
understand restored behavior, he explains, as material records of pastness, like reels of 
raw footage on celluloid. Much like a filmstrip, restored behavior, or “strips of behavior,” 
refers to lived events in social space that evoke the past insofar as those past events “can 
be rearranged or reconstructed.”3 In the process of restoring, rearranging, or 
reconstituting past behaviors (each of which constitute related but slightly different forms 
of engagement with social ideologies of performance), those behaviors associated with 
the past, once though of as primary, originary, and prior, “may be lost, ignored, 
contradicted—even while this truth or source is apparently being honored and observed” 
(35).  
 We can understand the queerness of rehabilitation through a slight departure from 
Schechner’s important concept.4 In this dissertation, queerness names a mode of restored 
behavior—or what I broadly conceptualize as the cultural performance of rehabilitation—
built upon an ambivalent fetishization and abjection of the past and how the past comes 
                                                                                                                                            
The Gendering of Men, 1600–1750: Queer Articulations, 2 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2008). 
3 Richard Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1985).  
4 In my indebted departure from Schechner follows understandings of the relation between lived 
performance and pastness also explored by two of the most notable performance theorists, Paul Roach and 
Margaret Thompson Drewal. See: Roach, Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), and Drewal, Yoruba Ritual: Performers, Play, Agency (Bloomington: 
University of Indiana Press, 1991).  
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to be lived out in daily life. Rehabilitation programs present Shakespeare as an image of 
the distant past as all too applicable in the present. Attributing a sense of intrinsic value to 
the cultural iconicity that the sign Shakespeare carries, rehabilitation programs 
programmatically establish the “Shakespearean” past as that which can potentially 
displace and eventually dispel the personal past experiences of the rehabilitative subject. 
However, queerness marks rehabilitation as events of failure—a sense of failure 
(sometimes on the part of the institutions facilitating rehabilitation, sometimes on the part 
of rehabilitative subjects) that opens strategic identificatory possibilities. The process of 
rehabilitation situates the non-normative—that is, the markedly inappropriate—subject as 
that which can be restored to circulation within the economy of properly authorized 
signification—that is, normative logic. By all means, rehabilitation operates by exclusion 
and supplementation; but in attempting to establish a system of exclusion against which 
inclusion is possible, rehabilitation as a performative process constructs a conceptual 
space, however unintentionally and unarticulated, in which the non-normative and the 
normative coexist over the representation of the rehabilitative body.  
 Rehabilitation operates as an operation of individuation qua liberation: it offers 
refuge to the non-normative subject within the signifying systems of substitution. 
Shakespeare-based rehabilitation programs imagine that the rehabilitative subject fulfills 
the rehabilitative aims by initiating itself in a process of signifying by self-substitution 
and self-negation. More specifically, as otherly signifying (or signifying otherness), 
rehabilitation displaces the very notion of otherness and non-normativity as things of the 
past, essences and identities left behind and jettisoned from the future of that subject. 
5 
 Perhaps the most familiar examples of Shakespeare-based rehabilitation programs 
are those set in prisons. This American Life, a weekly narrative audio program hosted by 
Public Radio International and National Public Radio (NPR), aired an episode entitled 
“Act V,” which documents the use of Shakespeare as a rehabilitative tool for inmates in a 
high-security prison in Missouri.5 By reading and performing Shakespeare, inmates are 
imagined to open a self-critical space in which they may take stock of past actions and 
claim responsibility for their crimes—actions, in other words, which they must 
effectively articulate before the parole board if they are to have a future outside of prison. 
But the project is built upon a double move, for there is a dual educational imperative in 
effect. While the inmates learn Shakespeare, the spectator learns about the socio-
economic disadvantages that influenced—and at times, the episode suggests, 
preconditioned—the inmates’ crime and subsequent incarceration. Over the past five 
years in particular, prison Shakespeare programs have received increased attention in 
mainstream news reports. The use of Shakespeare as a rehabilitative tool in penal 
populations has been chronicled and critiqued by major U.S. newspapers, including: Los 
Angeles Time, Boston Globe, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and Washington 
Post.6 Last year, PMLA issued a special edition on the intersection of incarceration and 
                                                
5 “Act V,” This American Life. Prod. Ira Glass. Radio. International Public Radio, 2004. The episode can be 
accessed online, at: http://www.thisamericanlife.org/. 
6 For a sampling of the media documentation on prison Shakespeare projects, see: Diane Haithman, 
“London Shakespeare Workout Prison Project puts the Bard behind Bars” in the Los Angeles Times (20 
Feb. 2008: E1; Susan Chaityn Lebovits, “Shakespeare Goes behind Prison Bars” in the Boston Globe (15 
July 2007: 8); Jodi Wilgoren, “In One Prison, Murder, Betrayal, and High Prose” in the New York Times 
(29 April 2005: A16); Peter Fimrite, “Convicts action out Shakespeare bare their inner feelings” in the San 
Francisco Chronicle (25 July 2006: B5); and William Wan, “Bard Behind Bars” in Washington Post (5 
Nov. 2007: B01). 
6 
social justice, and prison Shakespeare programs represented two important case studies in 
this collection.7 
 Prison Shakespeare programs operate with the desire to mobilize inmates toward 
more socially responsible and self-possessed futures, and the documentations of these 
programs work to mobilize spectators toward socially educated present understandings of 
penal systems operating in the U.S. However, they have also mobilized critical attention 
within the field of Shakespeare studies as well. At their 2006 meeting, the Shakespeare 
Association of America8 screened the popular documentary film Shakespeare Behind 
Bars (dir. Hank Rogerson, 2005), which takes its name from a company of incarcerated 
adult male actors at a medium-security prison in Kentucky.9  The film follows the men 
over the span of nine months as they cast, rehearse, and stage a full-length production of 
The Tempest. The screening was followed by a discussion with the film director as well 
as the director of the Shakespeare Behind Bars program. SAA also hosted a workshop 
that year entitled “Big-House Shakespeare,” organized by Amy Scott-Douglass, author of 
Shakespeare Inside: The Bard Behind Bars.10 In the workshop, facilitators of various 
prison Shakespeare programs discussed how and why they use the performance of 
Shakespeare as a means of communal and social education: to educate inmates as well as 
the audiences who attend the inmates’ final performances and view or listen to these 
                                                
7 PMLA 123.3 (2008). See specifically: Jonathan Shailor, “When Muddy Flowers Bloom: The Shakespeare 
Project at Racine Correctional Institution,” 623-41; and Jean Trounstine, “Beyond Prison Education,” 674-
77. 
8 Shakespeare Association of America, Philadelphia, PA, 13-5 April 2006. 
9 Shakespeare Behind Bars was screened at several major independent film festivals in 2005, the year of its 
release. It was nominated for the Grand Jury Prize at the Sundance Film Festival; it won the Special Jury 
Prize for Feature Documentary at the Independent Film Festival of Boston, the Crystal Heart Award for 
Documentary Feature at the Heartland Film Festival, and Best Documentary Director’s Choice Award at 
the Bluegrass Independent Film Festival, to name only a few of its awards. For a full listing of the film’s 
national and international premiers and awards, see: http://www.shakespearebehindbars.com/ 
10 Amy Scott-Douglass, Shakespeare Inside: The Bard Behind Bars (New York: Continuum, 2007). 
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performances in the documentary projects that advertise their pursuits. The work of 
Shakespeare scholars, including Scott-Douglass, Laura Bates, and Niels Herold,11 joins 
news reports and journalistic pieces in attempting to make sense of the cultural 
phenomenon of using Shakespeare as a rehabilitative tool for adult male inmates.  
 The emergent paradigmatic quality of Shakespeare as a mechanism for 
rehabilitative futurity, I argue, signals the ways in which questions of what it means to 
identify as an authentic subject have opened to new considerations of how identity can 
operate strategically to create new political and social possibilities. In other words, 
Shakespeare-based rehabilitation functions on the level of the individual, with the larger 
goal of installing an all-encompassing viosion of the social in which margins and centers 
fold in upon themselves. The rehabilitative Shakespeare A Dream in Hanoi (dir. Tom 
Weidlinger, 2002) demonstrates this dynamic particularly well. In 2000, twenty-five 
years after the end of the Vietnam War, a cross-cultural theater project was created 
between an American and a Vietnamese theater company to stage a bi-lingual 
performance of A Midsummer Night’s Dream in Hanoi, Vietnam.12 The Vietnamese-
American Theater Exchange (VATE) facilitated the project, in collaboration with the 
Ford Foundation and the U.S. State Department, in an effort to supplement, and in the 
process rehabilitate, failing American foreign policy in Vietnam with theater arts, or what 
VATE creator Lorelle Browning describes as “our most universal language—one that is 
absolutely essential to human communication. Since theater’s essence is profoundly 
collaborative, it requires us, as artists, educators and audiences, to discover and negotiate 
                                                
11 I discuss the phenomenon of prison Shakespeare and the works of Scott-Douglass, Bates, and Herold in 
detail in chapter three.  
12 For more information on this program, see the website: http://www.adreaminhanoi.com. All press release 
materials and quotes from program facilitators are taken from this website.  
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a common bond, a place where we fully experience our human connections and accept 
and transcend our differences.” Two years later, the documentary film Dream in Hanoi 
was released as a record of this endeavor.  
 The ostensible subject of the film is the attempt of both companies to, as the 
film’s opening subtitle states, “creat[e] a bridge between two peoples who were once 
enemies.” Shakespeare is that bridge. The fantasies of humanist transformation 
subtending the figure of Shakespeare invariably shape the logic within which 
rehabilitation can be practiced, and, likewise, how it must be thought. His works are 
cinematically imagined to transcend geographical and conceptual boundaries of nation 
and in the process both acknowledge and suture over the problem of cultural difference 
and the trauma of historical memory. Press materials for the film explain, “this is the first 
American documentary about American/Vietnamese relations that does not focus on the 
Vietnam war [sic] or its legacy of human suffering.” Rather, the film focuses on the 
process of rehabilitating intercultural relations after the trauma of war. It explores the 
process by which differently identified national subjects appropriate the power of 
Shakespeare’s international appeal and presupposed transcultural capital in order to find 
common ground and mutual understanding by rejecting a shared cultural trauma. 
Dream in Hanoi dramatizes for us the importance of difference in rehabilitation. 
When subjects perform rehabilitation (or what we might think of as newly habituated 
modes of living), they must materially signify difference—that is, they must signify their 
refusal of repetition. Subjects must represent themselves as selves othered, as self-
differentiated, new selves that have sloughed off old ones. Their performance of identity 
must read as that which has not come before, that which has not been done, at least not by 
9 
those subjects. Rehabilitation is the performance of differentiation. But it is also an act of 
restoration, of resituating concepts of normative identity and how it should be performed 
in non-normative, marginalized communities. In other words, there are multiple 
temporalities in play in the performance of rehabilitation. In performing resituated 
difference, subjects perform in a way that draws attention to differences that matter in 
specific cultural contexts, the systems of difference that make the representation and 
signification of identity possible. To bring my understanding of the term queer 
subjectivity and its relation to performative difference into focus, we first must 
understand the perversity of Shakespeare as it operates in the process of rehabilitation. 
 As we see through the VATE program, Shakespeare-based rehabilitation projects 
most often market themselves as inspirational testimonials to a subject’s ability to 
transform for the better. However, the programmatic perversity of these projects troubles 
their liberatory agendas. This perversity condenses most clearly in the degree to which 
the figure of Shakespeare represents the instrumentality and agency of the rehabilitative 
subject. Such perverse agency speaks to the ways in which a critical focus on a subject’s 
potential displaces an understanding of the systems of socio-cultural construction through 
which subjects are understood as subjects. Shakespeare has long occupied a central 
position in the Western cannon and is likewise a powerful force of discipline in the 
properly social institution of education. As Gary Taylor bluntly puts it: 
Shakespeare’s power as a literary genius is now inextricably entangled 
with the institutional power of his official canonization. None of us… can 
escape from the consequences of that entanglement. What has been done 
to Shakespeare in canonizing him has affected what Shakespeare does, in 
countless classrooms, to Shakespeare’s subjects.13  
 
                                                
13 Gary Taylor, “Power, Pathos Character” in Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare, eds. Christy Desmet and 
Robert Sawyer (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 43-63, 61. 
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Such entanglements, I would add, likewise shape the ways in which Shakespeare can be 
imagined to operate as both a subjected and subjecting force of socialization. 
 To rehabilitate subjects into a potentially new and more flexible sense of self 
presumes that we can first liberate Shakespeare from the systems of disciplinary power 
within which he circulates. In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault defines 
disciplinary power as that which properly “trains” or normalizes individuals through the 
mechanisms of surveillance, hierarchical observation, and examination in order to 
produce “docile bodies,” or bodies “that may be subjected, used, transformed, and 
improved.”14 Foucault characterizes these mechanisms of disciplinary power as effective 
tools developed for the regimentation of other docile bodies, mechanisms that achieve 
strategic effect through their disciplinary character. These strategies are maintained even 
when, and most effectively when, they provoke resistance, for acts of resistance, he 
suggests, demonstrate the necessity of the discipline that provokes them.  
 However, what emerges in the rehabilitation projects I examine is a figure of 
Shakespeare who exceeds institutional logics, and, as a result of his symbolic excess, 
possesses the ability to teach subjects strategies for resistance, but resistance that 
manages to escape what Foucault describes as the rather exclusively normative-inflected 
mechanisms of disciplinary power and social regulation. The agency of the subject is 
predicated on the positioning of Shakespeare as a new technology of the self, or what 
Foucault describes as a signifying system by which individuals come to know themselves 
and identify as subjects.15 However, Shakespeare operates as a mechanism of 
                                                
14 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 136. 
15 Foucault defines technologies of the self as systems of knowledge and practical reason which “permit 
individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their 
own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transforms themselves in order to 
11 
socialization in rehabilitative Shakespeares precisely because it saturates the social 
landscape in multiple ways and can be used toward uncountable and unforeseeable ends, 
like rehabilitation. Rehabilitative Shakespeares suggest that sometimes subjects resist 
systems of power precisely by embracing those systems. By extensions, they also suggest 
that there exist multiple systems of power, which may or may not come to 
programmatically bear on all subjects in the same ways.  
Like any cultural phenomenon, Shakespeare’s emergent paradigmatic quality is 
marked by a particular mode of technology. The artifacts attesting to the cultural 
phenomenon of Shakespeare’s rehabilitative power take the form of audio-visual 
documentary, a genre that markets itself as the most unmediated media representation of 
reality possible.16 These documentary projects, what I refer to throughout this project as 
rehabilitative Shakespeares, reflect in the contemporary moment what we might think of 
as “the desire called Shakespeare” in the age of cinematic reproduction. It is both an 
authenticating desire—or a desire to authenticate marginally represented subjects—as 
well as a marketable simulacrum, stamped on celluloid and circulating within popular 
culture as both a mode of entertainment and inspiration. Thus, my interests in 
Shakespeare are more presentist and theoretical than historical or properly literary. I 
contextualize Shakespeare in the present moment and the subjunctive future rather than in 
the past. For in the contemporary moment, Shakespeare operates as a sort of cultural 
promise that we as individuals and collective communities can and will improve, that is, 
                                                                                                                                            
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (18). It is differentiated from 
three related technologies—those of production, sign systems, and domination—but operates in 
hermeneutical relation to them. See: Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, eds. Luther 
H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988). 
16 Over the past decade, documentary theory has produced exciting work in its desire to question the 
relation among reality, the Real, representation, and spectator reception. At the moment, I leave this claim 
on documentary’s supposed function unmediated, but I discuss this claim in detail in chapter two.  
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transform for the better, as long as we are willing to work for it. And in working for a 
better tomorrow, it appears that we are continually working with and reworking 
Shakespeare with the desire to unwrite our histories.  
Rehabilitation as an emergent cultural preoccupation is itself historically marked. 
It may represent an emergent cultural phenomenon, but it is one built upon an early 
modern understanding of rehabilitation and its queerly out-of-joint temporality. The 
Oxford English Dictionary cites the first recorded use of rehabilitation in Henry VIII’s 
Act of Supremacy (1534) as a synonym for a Perinde valere, or a judiciary writ by which 
royal favor previously granted is revalidated.17 Rehabilitative writs, in other words, give 
the effect to judiciary and sovereign revalidation of going back to the original time in 
which the grant was dispensed. The early modern lexiographer Thomas Blount explains 
in his legal dictionary Nomo-Lexikon (1670) that the term Rehabilitation “Is one of those 
Exactions mentioned in the said Statute, to be claimed by the Pope heretofore in England; 
and seems to signifie a Bul or Breve, for re-inabling a Spiritual Person to exercise his 
Function, who was formerly disabled; or a restoring to former ability."18 William 
Prynne’s (1645) use of the term rehabilitation in his account of the trials against Irish 
rebel Lord Connor Maguire similarly refers to an act of restoring a subject to a former 
condition with the contingent promise of an improved future. He offers as an appositive 
to the term: “to dispence therewith, or grant to any other any power or faculty of 
                                                
17 “rehabilitation,” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 4 
Apr. 2008 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50201415>. 
18 Thomas Blount, Nomo-Lexikon, a law-dictionary interpreting such difficult and obscure words and terms 
as are found either in our common or statute, ancient or modern lawes: with references to the several 
statutes, records, registers, law-books, charters, ancient deeds, and manuscripts, wherein the words are 
used : and etymologies, where they properly occur (In the Savoy: Printed for Thomas Newcomb John 
Martin and Henry Herringman), Kkk. 
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dispensation, rehabilitation or restoring the [delinquent] to his former condition.”19 The 
process of rehabilitating by Shakespeare, in other words, carries with it early modern 
understandings of subjects as subjected to judicio-political mechanisms of state power, 
mechanisms that exert force through a retrospective logic.  
It is precisely the mark of the past that allows rehabilitative transformation to 
register as efficacious, while also troubling the very efficaciousness of rehabilitation as a 
liberatory project—a queerly signifying logic that the early modern etymological baggage 
of the term rehabilitation explicitly suggests. Dream in Hanoi typifies the degree to 
which history—the personal histories of subjects in the process of rehabilitation, history 
as a subject of inquiry, and history as a subjecting force—haunts the rehabilitative 
imperative. What quickly becomes apparent in the film is that the rehabilitation project 
and the process it takes is one of American design, most innocuously demonstrated by the 
fact that the film is in English and circulated exclusively in the United States. Less 
innocuously, the film primarily concentrates its interview sequences on the experiences 
of the American cast members, and occasionally on the ways in which the Vietnamese 
cast have come to respect their American colleagues. The film documents several 
moments of intercultural strife, including American objections to the Vietnamese 
director’s desire to add characters to the play, cut scenes, incorporate a traditional 
Vietnamese dance sequence, and have the actors and actresses abstain from acts of 
intimacy on stage, like hugging or kissing. On the latter objection, the American director 
retorts rather straightforwardly that the young lovers are just that, in love, and the way to 
signify that one is in love is through exuberant emotion and physical intimacy. Without 
                                                
19 William Prynne, et al, The vvhole triall of Connor Lord Macquire with the perfect copies of the 
indictment, and all the evidence against him (London 1645), Ev. 
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witnessing hugging and kissing on stage, she suggests, the audience may not realize the 
passionate dynamic between the lovers and the problems that occur when Puck interferes 
with these dynamics. She objects loudest, however, to the notion of emending 
Shakespeare. The act of altering the playtext embodies the American limit of intercultural 
exchange. 
 By the film’s end, testimonies of mutual understanding overwrite the scenes of 
obvious intercultural conflict. Subtitled interview sequences with the Vietnamese cast 
and directors structure the final scene and primarily center on what the Vietnamese have 
learned about Americans. For instance, one of the Vietnamese actresses explains that she 
previously thought of Americans as having big personalities and closed minds, but she 
has changed her mind after working with the American theater company. “So I am 
completely surprised to find that you are very gentle,” she tells the camera and 
subsequent American audience. Another actress professes to the camera, “you have 
brought to your Vietnamese friends a very good way of working. I will miss your way of 
working.” Her coded testimony draws attention to the ways in which Vietnam’s socialist 
regulations become a primary point of contention in the theater project. At one point, the 
American stage manager threatens to quit if the Vietnamese cast continues to take two-
hour lunch breaks, while the Vietnamese director complains that American obsessions 
with timetables and schedules infringes on his creative process. Rehabilitating 
international relations at this point in the film lapses into an assertion that American 
conceptions of capitalist meritocracy can liberate Vietnamese socialism, a claim that 
seems to be supported by the actress’s lament that she will regret the Americans’ 
departure and along with them their methods of capitalist labor. The performance of 
15 
rehabilitating international relations slides into a colonialist project of disciplining 
Vietnamese minds and bodies not only on the proper ways in which Shakespeare should 
be performed but also on the virtues of American democracy. 
 But the joke, it seems, is on the Americans. In the final scene, they bid an 
emotional farewell to their new Vietnamese friends. The American actor playing 
Lysander professes on behalf of his theater company and the Vietnamese cast, “we fell in 
love.” But it is painfully apparent that American love for the Vietnamese is not retuned in 
the way the Americans would have it. The Vietnamese cast reciprocates the embrace of 
the Americans with what the spectator cannot help but notice as reserved propriety, 
appropriate to the point of unsettling. While the Americans offer laments cut short by 
choking emotion, the Vietnamese respond with sighs and bouquets of roses, an American 
semiotic of love that seems incredibly deflated when we compare it to the Americans’ 
incessant wiping of tears with shirt sleeves. Clearly, something has been lost in 
translation. The narrator’s announcement that, “After three months in Vietnam, it is time 
for the Americans to go home,” echoes with discomforting irony at this moment.  
 On one level, the rehabilitative project succeeds in its objective to publicly stage a 
productive cross-cultural encounter in the name of Shakespeare. What it produces as a 
final staged performance, however, is a version of A Midsummer Night’s Dream that 
reflects the American cast’s ideas of what a bi-lingual production of Shakespeare should 
look like, and the Vietnamese have apparently come to understand and agree with the 
supremacy of this version, however coerced this agreement may have been. The process 
of rehabilitation, in other words, reflects (rather painfully at times) dominant ideologies 
of culture and its relatively stealth mechanisms of appropriation. Yet, the Vietnamese cast 
16 
performs their farewell to the Americans so properly coded in red roses and pregnant 
sighs that the spectator must wonder to what degree the Vietnamese cast has actually 
internalized the American ideologies of affect and meritocracy established by the film. 
They perform the role of the properly disciplined subject so well that mimetic 
identification with the dominating American culture appears as just that: a performance, 
rather than the internalization of American ideologies as naturalized truth. Whether or not 
the American cast recognizes the (at least) partial failure of their rehabilitative project is 
of little matter; in fact, they appear rather pleased with themselves at film’s end. I am 
concerned with the way in which the performative discipline of the Vietnamese cast 
precludes the documentary film’s foundational assumption that Shakespeare can serve as 
a paradigm of cross-cultural mediation, that which bridges disparate peoples, cultures, 
ideologies, and histories so as to build a better future. 
 A Dream in Hanoi, as well as the other rehabilitative Shakespeares I examine, 
dramatizes the reality of disciplinary power, or the representation of the ways in which 
Shakespeare becomes an alibi for troubling political agendas. But in watching the 
spectacle of normativity, we also see moments in which it breaks down. For the film also 
suggests, however counterproductive to its cinematic aims, that disciplined subjects can 
learn to co-opt the normative power which Shakespeare is made to represent in ways that 
turn normativity against itself. If the naturalization of truth can be appropriated as a 
rehabilitative performance of regulated selfhood, then the agency both of power and the 
subject come into question: who or what exactly is doing the appropriating in the 
performance of rehabilitation, normative ideologies or the rehabilitative subject? 
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The perverse position of the figure of Shakespeare in projects of rehabilitation 
underscores the double function of rehabilitation. On one level, made clear in Dream in 
Hanoi, rehabilitation operates as a mechanism of normative regulation. On another level, 
rehabilitation is a cultural performance, and like any cultural performance, rehabilitation 
must socially signify as operating within cultural norms and ideological systems of 
valuation. Precisely because rehabilitation functions both as a normalizing social 
mechanism and a cultural performance of identity transformation, it must be understood 
within a queer temporal logic. The socially regulatory mechanism of normativity 
functions in the future perfect.20 Performativity, however, signifies the performance of 
the past through repetition and reiteration. Rehabilitation mediates these dual functions as 
parallel operations that exceed both/and and either/or logics. Thus, it represents the site 
of the rehabilitative body as a palimpsest of multiple temporalities. When subjects 
perform to signify resituated difference, their performance constitutes a mode of self-
production: it insinuates a subject into a future tense. It is also a performance of self-
negation: the rejection of the non-normative identity position which the subject once 
occupied. But this mode of self-negation can only signify once a new sense of self-
production is first established. In this way, the performance of normative identity requires 
a belated signification of the non-normative: that which the self is no longer, that which it 
opposes, and that which brings normativity into the present as the desire of the 
subjunctive future. Non-normative identity becomes a proleptic construct, the 
performance of an identity position that occurs in the past only insofar as the present 
moment works toward a more appropriate and appropriable future. The necessarily queer 
                                                
20 For instance, Foucault claims that the function of modern discipline is to prevent repetition of 
unsanctioned behavior (Discipline and Punish, 26-28). 
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logic of rehabilitation both allows for and demands the appropriation of queer 
subjectivity. 
This queer logic also demands a reconsideration of what it means to name 
queerness as a performative process. Rehabilitative Shakespeares suggest that the logic of 
habituating a subject again and again constitutes a crucial performance or reiterated and 
ritualistic imperative which normativity must follow according to its own operational 
design. Judith Butler’s work on performativity here is crucial to an understanding of the 
possibilities of resistance to performances of power. Drawing upon Jacques Derrida’s 
work on citationality,21 Butler establishes the now well-know argument that identity is 
performative; it brings itself into being through the repetitive performance of norms 
which precondition how identity may be performed. Drawing a distinction between 
performance—what we might think of as the act of doing—and performativity—the 
social norms by which an act is done—she writes: 
Performativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a 
regularized and constrained repetition of norms. And this repetition is not 
performed by a subject; this repetition is what enables a subject and 
constitutes the temporal condition for the subject. This iterability implies 
that ‘performance’ is not a singular ‘act’ or event, but a ritualized 
production, a ritual reiterated under and through constraint, under and 
through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and 
even death controlling and compelling the shape of the production, but 
not, I will insist, determining it fully in advance.22 
 
In Butler’s formulation, performativity denotes the conditions of possibility within which 
identity is performed or enacted. We might think of the performance of identity, then, as 
                                                
21 Analyzing the indeterminate conditions of any context or event, Derrida argues that utterative 
quotation—what he refers to as citation—marks the difference between representation and the reproduction 
of an original. “Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written (in the current sense of this 
opposition), in a small or large unit,” he explains, “can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it 
can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is 
absolutely illimitable” (320). See: “Signature Event Context," trans. Alan Bass in Margins of Philosophy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) 309-330. 
22 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 95. 
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the event or the doing of an act of identity that has been done before. In doing an act 
already done, a subject highlights the rules that structure the possibility of that event and 
its continuation. Performative reiterability ensures the reproduction of norms within 
social space, without fully or completely prescribing the forms that the performance of 
norms might take. For there is always the possibility of failure, that the event will exceed 
the rules of its condition in some way. To paraphrase Derrida, with repetition comes 
indeterminacy of effect. Since identity is always a repetition of the norms that enforce its 
rule, Butler makes the claim that “it is only within the practices of repetitive signifying 
that a subversion of identity becomes possible.”23 
 To shift critical consideration from the process of habituation to the necessity of 
regulatory power to rehabilitate subjects is to call into question the ways in which certain 
modes of performance must be understood as resisting the prior conditions of its rule. 
When subjects perform identity to signify as rehabilitative performances, or newly 
habitual modes of living, they must materially signify difference, and likewise signify 
their refusal of repetition, or the performance of prior conditions. Rehabilitative subjects 
must represent themselves as selves both inside and outside prior conditions of legibility. 
This assumes multiple systems of legibility, or multiple possibilities for the ways in 
which pre-conditions of rules can be thought.  
Such multiplicity also allows for productive conceptual conflict between the 
distinction between performance and performativity. Rehabilitative Shakespeares suggest 
that the distinction between two may not be as discreet as Butler would have it. Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick warns that differentiating between the two potentially replicates a 
hierarchical and taxonomical othering which performance studies once sought to trouble. 
                                                
23 Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990), 145. 
20 
Calling attention to the “obliquities between being and doing,” she suggests that the 
division between the terms demonstrates a critical desire to determine once and for all 
“whether particular performances (e.g. of drag) are really parodic and subversive (e.g. of 
gender essentialism) or just uphold the status quo. The bottom line is generally the same: 
kinda subversive, kinda hegemonic. I see this as a sadly premature domestication of a 
conceptual tool whose powers we really have barely yet begun to explore.”24 The 
emergent paradigm of Shakespeare as a rehabilitative phenomenon demonstrates the 
ways in which a subject’s performance can—and repeatedly does—fail to register the 
normative conditions in which it is produced. In other words, rehabilitative performances 
cannot signify within the normative conditions of its production. In response, they 
reframe the conditions of performance so as to account for the resistance. Thus, 
performance, in certain contexts, produces the conditions in which it can be thought as 
belated constructions. These belated conditions of rule signify as (ineffectually) 
normative in scope, but differently normative, nonetheless.  
 
 Over the span of each of the following chapters, I develop my model of queerness 
and queer subjectivity in more depth by exploring it from various angles. I present this 
introduction, in part, as the first move in articulating this model by establishing some 
notable differences. Differentiating my use of the term queer seems incredibly necessary 
given the degree to which queer has itself experienced a series of rehabilitations over the 
past two decades. Queer has been used in various ways: to refer to something as strange, 
odd, or perverse; to signify negative characteristics (as in counterfeit or worthless); to 
                                                
24 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Queer Performativity: Henry James’s The Art of the Novel,” in GLQ 1 
(1993): 1-16, 15. 
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express pejorative, homophobic sentiments; and to denote socio-political movements—
like ACT UP and their rallying cry, “we’re here, we’re queer, so get fucking used to 
it!”—that work to reclaim the sense of perversity once associated with queer.25  
Likewise, the term has been used contemptuously and endearingly to colloquially refer to 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual sexual orientations; more recently, queer has been 
reformulated in queer theories to denote that which signifies otherly gendered and 
sexualized identities, such as transgenderism, pansexuality, and genderqueer, rather than 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual.26  
Although queer theory is now recognizable as an academic methodology, it 
nevertheless continues to actively resist the reifying effects of institutionalization. Queer 
has its own troubled history, as the term is made to signify in (sometimes radically) 
different ways within various theories.  Partially, at least, this difference registers a desire 
to reserve a critical focus on the process of (un)becoming, as queer positions itself both 
within and without academic disciplinarity. Recently, theorists have worked to recuperate 
queer as a non-identity and even anti-identitarian qualifier in the hopes that such a move 
would, in the words of Carla Freccero, “urge resistance to its hypostatization, reification 
into nominal status as designating an entity, an identity, a thing, and to allow it to 
continue its outlaw work as a verb and sometimes an adjective.”27 Such an anti-
identitarian agenda sounds strikingly similar to earlier understandings of queer as odd or 
                                                
25 For a genealogy of queer see: Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Nikki Sullivan, A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory. New 
York: New York University Press, 2003); and William B. Turner, A Genealogy of Queer Theory. 
Philadelphia, P.A.: Temple University Press, 2000). 
26 See: Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place (New York: New York University Press, 2005); 
Howell Nestle, Clare Howell, and Riki Wilchins, eds., Gender Queer. Voices From Beyond the Sexual 
Binary (New York: Alyson Books, 2002); and Susan Stryker and Stephen White, eds., The Transgender 
Studies Reader. New York: Routledge, 2006). 
27 Carla Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 5. 
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strange, at a time before the term was deployed within identity politics. In other words, 
queer has become ostentatiously weird again. I take a cue from these contemporary 
theorists in my deployment of queer subjectivity, or what I consider to mean that which 
signifies oddly-poised subject positions, ones in which a subject works to position itself 
both alongside and specifically outside power structures.  
 In this dissertation, queer (again, as a performative event) signifies a theoretical 
disruption, a mode of epistemology that questions epistemology itself, or the structures 
by which we think we know the truth of subjects, histories, and identities. Thinking 
queerly performs, in the words of Donald E. Hall, a “project of creative abrasion,”28 the 
speculative wearing away and potential damaging of the integrity of normative structural 
logics that organize understandings of how identity both constitutes and is culturally 
constituted. For this reason, queer theories usually presuppose that queer follows an anti-
identitarian logic in that it cannot describe an authentic identity but rather an alternate to 
identity. Lee Edelman writes, for instance, that queer “can never define an identity [but] 
only ever disrupt one,”29 a claim that echoes Leo Bersani’s insistence that queer signifies 
“anti-identitarian identity”30 and Annamarie Jagose’s astute summary that queer is “less 
an identity than a critique of identity.”31  
 My theoretical project in this dissertation follows this emergent understanding of 
queer as disruptive of identity rather than a synonym for identity positions that have 
traditionally been posited as non-normative, like gay and lesbian. But I follow this model 
only to a calculated point. Let me make clear my intervention in conceptualizing the 
                                                
28 Donald E. Hall, Queer Theories (Transitions) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 71. 
29 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 17. 
30 Leo Bersani, Homos (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 101. 
31 Annamarie Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 1996) 131.  
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relationship between queer and identity: though queer operates within an non-identitarian 
logic no longer homogeneous with non-normative identity, I maintain in this dissertation 
that an examination of how non-normative identity positions are produced as byproducts 
of the desire to know subjects—both how they perform and how they might perform 
differently—allows us to understand the cultural work that Shakespeare-based 
rehabilitation performs. And this cultural work, first and foremost operates on the level of 
identity.  
 In my conclusion chapter, I confront the ways in which queering Shakespearean 
praxis requires a theoretical understanding of the degree to which identity, though 
socially constructed, nonetheless remains the dominant cultural signifier of social power, 
cultural capital, and the politics of which subject may access what resources. Queer 
theory may allow us to deconstruct the normalization of certain modes of sexuality and 
the ideologies of socio-sexual reproduction; but at times it also tends to misremember 
that processes of normalization can take dramatically different forms across various 
contexts. Queerness, in this dissertation, names an ambivalent approach to the 
relationship between the social and the political. Although queer theory has successfully 
demonstrated the social and political need to deconstruct identity boundaries based upon 
sexually reproductive capability, the next step in the future of queer theory lies in the 
need to question both how these identities are constituted and to take seriously the fact 
that social regulation, however much they are built upon fantasies of the normal and the 
stability of identity, nonetheless, continue to enforce severe consequence for deviating 
from these fantasies.  
24 
 In underscoring the enigmatic dynamism of queer I want to refrain from 
conferring upon the term a sort of “Tinkerbell effect,” or what Nikki Sullivan refers to as 
the “claim that no matter how hard you try you’ll never manage to catch it because 
essentially it is ethereal, quixotic, unknowable.”32 The shifting nature of the term queer 
registers a changed (and still changing) socio-political and theoretical formulation of the 
relationship between identity construction and desire. The contingent and fleeting forms 
that queer subjectivity takes will be informed by the supplemental relation of normative 
and non-normative identification with and against which it operates. While queer 
subjectivity cannot be definitely describes in advance, we can, however, examine its 
discursive construction from multiple perspective to better understand the conditions of 
possibility for which it allows. For this reason, I focus each of the following chapters on 
identity- and context-specific modes of performing Shakespeare-based rehabilitation, and 
examine the different visions of queer subjectivity that these identities and contexts 
produce. Although each chapter examines queer subjectivity from a different set of 
conditions, this should not imply a development of thought. Rather, I present each 
chapter in conversation with the others. I understand each chapter calling back and forth 
to the others on the topic of what the event of queer subjectivity looks like, as well as the 
conditions of its emergence.  
 The following two chapters explore rehabilitative Shakespeares that represent the 
figure of Shakespeare as a formally organized and properly institutional means of social 
futurity for specifically marginalized subjects. In chapter two, “Promising the National 
Subject,” I examine two rehabilitative Shakespeares, The Hobart Shakespeareans (dir. 
                                                
32 Nikki Sullivan, A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory (New York: New York University  
Press, 2003), v. 
25 
Mel Stuart, 2005) and My Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet for a new Generation (dir. 
Michael Waldman, 2005), both of which position the figure of Shakespeare as American 
and British national ideals, respectively, as a means of acculturating youth and young 
adult immigrant communities of color. Tracing the tensions between local and national 
operating in these documentary films, I argue, demonstrates the multiple and perverse 
modes of mimetic identification and supplementation so programmatic in the genre of 
rehabilitative Shakespeares at large. The ambivalent trope of mimetic identification in 
these two films demonstrates the failure of the national ideal to register within the 
framework of rehabilitative success; but it also points to the fissures between the 
ideological constructions of normativity and non-normativity wherein we witness 
moments of queer subjectivity.  
 Chapter three, “Witnessing Prison Rehabilitation,” shifts considerations of 
identity and context to an examination of Shakespeare’s presence in medium- and high-
security correctional facilities. Building on an understanding of the ambivalent 
performance of mimetic identification that open a space for the emergence of queer 
subject, I argue in this chapter that the figure of Shakespeare as an image of social 
redemption suggests that queer subjectivity confounds social legibility of the level of 
affect. Both of the rehabilitative Shakespeares I examine in this chapter, Shakespeare 
Behind Bars and “Act V,” represent Shakespeare as a redemptive force that allows 
inmates (all males and primarily violent sex offenders) to take responsibility for their past 
crimes and forgive themselves, in order to then begin the task of seeking the forgiveness 
of society outside of prison. Rehabilitative success, then, exists in the production of 
authentic public performances of regret and remorse. However, because these 
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rehabilitation programs are institutionally sanctioned by the prisons, Shakespeare Behind 
Bars and “Act V” call into question the degree to which the production of authentic affect 
can ever register as authentic, which is that wonder whether it can register at all. Prison 
Shakespeare represents queer subjectivity as perversely affective relation between the 
subject and the social, one built upon simultaneously authenticating and inauthenticating 
productions of public emotional display.  
 In the fourth and fifth chapters, I deploy the term rehabilitation in the title of this 
dissertation in its gerund form. Just as formalized rehabilitation programs imbue the 
figure of Shakespeare with the power to rehabilitate marginalized subjects, less 
traditional modes of rehabilitation identify the cultural value of Shakespeare as their 
rehabilitative subject. I include an examination of these non-traditional understandings of 
rehabilitation to make the point that queer subjectivity cannot reduce to a byproduct of 
social institutions or circulations of properly understood disciplinary powers. More 
socially endemic, queer subjectivity marks those conceptual spaces in which any system 
of normativity, formally articulated or left relatively unspoken, must continually 
renegotiate itself against its own belated production of the non-normative. Though the 
public display of social institutions may dramatize this relationship most forcefully in 
traditionally understandings of how power operates, I am more interested in the last two 
chapters in exploring those social spaces not often associated with the production of 
proper social regulation. 
 In chapter four, “Dreaming Juliet in Shakespeare Pornography,” I expand the 
notion of socially marginalized bodies to include genre. More specifically, I explore the 
ways in which hard- and soft-core pornographic film occupy a liminal space in terms of 
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cultural value: though pornography generates more monetary capital than any other film 
genre, it nonetheless remains a sort of social secret. In this chapter, I reference the larger 
body of recently produced Shakespeare pornography, while examining two pornographic 
adaptations of Romeo and Juliet in particular: Shakespeare Revealed (dir. Ren Savant, 
2001) and Tromeo and Juliet (dir. Lloyd Kaufmann, 1998). Both present their Juliet 
figures as constantly fantasizing about or having nightmares over perverse, pornographic 
sexual activity. These films suggests that a productive encounter between Shakespeare 
and pornography exists only in the imaginative, not the literal, because, as they 
parodically point to, pornography and Shakespeare occupy conflicting points on the 
social spectrum of taste, appropriateness, and legitimacy. While each of the Juliet figures 
decide to willfully subvert these hierarchies and implement pornographic sex into their 
Shakespearean prescriptions, however, the films also follow a normative teleological 
representation of female sexuality. Moving from lesbianism to romantic, heterosexual 
monogamy, the Juliet figures subvert cultural standards of taste only insofar as they 
simultaneously subscribe to heteronormativity. To understand the mergence of queer 
subjectivity in these projects, I shift critical focus to the production of mimetic 
identification and authentic affect on the level of the spectator body, the primary level of 
which pornography operates. As I lead into the next chapter, I explore the question of 
what it means to represent Shakespeare as a pinnacle of cultural legitimacy, as is the 
programmatic move of the rehabilitative Shakespeares I examine in chapters two and 
three. In chapter four I argue that pornographic attempts to “dirty up” Shakespeare cannot 
register successfully because, quite simply, his function in culture today is just not as 
cleaned up as pornography would have it. I use chapter four to underscore the point that 
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queer subjectivity operates as a reminder that the relationship between cultural capital 
and social legitimacy involve continual renegotiations of identity, affect, and context. 
 Chapter five, “Rehabilitating the Classroom: Shakespeare and the Problem of 
History,” explores the possibilities of rehabilitating Shakespeare from the perspective of 
pedagogy. I spend the majority of this chapter examining one rehabilitative Shakespeare 
that differs from the others, in degree but not in kind. In Search of Shakespeare (dir. 
David Wallace, 2003), a two-disc BBC biography on Shakespeare, documents the 
attempts of television personality Michael Wood as he engages in a two-fold project: to 
discover the truth of who Shakespeare really was, while also demonstrating to those who 
teach Shakespeare that an approach to history (and in particular, British early modern 
history) built upon affective similarity rather than difference offers an opportunity to 
better engage students and to recognize the ways in which the past continually erupts as 
trace moments in the present. This methodology finds an affinity with Jonathan Goldberg 
and Madhavi Menon’s understanding of “homohistory,” or what they describe as a mode 
of “question[ing] the premise of a historicism that privileges difference over similarity.”33 
What emerges from Wood’s homohistorical project, however, is a mode of historical 
mastery that evokes exhausted images of Shakespeare that we also see in the 
pornographic projects I examine: a heterosexual, one-woman-loving man who may have 
written works that sound homoerotic, but only if we misunderstand that those moments of 
male-male love refer to his paternal love for an absent son. In order to liberate 
Shakespeare from normative modes of historicity, then, In Search of Shakespeare 
represents him as particularly heteronormative. The film demonstrates the ways in which 
                                                
33 Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon, “Queering History,” in PMLA (120.5, Oct. 2005), 1608-1617, 
1609. 
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queer projects built exclusively on either sameness or differences reproduce alternately 
fetishistic and totalizing mastery narratives of identity and its relationship to the social in 
ways that draw attention to those subjectivities excluded from queer projects. 
 Though we can never identify in advance the forms which queer takes, in 
retrospectively taking stock of these forms, we witness a series of performative strategies 
that, taken together, constitute an emergent and always emerging method of exposing 
possible context-specific and situational tactics of embodying identification in ways the 
resist that inertia of normativity. Closing this dissertation, I propose as a final reflection 
on the multiple forms of queer subjectivity that we bring its nonrationality and 
asymmetry to bear more forcefully on queer theory itself and the normative politics that 
its critical fetishization in the present moment of either identificatory sameness or 
difference performs.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
PROMISING THE NATIONAL SUBJECT: THE HOBART SHAKESPEAREANS 
AND MY SHAKESPEARE 
 
The multimodal and multimedia cultural artifacts I organize in this dissertation 
under the experimental term rehabilitative Shakespeares programmatically invest in the 
belief that dramatic mimesis can effect real psychological and social change. These 
audio-visual artifacts document institutional demands that subjects under rehabilitation 
physically perform the playtext, which implicitly lays the claim that acting out 
Shakespeare offers transformative potential that other modes of engagement cannot (e.g., 
reading the playtext as literature or watching film adaptations).1 In this way, Shakespeare 
becomes a communal enterprise, a physical task carried out by multiple material bodies 
to generate social meaning.2 This mode of rehabilitation also demands that subjects 
psychologically identify with aspects of the playtext, to find those moments when 
Shakespeare speaks directly to them in their current situation. Such a demand echoes the 
familiar myth of Shakespeare’s power to understand and empathize across time and space 
                                                
1 The programmatic investments of rehabilitative Shakespeare in the supremacy of performance as an 
interpretative find affinity in H. R. Coursen’s Shakespearean Performance as Interpretation (London and 
Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1992), in which he demands, “a Shakespeare script exists in 
performance only. Period” (15). Thought I disagree with the absolutism of this claim, I take a cue from his 
insistence that “Production…is a mode of interpretation” (23). 
2 The multiple articles in Sonia Massai’s edited collection World-wide Shakespeares takes this premise as a 
starting point, in order to further explore the degree to which separating a consideration of the local and 
individual from the national/global and communal tends to produce reifying and hegemonic understandings 
of the Shakespeare’s use value today. Massai elaborates on the stakes of such an intervention in her 
introduction. See: Sonia Massai, “Introduction: Defining Local Shakespeares” in World-wide 
Shakespeares: Local Appropriations in Film and Performance, ed. Sonia Massai (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2005) 3-14. 
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and across boundaries of identity.3 Simply put, the performance of rehabilitation in these 
programs asserts an analogical implication: to perform Shakespeare is to know 
Shakespeare, and to know Shakespeare is to come to know one’s self. And in coming to 
know one’s self (that is, in getting to know Shakespeare) the individual interacts with a 
community of other like-minded subjects. 
Not so much concerned with the models of mimesis operating within the 
playtexts, these audio-visual documentations of “real life” performances of Shakespeare 
presuppose that Shakespeare’s ideological function in the contemporary moment supplies 
the necessary force by which a subject might come to embody representations of that 
which qualifies as culturally appropriate, successful, and socially productive. They 
register the mimetic systems of socio-cultural power imbued within the figure of 
Shakespeare and the Shakespearean playtext today. An exemplar of rehabilitative 
Shakespeares, The Hobart Shakespeareans (dir. Mel Stuart, 2005), documents the work 
of Raif Esquith, award-winning American teacher, over the span of one academic year.4 
Esquith uses the performance of Shakespeare to teach the primarily first- and second-
generation Latino and Asian immigrant students in his fifth-grade class and afterschool 
program the tenets of American citizenship. The afterschool program, from which the 
                                                
3 Anthony Dawson offers an important assessment on the representation of Shakespeare as a cross-cultural 
signifier in his analysis of the multiple film adaptations of Akira Kurosawa. He writes, “Shakespeare’s 
international cache enables a partnership between local and global, freeing the demotic language as a kind 
of resistance to cultural standards…At the same time, of course, Shakespeare and the cross-cultural values 
associated with him provide the occasion by which such moves are enabled and justified. Even more to the 
point, perhaps we should be looking for ways to ask different questions, ones that move away from political 
negotiations. What alternatives to the cultural studies path might be worth following?” (158). For Dawson, 
the answer lies in a shift to understanding cinematic adaptation as a distinct reading practice discreet unto 
itself. With a similar question in mind, I explore the ways in which cinematic readings are always steeped 
in cultural studies, and, as such, are inescapably tied to social politics, even, and perhaps especially when, 
those reading practices attempt to distance themselves from social politics, as is the case in rehabilitative 
Shakespeares. See: “Cross cultural Shakespeare: Akira Kurosawa Reading Shakespeare” in A Concise 
Companion to Shakespeare on Screen, ed. Diana Henderson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 155-175, 158.  
4 For more information on the Hobart program, see: http://www.hobartshakespeareans.org. 
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film takes its name, offers the children in Los Angeles’s Hobart Elementary a space off 
the street, a place to go when school is out and where Shakespeare is always in. In the 
process of witnessing the efforts of these children to work against systems of race- and 
class-based systems of inequality, the film explicitly challenges the spectator to question 
the identity-based criteria in which we imagine the possibility of upward social mobility.  
While The Hobart Shakespeareans centers on the attempts of one instructor to 
help students decontextualize from their local, urban Los Angeles community-based 
identity in exchange for a broader American citizenship, the other film I examine here, 
My Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet for a New Generation (dir. Michael Waldman, 2005), 
follows the efforts of aspiring director Patterson Joseph as he works with primarily Afro-
British young adults to negotiate a performance of Shakespeare that speaks more directly 
to their current local environment, the impoverished town of Harlesden in the greater 
London area. Under Joseph’s tutelage, the urban community comes together in the space 
of the theater to explore what a Harlesden Shakespeare might look like and how it might 
compare to the time held English tradition of staging Shakespeare. In the process, the 
film challenges the spectator to question the ethnic and class-based modes of evaluation 
that structure social understandings of particular productions of Shakespearean theater as 
“legitimate,” and by extension, those assumed “illegitimate” or socially unsanctioned.  
 Both films represent the figure of Shakespeare as a technology of the self: a 
signifying system by which individuals come to know themselves and identify as 
subjects. Foucault explains that technologies of the self “permit individuals to effect by 
their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own 
bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in 
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order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”5 
What appears at first glance as a relatively radical social activist project offering 
marginalized youth communities increased resources to aid in their ability to navigate 
social space—namely, the cultural capital imbued in the figure of Shakespeare—is, in 
effect, an aggressively disciplinary project based upon normative categories of national 
identity. As I will discuss in what follows, it is not so much that the subjects learn what it 
means to identify as authentically and legitimately American or British; rather, the 
youthful subjects learn how to identify in these nationalistic ways. There follows the 
imperative that they now must also perform these national identities if they are to 
navigate social space in a way that signifies their rehabilitative success.  
 Signification, however, requires difference. In both films, the process of 
rehabilitation projects normative identity within nationalistic terms; but nationality is a 
conceptual mode of identity that cannot signify as essentially given or as a stable 
ontology.6 Benedict Anderson has famously defined nation as “an imagined political 
community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”7 Nations are 
socially constructed systems of identification and disidentification, systems of 
psychological recognition (that is, individual identification with an imagined communal 
body) that operate on a social level. If nationality is to signify as an ideal and disciplinary 
                                                
5 Foucault differentiates technologies of the self from three related technologies—those of production, sign 
systems, and domination—but notes that each operates in hermeneutical relation to one another. With the 
technology of the self, in other words, comes technologies of domination, or a mode of social discipline. 
See: Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and 
Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18.  
6 This concept has been examined by a series of scholars who bring the ideologies of nationality in 
productive conversation with queer theory. See, in particular: Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman, 
“Queer Nationality” in Fear of a Queer Plant, ed. Michael Warner (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993) 193-229; Robert Caserio, “Queer Passions, Queer Nationality: Some Novels about the State of 
the American Nation, 1946-1954” in Modern Fiction Studies 43.1 (1997): 170-205; and Lisa Duggan, 
“Queering the State” in Social Text 39.2 (1994): 1-14. 
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983) 6. 
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subject category, it requires a supplement to signify its normativity: it requires a referent 
of non-normativity. The Hobart Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare position the non-
normative point of resistance with material and spatial terms. The urban street signifies a 
space of social contamination, that which has mimetically contributed to the 
impoverished and endangered state of Esquith’s and Joseph’s students. The programs of 
rehabilitation, then, work to supplant one system of mimetic power—that associated with 
urban street life—for another—Shakespearean theater.  
The process of rehabilitating nationalism in the name of Shakespeare requires 
dislocation. But as a process, dislocation also prioritizes space within hierarchical 
systems of valuation and propriety, systems of cultural value that the films purport to call 
into question. The subjects of rehabilitation work within a dialectical negotiation of 
becoming and unbecoming: unbecoming a product of local and site-specific urban 
cultures in exchange for the ability to perform a more appropriate version of the national 
subject. Yet the films also go to great lengths to frame the localized urban street within 
cinematic semiotics of socially marginalized systems of racial, ethnic, and class identity. 
The forms of mimetic transformation that performing and identifying by Shakespeare 
take in the name of rehabilitated nationality, as I will argue, belatedly project ethnic- and 
class-based identities as the non-normative point of being that subjects must resist. The 
films construct non-normative identity as an anachronistic byproduct that serves to justify 
their simultaneously disciplinary and liberatory nationalization of marginalized subjects.8 
                                                
8 Let me mark more clearly that, in my following analysis, I am interested in the representation of the 
rehabilitative subject and the psychological and social effects that Shakespeare-based rehabilitation 
programs claim to have. In the following chapter I also extend this analysis to the psychological and social 
effects rehabilitative Shakespeare imagine to have on the spectator audience. I am not, however, interested 
in psychologizing marginalized subject, program facilitators, or the spectator.  
35 
This double move of resistance and recapitulation places stress on the liberatory 
fantasies on which the discourse of rehabilitation is built. The investment in mimetic 
identification, so programmatic in rehabilitative Shakespeares, places the concept of 
transformation as the primary characteristic of rehabilitative success, but the 
transformations that occur take vastly different forms than those authorized by the 
programs. These audio-visual artifacts go to great lengths to explain, however perversely 
and paradoxically, how mimesis operates in the performance of rehabilitation. Yet, their 
explanations fall far short, and cannot account for their programmatically queer temporal 
structure of producing simultaneously self-possessed and self-negating subjects that 
emerge from the process of rehabilitation. Which begs the questions that organize my 
analysis in this chapter: how is mimesis imagined to operate in Shakespeare rehabilitation 
programs? And how do these operations come to be encoded in rehabilitative 
Shakespeares?9  
 The representations of dramatic mimesis organizing these rehabilitative narratives 
are framed in systems of fascination and anxiety strikingly reminiscent of early modern 
debates over theater’s potential to transform actors and spectators, for better or worse.10 
Both the films and early modern theatrical and anti-theatrical debates encounter a similar 
crux: what cultural work does mimesis perform? The controversy over the Elizabethan 
and Jacobean English theater centered on a discussion of the relationship between 
performance and being, and the power of mimesis to affect this relationship.  
                                                
9 Throughout this dissertation I refer to the effect of Shakespeare-based rehabilitation. I refer explicitly to 
the effects of the media artifacts of rehabilitative Shakespeares only, not the “true” or “actual” outcomes of 
the programs as they operate in social space. Although this dissertation concerns itself with the social, I 
refrain from sociological methodologies.  
10 For a brilliant discussion of the cultural anxieties fueling the debates, see: Jean E. Howard, The Stage and 
Social Struggle in Early Modern England (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), especially chapter 
three, “Antitheatricality Staged,” 47-73.  
36 
The two primary mimetic models in the early modern period are those of Plato 
and Aristotle.11 In The Republic, Plato denounces the poet as an imitator who possesses 
through the power of art the potential to deceive the naïve reader. Three degrees of 
separation prevent the artist from providing an authentic representation: the ethereal form 
of an object, the physical manifestation of an object, and knowledge of the physical 
manifestation. An artist merely copies the surface of an object, working on the level of 
mere appearance without an awareness of that object’s fuller substance. Thus, for Plato, 
the artist is an “imitator [who] will neither know nor have right opinion about what he 
imitates relative to its excellence or vice.”12 While it attempts to claim truth as its 
domain, for Plato, art as a process of imitation is a deceptive but essentially superficial 
and imperfect enterprise. Theater possesses a particularly corruptive potential because of 
its dependence upon spectacle. It deceives the audience into sympathizing with those who 
grieve excessively, who lust inappropriately, who laugh at base things, all vicariously. 
Within this system of vicariousness lies the primary danger: the enjoyment the audience 
feels in indulging these emotions can transfer to their own lives and ultimately transform 
the theater-goer in the grotesque sorts of people they saw on stage or heard about in epic 
poetry.  
The anti-theatricalists adopt Plato’s model of mimesis in their attacks on the 
theater.13 For instance, in Histriomastix (1633), a diatribe against plays, actors, 
                                                
11 Though Aristotle’s Poetics was not published until the mid-sixteenth century (and even then it was 
available only in Latin and Italian), Horace’s Ars Poetica was widely available and had assimilated 
Aristotle’s notion of mimetic action. See: Brian Vickers, “Introduction” in English Renaissance Literary 
Criticism (Oxford 1999), 11-12.  
12 Plato’s Republic, trans. R.E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 336. 
13 For a general overview of Platonic anti-theatricalism, see: Jonas Barish, “The Platonic Foundation” in 
The Anti-Theatrical Prejudice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 5-37; and Anne Melberg, 
“Plato’s Mimesis” in Theories of Mimesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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playwrights, and spectators, William Prynne expresses social concern about theater’s 
counterfeit nature:  
If we seriously consider the very forme of acting Playes, we must needs 
acknowledge it be nought else but grosse hypocrisie. All things are 
counterfeited, feined, dissembled; nothing really or sincerely acted. 
Players are always counterfeiting, representing the persons, habits, offices, 
callings, parts, conditions, speeches, actions, lives; the passions, 
affections, the anger, hatred, cruelty, love, revenge, dissentions; yea, the 
very vices, sinnes, and lusts; the adulteries, incests, rapes, murthers, 
tyrannies, thefts, and such like crimes of other men, of other sexes, of 
other creatures; yea, oft-times of the Divell himselfe, and Pagan Divell-
gods. the whole action of Playes is nought else but feining, but 
counterfeiting, but palpable hypocrisie and dissimulation which God, 
which men abhorre: therefore it must needs be sinfull.14 
 
For Prynne, theater’s representation of the world is degraded by the base imitative nature 
of the plays and the players. He goes beyond Plato in demonizing the act of 
counterfeiting. But like Plato, he fears what these false representations induce in the 
imaginations of spectators. For several anti-theatricalists, the falsity of theatrical 
representation catalyzes a blurring of categorical difference that threatens the very values 
that constitute Englishness. In The Schoole of Abuse (1579), Stephen Gosson imagines 
England at wartime and the particularly destructive force of the Poet to national security: 
“If the enemy beseege us, cut off our victuals, prevent forrain aide, girt in the city, & 
bring the Ramme to ye walles, it is not Ciceroes tongue that can peerce their armour to 
wound the body, nor Archimedes prickes, & lines, & circles, & triangles, & Rhombus, & 
rifferaffe, that hath any force to drive them backe.”15 Gosson offers an apocalyptic vision 
of mimesis here: poets weaken the nation in their morbid fascination with appearances 
and their distance from reality. The endpoint of poetry, Gosson warns, could result in the 
violent destruction of England.  
                                                
14 William Prynne, Histriomastix. (London, 1633) sig. X3v. 
15 Stephen Gosson, The Schoole of Abuse (London: F. Shoberl, 1577) sigs. D8r-D8v. 
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In a radically different representation of mimetic power, Aristotle’s model 
positions imitation as a tool for teaching virtuous behavior. In his Poetics, poetry 
becomes a pedagogical tool that defines humanity: 
Poetry in general seems to have sprung from two causes, both natural 
ones. First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, 
one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most 
imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest 
lessons; and it is also natural to delight in imitations….Objects which in 
themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when 
reproduced with minute fidelity. The cause of this again is, that to lean is 
gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to philosopher but to men in general; 
whose capacity, however, of learning is more limited. Thus the reason 
why men enjoy seeing a likeness is that in contemplating it they find 
themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, “Ah, that is he.” For 
if you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to 
the imitation as such, but to the execution, the coloring, or some such 
other cause.16 
 
This model provides the backbone of the defenses of poetry and theater. In Defence of 
Poesie (1595), Philip Sidney defines poetry as “an art of imitation, for so Aristotle termed 
it in his word mimesis, that is to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth—to 
speak metaphorically, a speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight.”17 The 
Aristotelian model also figures in Thomas Heywood’s somewhat belated defense of 
theater, An Apology for Actors (1612):  
If we present a Tragedy, we include the fatall and abortive ends of such as 
commit notorious murders, which is aggravated and acted with all the Art 
that may be, to terrifie men from the like abhorred practices. Either the 
vertues of our Country-men are extolled, or their vices reproved. [We do 
this] either animating men to noble attempts, or attaching the consciences 
of the spectators, finding themselves toucht in preventing the vices of 
others. If a morall, it is to perswade men to humanity of good life, to 
instruct them in civility and good manners, shewing them the fruits of 
honesty, and the end of villany.18 
  
                                                
16 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. S.H. Butcher (New York: Hill and Wang, 1961), 5-6. 
17 Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie (London: James Roberts, 1595), sig. C2v. 
18 Thomas Heywood, An Apology for Actors (Nicholas Okes: London, 1612), sig. F4v. 
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Sidney’s “speaking picture,” though not originally referencing the theater, provides an 
apt metaphor for the stage. Hamlet famously instructs his company of players not to 
overact but to perform as theater intends, “whose end, both at the first show and now, 
was and is, to / hold as ‘twere the mirror up to nature” (21-22). The trope of “copy as 
mirror” figures prominently in both Plato and Aristotle and is a ubiquitous image in early 
modern literature and drama. Texts place a mirror before the reader; the text-as-mirror 
functions both as a mirror of the world and also a mirror whereby readers may see 
themselves reflected back, recognize their faults, and correct those faults in the pursuit of 
virtuous behavior.19 For Heywood, the mirroring effect of theater teaches civility and 
potentially inspires appropriate nationalism on the part of the spectator. Thus, the 
spectator becomes the performer in the space of theater; dramatic mimesis blurs the line 
between the subject and object on stage and off. Theater for Heywood, then, is always 
already nationally inflected and holds the power to fashion the national subject into the 
ideal image. 
 Central to a discussion on rehabilitative Shakespeares is the question of how the 
transformative potential of dramatic mimesis comes to be articulated and rearticulated as 
a coincidental discourse that bridges the early modern and the contemporary moment. 
The performance of rehabilitation, then, bears witness to the coinhabitation of two 
historical junctures that meet at the mutual anxiety over the possibility of performance to 
                                                
19 For a discussion of four basic ways in which the literary trope worked, see Herbert Grabes, “A Typology 
of Works Bearing Mirror-Titles” in The Mutable Glass, trans. Gordon Collier (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 38-63. For deliberations on early modern mirror technology and the implications 
this has for the mirror metaphor, see: Adam Max Cohen, “Shakespeare’s Hall of Mirrors” in Shakespeare 
and Technology: Dramatizing Early Modern Technological Revolutions (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 151-
70; Christian Billing, “The Distorting Mirror.” Refiguring Mimesis: Representation in Early Modern 
Literature, eds. Jonathan Holmes and Adrian Streete (Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2005) 
137-59; and Arthur F. Kinney, “Shakespeare’s Mirrors” in Shakespeare’s Webs (New York: Routledge, 
2004), 1-33. 
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affect identity in unauthorized and unanticipated ways. In other words, The Hobart 
Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare offer a contemporary meditation on an early 
modern anxiety.20 Mimesis is fractured along local and national lines and at the 
ambivalent point of the ability of performance to reveal the dynamic potential of the 
subject. Successful performances of dramatic mimesis depend upon kinesis, or the 
performance of dynamism. These films dramatize the efforts of subjects to rehabilitate by 
Shakespeare, as well as navigate the various models of the power of theater.  
 The dual modes of mimetic identification operate as parallel structures, and 
produce compounding possibilities by which subjects might conceive of themselves in 
relation to Shakespeare. But these possibilities are also confounding in that they threaten 
to unravel the systems of legibility by which rehabilitative transformation culturally 
signifies. In the performance of rehabilitating by Shakespeare, mimetic desire for 
identification—to identify with socio-cultural systems of power and the desire to be 
identified or made intelligible by these systems—depends upon a perverse mode of 
subjectivity built upon dialectics of discontinuity and conflict, resistance and acceptance, 
coercion and consent. The pursuits of rehabilitating a subject (that is, the process of 
allowing a subject to embody a mode of psychologically and socially intelligible 
subjectivity) depend up that subject’s ability to queerly signify across fractured lines of 
identification, at once individual and communal, a product of the street and of the nation, 
a reproduction of the identification and disidentification with multiple and conflicting 
ideologies. The way these conflicting theories of representation and mimetic 
                                                
20 Like a haunting demand to “remember me” (Hamlet I.iv.91), early modern anxieties over the place of the 
theater in cultural reproduction inflect rehabilitative Shakespeares in their desire to make the claim that 
embodied performance effects. All quotes form Shakespeare throughout this dissertation are taken from 
The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Group, 
1997).  
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identification underwrite the phenomenon of rehabilitative Shakespeares today, I suggest, 
registers contemporary ideologies of what is means to signify as an authentic and 
legitimate subject. The dual and contradictory models of mimesis at play in The Hobart 
Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare function with the mutual goal of registering a 
subject’s ability to cross-identify—that is, to identify across conceptual and culturally 
determined boundaries of identity, like race, ethnicity, and class, as well as geographical 
and conceptual boundaries of nationality.  
 The sense of self these films produce is one of co-location and diffuse agency, a 
subjectivity of infinite forms and possibilities—in other words, a mode of subjectivity 
that signifies as a queerly conceptualized spatial and temporal position.  This, however, is 
not the subject position authorized by the rehabilitative project, but rather one that 
emerges, much like the belated construction of non-normativity, as a byproduct of the 
system of signification within which rehabilitation conceptually and cinematically 
signifies. It is the programmatic queerness of rehabilitation as both a cultural 
performance of transformative subjective possibility and as a mechanism of disciplinary 
power that places as imperative a demand on rehabilitation to signify as an efficacious 
use of Shakespeare, as rehabilitation places on the subject in process to signify 
normatively. Queer becomes the unauthorized effect of rehabilitation that, in turn, 
requires that rehabilitation belatedly construct the non-normative as a means of stabling 
its system of signification. Thus, in my analysis of the programmatic process of 
rehabilitative nationality, I begin with the construction of the non-normative.  
 
 
Contextualizing Rehabilitation 
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 To rehabilitate by Shakespeare is to embody the transformative power of 
performance. In the process of literary-cultural ownership—claiming identification with 
the Shakespearean playtext and specific characters as a means of claiming individual and 
communal identity—the process of individuation initiates the subject of rehabilitation.21 
Through the process of identifying as an individual who belongs to a larger cultural 
community, the subject is reborn, refashioned, rehabilitated. Such programmatic beliefs 
position knowledge not as a mode of cognition but rather as practical activity: the ability 
to navigate cultural performances demanded in and by various social contexts, from acts 
of individuation to those that foster a sense community formation. Inherent in this model 
of performance is the mediation between knowledge and being, and the ways in which 
modes of contextualization can reformulate this relation.   
A two-fold investment in psychological and social transformation links the 
individual and the communal on the level of performativity: the ways in which habitual 
behaviors and actions (or performances) affect and are affected by culturally sanctioned 
ideologies of identity, or how particular beings properly act out particular states of being. 
In Bodies that Matter, Judith Butler argues that a body comes to matter—to materialize 
and to mean, to be situated and to signify—as a belated effect of discourses surrounding 
that body’s origins, its transformation, and its potentiality. A body’s means of mattering, 
or the ways in which bodies come to be intelligible, is not given but constructed. Butler 
                                                
21 In his Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare and Popular Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), Robert Shaughnessy writes, “When the transmission and appropriation 
of Shakespeare are at stake, considerations of taste and aesthetic value are also bound up with inevitably 
vexed questions of cultural ownership, educational attainment and class, and with issues of who the desired 
and actual consumers of ‘popular’ Shakespeare may be, who these hope to include, and who they don’t” 
(2). The question of cultural ownership inevitably follows (haunts, perhaps) any mode of adapting, 
reimagining, and revising Shakespeare; for rehabilitative Shakespeares, however, the process of cultural 
ownership becomes the primary concept on which questions of Shakespeare’s function in popular culture 
programmatically return.  
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identifies the production of the body’s intelligibility at the site of performativity, or the 
“specific modality of power as discourse.”22 Bodies come to matter in the process of 
rehabilitation by mattering differently. Because a subject enters into rehabilitation, there 
follows a belief that the subject once signified inappropriately, performed unsuccessfully, 
and through an engagement with the playtext and with Shakespeare, that subject can 
come to perform selfhood in a way that is socially legible, or legitimate. Again, 
transformation is the key element, and is always predicated on the establishment of 
distance from the subject’s origin (in this case, the point of being he or she performed 
upon entering into the rehabilitation program). But that fantastical point of origin always 
circulates within the economy of transformation, as that which legitimizes change while 
also inescapably linking the subject to its past.  
The possibility of rehabilitating by Shakespeare presupposes that the subject is 
socially constructed and that subjectivity is malleable. It also presupposes that an 
appropriate contextualization stands alongside—and specifically outside—an 
inappropriate one. The discursive construction of the rehabilitated subjects in The Hobart 
Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare depends upon the concept of performing 
differently, or articulating the performance of spatial identification with the urban street 
as differentiated with the performance of identifying as a national subject. If the 
performance of rehabilitation depends upon both the possibility and necessity of a 
subject’s entrance into a more appropriate context, then the very process of 
contextualization always involves a recontextualization as well as a decontextualization. 
Thus the subject must first be decontextualized from the socio-cultural structures—the 
                                                
22 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 
187. 
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urban street—that previously informed a sense of self. The subject must move from 
outside in, into a socially acceptable identity. That which has formerly been internalized, 
must be rejected for rehabilitation as a cultural performance to successfully operate 
within the frameworks by which it structures itself. To understand the discursive 
construction of the rehabilitated subject, then, it is first necessary to understand the 
context of origin (in these cases, the spatial materiality of the urban street) and how that 
point of origin is constructed and imagined to operate within the rehabilitative economy.  
The opening sequence of The Hobart Shakespeareans establishes the film’s 
formulaic treatment of Los Angeles as a spatial threat not only to the rehabilitative aims 
of the film but also, and more sensationally, to the students’ lives. The film’s cinematic 
style adopts the familiar documentary convention of pastiche, which registers clearly in 
the introductory sequence. It opens with brief interview sequences with Esquith’s 
students who explain that before working with the Hobart Shakespeareans program they 
had either never heard of Shakespeare or never understood what the playtexts were about. 
In a particularly adorable moment, one of Esquith’s students claims, “First when I read 
Hamlet, I didn’t know what it meant, but Raif kept explain us, like five times, like every 
time, and now I got it.” These young students are so effervescent with the excitement of 
reading and performing Shakespeare that they repeatedly choke through their 
testimonials, their words unable to match the real life adventures they try to describe. It’s 
easy to get caught up in the excitement. These are students that some of us dream about: 
students who are so eager to learn that it’s difficult to match their enthusiasm. The film 
moves to quick images of the student’s final performance of Hamlet. We see the students 
huddled together as they cheer “Will Power!” (the group motto in the Hobart 
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Shakespeareans) and prepare to take the stage. Then: fade to black. The camera shifts to 
an image of the Los Angeles cityscape shot in an overhead panoramic perspective. As the 
title of the documentary enters as paratext writ large across the Los Angeles urban 
sprawl, the camera pans down to reveal the industrial landscape of East Los Angeles, 
which is visually chocked with a thick layer of smog. The overhead shot and 
accompanying helicopter sound effects visually and auditorily mark Los Angeles within 
semiotics of danger, crime, and surveillance.  
The opening sequence establishes the tone of overexposure and physical threat 
associated with the urban street that will weave throughout the film. At one point, Hobart 
Elementary enters into lockdown just as the school lets out because an unknown assailant 
opens fires mere blocks form the school. What is most striking in this moment is the 
students’ reaction. They appear unfazed by the violence of the situation, and routinely 
settle in to their seats to await the announcement that they may leave. Later in the film, 
the camera documents Esquith’s morning commute to Hobart Elementary, and as he 
drives through the streets of Los Angeles he points to various dilapidated and ominous-
looking industrial buildings that make the area appear more like a war zone than a 
community. Esquith explains, “When I began teaching here twenty years ago it was a 
poor neighborhood. These days it’s a poor neighborhood and it’s also a rough 
neighborhood, and it makes it very difficult for the students going to school there.” 
Hobart Elementary is one of the largest schools in the U.S. and is situated in the heart of 
downtown Los Angeles, an area known for high numbers of undocumented immigrants, 
an equally high crime rate, and a low socio-economic status. Yet The Hobart 
Shakespeareans promises hope. In the midst of such a sprawling landscape so saturated 
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with urban violence, there exists something special, if only we know where to look. The 
camera helps us with this project of discovery by zooming in from the panoramic 
perspective of Los Angeles to an overhead shot of the Hobart Elementary schoolyard.  
The camera movement represents the students of the Hobart Shakespeareans 
program as situated in their local urban context, while also implying that they are 
somehow different, unique, special, and their trials worth watching. These children 
devote endless hours to Esquith’s Shakespeare curriculum. They voluntarily attend the 
Hobart Shakespeareans program after school and on most weekends. They spend tireless 
hours in rehearsal, constructing the sets for the final production, and learning to play 
musical instruments so that they can create a multimodal performance for their audience. 
And, as the opening sequence blatantly claims, these children are working against 
incredible odds. In an area in which walking home from school can be a life threatening 
act, these fifth graders strive to create art and classical entertainment in the face of such 
adversity. The film documents the real life experiences of these students through a 
melodramatic lens. Because the term melodrama carries with it a history of pejorative use 
based on specifically gendered-terms,23 let me be clear here that I refer to melodrama as a 
rhetorical strategy that articulates an imagined struggle between moral forces in the 
modern world. This stratagem uses heightened emotional, visual, and stylistic language to 
convey and articulate moral dilemmas.24 Linda William’s work on melodrama is useful 
                                                
23 Some of the contemporary monikers for melodramatic films include: tear-jerkers, women’s films, and 
chick flicks. For a discussion on the pejorative and gendered treatments of melodrama, see: Christine 
Gledhill, Home is Where the Heart Is (London: British Film Institute, 1984), and Mary Ann Doane, The 
Desire to Desire: The Woman's Film of the 1940s (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 
24 For definitions of melodrama in film, see: Peter Brook, Melodramatic Imagination (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995); Christine Gledhill, “Rethinking Genre” in Reinventing Film Studies, eds. Christine 
Gledhill and Linda Williams (London: Hodder Arnold Publication, 2000) 221-43; and Linda Williams, 
“Melodrama Revisited” in Reconfiguring American Film Genres: History and Theory, ed. Nick Browne 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998) 42–88. 
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here. Williams argues that the anxiety over melodrama lies in its dependence upon affect, 
which is critically positioned as an antagonist to cinematic reality. But as she explains, 
“supposedly realistic cinematic effects—whether of setting, action, acting, or narrative 
motivation—most often operate in the service of melodramatic affects.”25 She suggests 
that melodrama is less a genre than a modality or an expressive code that cuts across 
always tenuous and culturally bound generic taxonomies. The documentary genre is no 
exception. Williams notes, “[i]n cinema, the mode of melodrama defines a broad 
category of moving pictures that move us to pathos for protagonists beset by forces more 
powerful than they and who are perceived as victims.”26 The opening sequence of The 
Hobart Shakespeareans clearly formulates the relation between the local context of Los 
Angeles, and the victimization of youth communities within analogous terms. Thus, a 
move toward grounding the reality of pathos necessarily calls attention to the narrative 
construction of the protagonist’s context, as well as the role of the spectator in bearing 
witness to the children’s attempts to break free from the bondage of local identification. 
 There is also a distinctly ethnographic logic to the construction of urban reality in 
The Hobart Shakespeareans.27 It withholds the use of traditional semiotics of Los 
Angeles to situate the geographical context of these students. There are no shots of the 
Hollywood sign or picturesque shots of Venice beach. In fact, the absence of clichéd 
signs of the city is as conspicuous as it is telling of the cinematic effect to which the 
                                                
25 Williams, “Melodrama Revisited,” 42. 
26 Ibid. 
27 This is not to say that The Hobart Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare qualify as ethnographic films. 
Karl G. Heider has made the claim that “all films are ‘ethnographic’: they are about people” (4); but both 
films stray from Jay Ruby’s definition of what distinguishes a documentary film from a properly 
ethnographic one are still widely accepted in the world of documentary filmmaking, and these films fail to 
satisfy those criteria. Rather, the use of ethnographic technique demonstrates the unstable relation between 
reality and drama in these films. See: Hedier’s Ethnographic Film (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2006) and Ruby’s Picturing Culture: Explorations of Film and Anthropology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000). 
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construction of urban reality hopes to have on the audience. The opening sequence of The 
Hobart Shakespeareans offers an alternate view of the city. The difference is in the 
documentation. It purports to record the dirty, gritty truth of Los Angeles, which marks 
the physical facade of condemned storefronts, outdated billboards, and abandoned dirt 
lots in architectonics of urban disrepair. This is a sober Los Angeles, told like it is, 
without the glitz of Hollywood filmmaking to suture over the dangers of the Hollywood 
area itself. Documentary film has often been referred to as a “discourse of sobriety,”28 
with the assumption that it divulges information (in its most objective form) about reality 
and any use of expressive devices is supposed to be on the terms dictated by the subject 
matter; it is more about content, subject matter, and information than about form, style, or 
spectator pleasure; it is more real than fictive.29 To paraphrase Lacan, the desire for the 
“real” is the desire for absence by which the possibility of presence is affirmed while yet 
restating loss, absence itself. The play of the presence and absence of the real tantalizes, 
offers the structure of desires its insatiable drive. Documentary generically traffics in the 
play of presence and absence. As documentary theorist Michael Renov notes, “every 
documentary claims for itself an anchorage in history; the referent of the nonfiction sign 
is meant to be a piece of the world…once available to experience in the everyday.”30 The 
process of representing documented reality, then, presumes the existence of a profilmic 
event, or a reality in front of the camera whose spatial and temporal integrity filmmakers 
                                                
28 The term was first introduced by Bill Nichols in Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in 
Documentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) and has since circulated widely in critical 
discussions of the genre. 
29 However, Michael Renov has brilliantly argued that documentary, as well as other modes of nonfiction 
film, “contains any number of ‘fictive’ elements, moments at which a presumably objective representation 
of the world encounters the necessity of creative intervention…[w]ith regard to the complex relations 
between fiction and the documentary, it might be said that the two domains inhabit one another.” See his 
introduction to Theorizing Documentary (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) 2-3.  
30 Michael Renov, “Toward a Poetics of Documentary” in Theorizing Documentary, ed. Michael Renov 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1993), 12-36. 31.  
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strive preserve as much as possible, a space of truth and reality outside the frameworks of 
representation and outside of the celluloid frame..31 The ethnographic promise in The 
Hobart Shakespeareans to offer an alternate, and thus more real than reel representation 
of Los Angeles, preconditions the reality of the rehabilitative scene as a type of spectator 
seduction. 
The cinematic semiotics of reality in My Shakespeare more aggressively construct 
the melodrama of urban street life within a structure of spectator temptation. My 
Shakespeare follows the impulses of The Hobart Shakespeareans to frame the 
rehabilitation of street subjects by first representing the contextual reality of urban life as 
a spatial threat. The film deploys multiple exposition shots of the Harlesden urban scene 
within its pastiche opening sequence. It opens abruptly on a young man dressed in 
camouflage. Perched atop an industrial building that overlooks the city, he recites a 
spoken word/rap rewriting of the prologue of Romeo and Juliet:  
Two households, love between ‘em as cold as the South Pole,  
Their story is now told.  
Lend me ears and come close as drama just unfolds onto you.  
Capulet and Montague  
Claim indignity, a flaming infamy.  
But can’t they see their conceit and vanity leads to complete tragedy 
In this mad city of despair:  
Fair Harlesden. 
 
The rap prologue offers a seductive hint as to what “Harlesden Shakespeare” might look 
like, but the performance is little more than a tease at this point. In fact, by the end of the 
film, the spectator realizes that the rap prologue is staged for the opening sequence and 
                                                
31 The preservation of the profilmic reality is characteristic of many but not all mode of documentary 
filmmaking. The Hobart Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare, however, follow a primarily observational 
and expository mode of documentary filmmaking, attempting to unobtrusively observe the process of 
rehabilitating by Shakespeare, while also using interview sequences to persuade the view of the reality of 
the subject’s transformation.  
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never becomes part of the final performance. The Harlesden Romeo and Juliet, staged at 
the Royal Academy of Dramatic Arts and done in heritage language mixed with modern 
dress, reads like any other staging of the play. What we finally get by the film’s close is 
something of a “straight” Shakespeare.32 The rap prologue, then, functions in the larger 
film project as little more than cinematic “pillow talk.” 
 Having peaked the spectator’s interests, the opening sequence later features a 
brief interview of the director of the rehabilitative project, Patterson Joseph, as he 
explains his goals for the Harlesden community. The camera follows as he walks the 
Harlesden streets, which are equally crowded with people and portentous signage. A 
voiceover narrates, “Harlesden in Northwest London is where Patterson Joseph grew up. 
He has returned with an ambitious project in mind.” Before this project can be explained, 
however, the film draws the spectator’s attention to street signs through the use of 
multiple quick cuts, which juxtapose street traffic with commercial postings promising 
fast mortgages, even faster payday loans, and government plaques warning that the 
streets are policed by plain clothes officers. “Robbers Beware,” one sign reads. 
Combining these images with shots of locked storefronts, the film marks the urban street 
here as steeped in the social dangers of crime and poverty. Following the series of street 
signs and illegal commercial postings that mark Harlesden as a space of danger, Joseph 
explains that the rehabilitation program he has imagined offers the citizens of Harlesden 
an opportunity to dissociate themselves from their local surroundings. “When I was 
eighteen, I was a painfully shy boy,” he remembers. “I felt myself to be unimportant and 
                                                
32 Susanne Greenhalgh and Robert Shaughnessy argue, “[t]he rap prologue is a red herring: the Harlesden 
Romeo and Juliet is empathetically realist, text-centered and character-driven—typically English theater, 
we might say” (93). See: “Our Shakespeares: British Television and the Strains of Multiculturalism” in 
Screening Shakespeare in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Mark Thornton Burnett and Ramona Wray 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) 90-112. 
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uninteresting. And when I came across drama I suddenly found that I could express 
myself and be understood.”  Performing on stage offered Joseph not only a sense of self, 
but also and equally important to the filmic project, it offered him a way out, a chance to 
leave Harlesden behind. He later explains that he moved to London to pursue theater, and 
in his turning away from Harlesden he managed to shed the self-loathing and poor self-
esteem of his adolescence. More specifically, Joseph identifies Shakespeare as the 
catalyst: “Shakespeare’s changed me,” he explains, “and what I’m doing here, basically, 
is trying to encourage, excite, and maybe challenge the people I grew up with to do kind 
of the same: to get articulate, to say what they think, to have an opinion.” Joseph’s 
homecoming, then, has a specific purpose: to help the citizens of Harlesden instantiate a 
distance between themselves and the environment in which they have been raised.  
 
Queer Turns 
 While the opening sequence of My Shakespeare melodramatically constructs the 
urban street as the space of non-normative mimetic identification, it likewise troubles the 
degree to which the subjects of rehabilitation can actually distance themselves from that 
fantastical point of origin. Ending the opening sequence, the film quickly lapses into a 
hyper-kinetic and color saturated montage sequence that uses split screen and double 
exposure. Clips from the cast’s final performance of Romeo and Juliet share frames with 
exposition shots of Harlesden, as the dual contexts of the street and the theater blur 
together to form a single, queerly palimpsestic cinematic space. Images of the cast’s final 
curtain call, for instance, share exposure with shots of crumbling brick walls and exposed 
rebar. Romeo and Juliet’s “palmer’s kiss” mixes with a long shot of low-income housing 
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projects. The subject of rehabilitation reads as a palimpsest, at once conditioned by the 
urban street origin and the theatrical space of rehabilitation. In other words, the end point 
of the rehabilitative project—the final performance—carries with it the visual remainder 
of the street, just as the opening montage cannot represent the street without alluding to 
the final performance. As with any palimpsest, the visual formulation of the subject as 
spatially and temporally caught between origin and transformation calls into question the 
very delineation of the origin.  
 The melodramatic reality-effect of the urban street operates in The Hobart 
Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare by establishing an imperative of dislocation within 
the performance of rehabilitation. By analogizing urban disrepair with moral despair, the 
films make the argument that Esquith’s and Joseph’s students exist within deadly systems 
of mimetic identification with their local environments. Esquith’s students candidly 
discuss drug use among their parents and siblings, and the number of family members 
they know to be in prison. In My Shakespeare, the amateur actors discuss gang wars in 
which they’ve participated. One cast member nonchalantly recounts a recent knife fight 
he had with another Harlesden youth.  The films draw the implication that if the students 
have any hope of futurity, they must turn away from the urban street on which their 
initiation into the rehabilitative scene is predicated. It must be realized as an othered 
space against which the subject of rehabilitation must work to dislocate. Julia Kristeva’s 
theory of abjection helps to clarify the ways in which these films represent the space of 
the street within the economy of rehabilitation. Kristeva describes abjection as part of the 
process of psychically creating an individuated identity. It is a “struggle [that] fashions 
the human being, the mimesis, by means of which he becomes homologous to another in 
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order to become himself.”33 In order to distinguish between the self and the not-self, 
boundaries must be established between the self and those elements of the self which will 
come to occupy an abject space, that which is designated as “other” or the not-self. In the 
process of making those boundaries, the abject object becomes one of distance and 
disgust. Abjection marks boundaries and, as such, anything or one considered foreign to 
the self becomes cordoned off in the space of abjection. However, abjection is a perverse 
process because of its borderlessness, its ambiguousness, and its ability to draw attention 
to the fragility of the construction of difference. She explain, “The abject is perverse 
because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule, or a law, but turns them 
aside, misleads, corrupts, uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them.”34  
 But as the montage sequence in My Shakespeare suggest, the urban street will 
always mark rehabilitative performances in these films as an inescapable and haunting 
remainder. The subject’s past—past home space and past history as street subject—
circulates within the rehabilitative economy as a haunting abject, the return of the 
dislocated other, variously acknowledged but left unarticulated. The urban street can 
never be rejected or abjected; instead, the process of dislocation marks the reality of the 
street as the crucial marker of rehabilitative success. According to Derrida, every concept 
contains the trace of its opposite, and mutual contamination between opposing concepts 
is unavoidable.35 In the concept of rehabilitation, this oppositional difference is more than 
                                                
33 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, trans Leon S. Roudiez (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1982), 
13. 
34 Ibid, 15. 
35 In his elaboration on différance in Speech and Phenomena (trans. D. Allison, Evanston: Northwest 
University Press, 1973), Derrida offers: “Différance is what makes the movement of signification possible 
only if each element that is said to be ‘present,’ appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something 
other than itself but retains the mark of a past element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of 
its relation to a future element. This trace relates no less to what is called the future than to what is called 
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unavoidable: it is necessary. The process of rehabilitation must continually posit the point 
of urban street origin as a means of gauging successful dislocation. Thus, the children in 
The Hobart Shakespeareans and the teenage and young adults in My Shakespeare are 
cinematically positioned in a paradoxical relation to the urban street. They are at once 
products of their local environment, while also distanced from that environment as 
differentiated. But this sense of distance rebounds on the subject, threatening to erase 
difference in the very process of establishing it. And it is this process that will carry the 
subject into the future: that teleological point so coveted but never reached by 
rehabilitation. These subjects will always be part of the street, by virtue of their material 
manifestation on celluloid, always accessible for the film viewer. The street will always 
construct the rehabilitated subject in these documentaries, just as the documentaries will 
have always already constructed the street as the site of the privileged encounter between 
Shakespeare and marginalized subjects who would be saved by Shakespeare. 
 The complex and paradoxical localized identity of the subject of rehabilitation as 
both within and without the urban context registers within a queer spatial and temporal 
logic. As I outline in the introduction, I use the term queer subjectivity to refer to a 
rehabilitative sense of self that simultaneously and aggressively occupies normative and 
non-normative identity positions. The queer temporal logic arises as a result of queer 
spatial occupation in these particular films. In belatedly occupying a non-normative 
identity position tied to the local, the causal and teleological sense of disciplinary 
transformation doubles back on itself as a reiterative and reiterating performance. Judith 
Halberstam offers a productive working framework for thinking about queer time and 
                                                                                                                                            
the past, and it continues what is called the present by this very relation to what it is not, to what it 
absolutely is not; that is, not even to a past or future considered as a modified present” (142-3). 
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space. In her analysis of the production of queer counter-cultures, she uses the term queer 
time to refer “to the place-making practices within postmodernism in which queer people 
engage and it also describes the new understandings of space enabled by the production 
of queer counterpublics,” while queer time, she explains, describes “those specific 
models of temporality that emerge within postmodernism once one leaves the temporal 
frames of bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity, risk/safety, and inheritance.”36 
But there is something seemingly contradictory about the operations of queer spatiality 
and temporality in the performance of rehabilitation. In the queer configuration of the 
urban scene, the normative structures of Los Angeles and London—crime and poverty—
are already established as non-normative points of resistance. The melodrama of these 
films lies, at least in part, in the assertion that the local threatens both physical and social 
death. In the struggle toward rehabilitating away from the urban street, the subject must 
come to recognize that the normative practices of the local register outside of the city in 
non-normative ways. Shots are fired, knives are drawn, and against all odds the subjects 
remain alive, ready to fight for a space of safety, to work toward a future, to strive for 
longevity. The queerness of rehabilitation as a psychological and social process places 
tension on the division between normative and nonnormative structures, and the effects 
such structures might have, queer or otherwise. Delineating either “normative” or “non-
normative” depends upon a temporally suspension of the subject’s rehabilitative process. 
                                                
36 Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 6. It’s 
worth noting that in her examination of the operations of queer time, Halberstam posit the local as the queer 
space par excellent on a metacritical level. In her introduction, she states, “the ‘local’ for postmodern 
geographers becomes the debased term in the binary, and their focus on the global, the abstract, and even 
the universal is opposed to the local with its associations with the concrete, the specific, the narrow, the 
empirical, and even the bodily” (11). In the performance of rehabilitation, however, the local becomes a 
belated and supplemental byproduct necessary (and necessarily failing) in the disciplinary desire to make 
the national signify as concrete, specific, and empirical. 
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Both categorical performances can only be understood within a supplementary logic as 
giving rise to the other.  
This struggle to recognize and negotiate what qualifies as a normative is precisely 
what makes a project about fifth graders performing Shakespeare sexy and exciting, 
worth watching.37 The Hobart Shakespeareans offers a sense of hope only insofar as the 
students in the Shakespeare program exist within a dangerous proximity to the street and 
as long as they strive for an identity position that elevates them above the debased plane 
of the street. Without this tension, what we see of their final performance of Hamlet 
might look strikingly similar to any other grade school performance of Shakespeare. In 
making this claim, I don’t mean to demean the struggles these students face in their real 
lives, in the lived experience of their daily trials; rather, I question my ability as a 
spectator to access a determinate understanding of the reality of these trials when they are 
represented to me as a belated effect of a fantastical Shakespearean engagement. In a 
documentary film that conspicuously organizes lived experience within a melodramatic 
narrative structure, the constructed relation between audience and the spectacle of reality 
becomes equally conspicuous, if not incredible suspicious. This film, like My 
Shakespeare, conditions spectator empathy, which raises the question of the role and 
effects such empathy performs in the larger rehabilitative projects played out in the name 
of Shakespeare. 
If the subject must be made to identify and disidentify with the street, then so, too, 
must the spectator. The melodrama of real life in these films blurs the distinction between 
                                                
37 On the cinematic strategies of Shakespeare adaptations, see: Mark Thornton Burnett and Romona Wray, 
eds. Screening Shakespeare in the Twenty-first Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006); 
Richard Burt, Shakespeare After Mass Media (New York: Palgrave, 2002); and Courtney Lehmann and 
Lisa A. Starks, “Introduction: Images of the ‘Reel’: Shakespeare and the Art of Cinema” in The Reel 
Shakespeare: Alternative Cinema and Theory (London: Associated University Press, 2002) 9-24. 
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the fictive and the real. The alternate ethnographies these films offer have the effect of 
making the familiar strange, a performance that situates the spectator in an uncanny 
position. Alternate urban reality serves a didactic function insofar as it teaches the viewer 
not to take representation for granted. The chiding message here is that Los Angeles and 
London are not the fantasy worlds that the silver screens of Beach Blanket Bingo and 
Mary Poppins would have one believe. Direct interviews with the subjects in the 
programs as they attest to the dangers of the city serve to highlight the absence of a fourth 
wall, that imagined space in which an audience might take a passive relation to the 
images represented. These representational techniques fall under the category of devices 
that Bertolt Brecht argues would potentially lead to a distancing effect 
(Verfremdungseffekt) “which prevents the audience from losing itself passively and 
completely in the character created by the actor, and which consequently leads the 
audience to be a consciously critical observer.”38  
However, herein lies the paradox: the lesson not to take representation for granted 
can only be taught through the use of representation. The duplication of reality is always 
a problematic process, one steeped in politics of identity and performance, seeing and 
knowing, differentiation between subject and object. In the attempt to “fix” on celluloid 
what lies before the camera, the process of selection (camera angle, technologies of split 
screen and double expose, the use of voiceover, etc.) will always intrude in the concept of 
objectivity. The resulting “reality,” thus, is always mediated: documented reality emerges 
as a result of multiple modes of intervention, from technologies of cinematic 
representation, to the creation of narrative structures that most adequately package reality 
for the aims of the arguments organizing the documentary. These interventions inevitably 
                                                
38 Brecht on Theatre, ed. and trans. John Willett (New York: Hill and Wang, 1964) 91. 
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come between the cinematic sign (what the spectator witnesses on screen) and the 
referent (that profilmic event that once existed in the world). And the ways in which these 
interventions are negotiated is as telling as the interventions themselves.  
Like the immigrant and at-risk youth and young adult communities in The Hobart 
Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare, the spectator becomes a subject of rehabilitation in 
these films. The audience is subjected to multiple and conflicting modes of mimetic 
power of the dramatic images. The films position the audience to perform in a mode of 
spectacle that Louis Althusser calls “internal distantiation,” or a virtual distancing. For 
Althusser, we look to art to perceive the world and the workings of ideology without 
necessarily knowing those workings: “What art makes us see, and therefore gives to us in 
the form of ‘seeing,’ ‘perceiving,” and ‘feeling,’ (which is not the form of knowing), is 
the ideology from which it is born, in which it bathes, from which it detaches itself as art, 
and which it alludes.”39 The virtual distance of art dramatizes the perception of ideology 
as “a retreat, an internal distantiation,” the effect of which makes us perceive “in some 
sense from the inside, by an internal distance, the very ideology in which [art] is held.”40 
Images of urban life exercise a mimetic power of representation on both the street subject 
and the spectator alike. The art of documenting rehabilitation—the manifestation of real 
bodies moving in real space and time with the hope of transforming from the inside of 
                                                
39 Louis Althusser, “A Letter on Art,” Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 2001) 151-55, 152. 
40 Ibid. Steven Mullaney relates Althusser’s use of literary example in his formation of “internal 
distantiation” to the theater, and more specifically, early modern modes of theater to which performances of 
rehabilitation discursively return: “Althusser’s examples are novelistic, but the situation he depicts is 
essentially dramatic, like the language he employs. Drama is the literary art of space, virtual or otherwise; it 
is the art that most concretely employs distance—literal, aesthetic, ideological, and historical—to bring 
reigning ideologies and cultural climates into view….The spatial metaphors of a later age do not always 
figure so prominently in the literal situations of the past, but Elizabethan drama took smatters of place and 
space, distance and displacement, quite seriously.” See: The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power 
in Renaissance England (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995) 52.  
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their deadly geographical contexts—demands of the spectator a paradoxically removed 
and critically distanced performance of empathizing objectively: sharing feelings with the 
rehabilitative other on the level of concrete reality by traversing subject and 
subject/object boundaries in the act of understanding the other’s position.  
 The project of empathetic objectivity, however, becomes as impossible to realize 
as the subject’s ability to reject the urban street context in the process of rehabilitation. 
For both depend upon a material manifestation of the relationship between (cinematic) 
language and acts, the interference and the interaction between the referent and the 
signifier: what Lacan refers to as “the Real.” For Lacan, the very notion of referentiality 
is an impossibility: unimaginable, indescribable, the Real is “the essential object which is 
not an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all 
categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence.”41 While Lacan’s Real remains the 
most elusive of the tripartite schema organizing consciousness (along with the Symbolic 
and the Imaginary),42 for the purposes of this project I want to stress Lacan’s insistence 
that the Real can be adequately localized in relation to discourse. 43 To offer a history of 
the Real, it is: “marked by symbolic nihilation,”44 “that which always returns to the same 
                                                
41 Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: Norton, 
1988), 164. 
42 Zizek has argued that Lacan’s account of the Real in the 1960s and 1970s begins to approach what, in the 
1950s, Lacan deems the Imaginary. He suggests that the immediate coincidence of opposite or even 
contradictory determinations is precisely what defines the Lacanian Real. See: The Sublime Object of 
Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 162, 171. 
43 Michael Walsh has made the claim in a recent and persuasive essay for the pertinence of the Lacanian 
Real for film studies. See: “Returns in the Real: Lacan and the Future of Psychoanalysis in Film Studies,” 
Post Scripts 14 (fall 1994 – spring 1995) 22-32. Michael Renov argues that documentary film has become 
an important means for both examining and constructing selfhood in the contemporary, media-saturated 
cultural moment, and that a mediation on the relation between death and mourning, and the Lacanian Real 
is crucial to such analysis, given the increasingly autobiographical quality and generic shifting of the 
documentary genre. See: The Subject of Documentary (University of Minnesota Press, 2004). 
44 Lacan, The Seminars of Jacques Lacan: Book III, trans. Russell Grieg (New York: Norton, 1993) 148.  
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place,”45 “being without alterity,”46 and “what resists symbolization absolutely…[the] 
literal ineffable.”47 Combining several of these usages, Zizek argues: “the point is that it 
does not matter if it has had a place, if it has ‘really occurred’ in so-called reality. The 
point is simply that it has created a series of structural effects (displacements, repetitions, 
and so on). The Real is an entity that must be constructed afterwards so that we can 
account for its distortions of the symbolic structure.”48  
 The structural effects of the Real of the urban street serve to subject the spectator 
to an impossible demand for empathetic objectivity, while also performing a displacing 
effect. The street becomes the point of origin against which the rehabilitative subject 
must reiteratively resist in order to fulfill the transformative project. Thus, the melodrama 
of the real life struggles of immigrant communities who work with Shakespeare to gain a 
sense of cultural legitimacy and legibility conditions the spectator to gauge rehabilitative 
success on their queer dislocation from the urban street. But in the process of 
rehabilitation, every good turn requires another. Turning from the local constitutes but 
one layer of the process of rehabilitation in these films. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, both The Hobart Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare present their Shakespeare 
performance projects as rehabilitative tools in explicitly nationalistic projects. Joseph 
explains in the opening sequence of My Shakespeare that his desire is for the Harlesden 
citizens to “be more articulate,” or to learn to be read in ways that register legitimately in 
their larger national context. Esquith is more blatant about the desires of his program.  As 
                                                
45 Allan Sheridan, “Translator’s Notes.” Ecrits: A Selection, by Jacques Lacan (New York: Norton, 1977) 
x. 
46 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan: The Absolute Master, trans. Douglass Brick (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991) 192. 
47 Lacan, The Seminars of Jacques Lacan: Book I, trans. John Forrester (New York: Norton, 198) 66. 
48 Zizek, 162. 
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he simply puts it, “I want these kids to be Americans.” In the process of rehabilitation, 
liberalist cultural fantasies that buttress the figure of Shakespeare as a transcendental 
signifier likewise serve as an alibi for conservatively ideological hierarchies of race, 
ethnicity, and class. As I will argue, the melodrama of resisting localized mode of 
mimetic identification in The Hobart Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare sutures over 
the startling monolithic structures of normative cultural identification that drives the 
rehabilitative project of performing successful models of national identity.  
 
Normative Impossibilities 
 The queerness of dis/identifying with the space of the street as a means of 
underwriting rehabilitative success operates alongside normative performances of 
disciplining subjects into an image of the national ideal. The Hobart Shakespeareans and 
My Shakespeare present Shakespeare as a conduit through which an individual on the 
street might turn toward the power of the nation, and embody that power as a means of 
registering as a legitimately nationalized subject. In the cinematic imaginations of these 
films, Shakespeare functions as a social mechanism that operates with the ability to pull 
the margin into the center, to consolidate individuals into subjects in a way that registers 
on a national scale as a process of self-sovereignty.  But the dialectic between becoming a 
subject and becoming subjected to systems of power is a multilayered process in these 
films, as with rehabilitative Shakespeares more generally. 
 In its hailing function, Shakespeare is made into the embodiment of “the voice of 
power” that Althusser allegorizes in the figure of the police officer. But the use of 
Shakespeare as a rehabilitative tool problematizes his allegory. Althusser’s officer can be 
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any officer of the law, any function of the state apparatus that not only wears the uniform, 
but also and more importantly speaks a language that is already part of that apparatus. His 
officer will always hail with “Hey, you there,” just as he will always look to hail the 
street subject whose face he cannot see. He is a diffuse figure, but Shakespeare is 
imagined in these rehabilitative projects as singular. Rehabilitative success, we are to 
believe, stems directly from Shakespeare’s unique and unsurpassed brilliance, his ability 
to speak across boundaries of history and identity. But his rehabilitative call demands 
both normative and queer performances of subjectivity. Thus, to be hailed by 
Shakespeare in the call of rehabilitation is to be hailed by a complex of ideologies: the 
regulations of space and time, productive longevity, ethnicity and acculturation, 
education, and class mobility.  
 Like Althusser’s police officer, Shakespeare doesn’t hail just anybody in the 
allegory of rehabilitation. His performative call is reserved specifically for the individual 
on the street. Reading the allegorical nature of Althusser’s drama, Judith Butler has 
noted:  
If we accept the scene as exemplary and allegorical, then it never needs to 
happen for its effects to be presumed….Interpellation, on this account, is 
not an event, but a certain way of staging a call, where the call, as staged, 
becomes deliteralized in the course of its exposition or darstellung. The 
call itself is also figured as a demand to align oneself with the law, a 
turning around (to face the law, to find a face for the law?), and an 
entrance into the language of self-ascription—“Here I am”—through the 
appropriation of guilt.49  
 
His theoretical theater may be a staged call, but it is necessarily staged in the street. For 
Althusser, the allegory of ideology is the allegory of the street. He adds the disclaimer: 
“Assuming that this theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed 
                                                
49 Judith Butler, Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997) 106-7. 
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individual will turn around.”50 Which begs the question: why must we assume the 
individual/subject in this drama is situated in the street? In what ways does the spatiality 
of the Althusserian street pre-condition the subject’s mis/recognition of himself as having 
once been not a subject interpellated by ideology, as once having been outside ideology 
(which is to say, on the street)? Much like the drama of rehabilitation, Althusser’s theory 
abjects the spatiality of the street as a place of necessary misrecognition, the point against 
which ideology continually works. Butler also notes that the performative nature of 
power for Althusser places stress on the systems of agency circulating in his allegory: 
“As Althusser himself insists, this performative effort of naming can only attempt to 
bring its addressee into being: there is always the risk of a certain misrecognition. If one 
misrecognizes that effort to produce the subject, the production itself falters.”51 To 
question the motivation of a subject’s turn toward power structures, then, is to question 
the subject’s agency in relation to power. 
 The interpellation of a subject by state apparatuses requires a threat of 
interpellative prevention. The space of the street, or the fantasy and misrecognition of 
being outside ideology, acts as a site of resistance in the allegory of interpellation, one 
that motivates the hailing function of ideology. A subject must be in the street, with back 
turned, in order to turn around toward the interpellative call. Misrecognized submission 
to the state apparatus is first preconditioned upon defiance. Interpellation presupposes an 
originary moment of willful refusal, symbolically registered in the would-be subject’s 
back-turned act of not-looking at and not-facing the officer. Without setting the space of 
the street, in other words, there can be no officer of the law to perform the act of hailing, 
                                                
50 Althusser, “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatus” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. 
Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001. 85-126, 116. 
51 Butler, Psychic Life of Power, 95. 
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no localized embodiment of ideology to perform its structural function. But 
misrecognition takes on a double meaning here. The Althusserian subject misrecognizes 
that he is already a subject, and thus subjected to state power, when he turns to face the 
officer. There is also a sense in which the subject may misrecognize the officer’s 
synechdotal representation of state power. There are the possibilities that the subject 
either doesn’t recognize the hailing call as coming from an officer of the Law, and by 
extension the possibility that the subject misrecognizes that turning toward the officer of 
the law is a turn toward the Law of reproductive state power.  
 These compounding possibilities of potential misrecongition on the part of the 
state disciplined subject take resonance in the nationalistic rehabilitative projects of The 
Hobart Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare. We can use Althusser to understand more 
clearly the process by which Shakespeare becomes an interpellative call in the 
rehabilitation programs; but we can also learn from these films the ways in which the 
performativity of state power can confuse the relatively hermetic process of subjecthood 
operating in Althusser’s formulation. 
 As the opening sequences of the films demonstrate, the materiality of the street 
recursively antagonizes the process of rehabilitation; however, the subjects are also 
placed in a defiant relation to the national image. In The Hobart Shakespeareans, Esquith 
greets the make-shift theater audience to the Hobart performance of Hamlet by explaining 
what he posits as the cultural work of the program. He explains, “This is about fifty kids 
who work unbelievably hard and defy the culture both of their neighborhood and of their 
country. They immerse themselves in a culture where people are good to each other, 
where hard works matters, and character matters even more.” While the opening 
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sequence of the film highlights the ways in which the students are expected to defy their 
neighborhood, it is unclear what Esquith means when he claims that the students work to 
defy their nation. In one sense, he seems to suggest that the performance of nationality 
surrounding the students in their site-specific locales inappropriately represents 
Americaness—that the national ideal is not built upon crime and poverty but centers 
more ideally on camaraderie. Esquith explains that he uses Shakespeare along with other 
conventional and non-conventional modes of curriculum to teach the students how to be 
American. At one point he analogizes Shakespeare and baseball, the great American 
pastime. Baseball, or what Esquith calls “the greatest game ever invented, the fairest 
game by far,” teaches students a sense of democracy that they also find in performing 
Shakespeare. In baseball, “the defense holds the ball, every kids gets a chance.” 
Similarly, “by learning Shakespeare these children are learning enormous amounts of 
vocabulary, enormous amounts of discipline, teamwork, the respect for one another,” 
qualities he identifies as paramount in the successful performance of Americanism. The 
motto of the Hobart Shakespeareans program, “Be good and work hard,” suggest the 
ways in which Americanism in the film becomes synonymous with meritocracy and 
morality. If the analysis of the relation between Shakespeare and Americanism sounds 
particularly tenuous here, that is because its relationship in the film is unsubstantiated. To 
be sure, Shakespeare occupies a synechdotal relation to America, but the basis of that 
relation remains inarticulable enough throughout the film to trouble the foundational 
presupposition driving the entire project: that Shakespeare can rehabilitate marginalized 
communities in the United States.  
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 On another level, the claim that his students work to defy their nation points 
toward the students’ identity as first- and second-generation immigrants, and calls 
attention to the disturbingly homogenous means toward which the camaraderie and 
“teamwork” of the American identity operates in the film. Esquith explains that 
Shakespeare operates as a unifying structure in his classroom, and that the timely themes 
of Hamlet cross the multiple systems of nationality and culture represented by his 
students. He explains of them, “A lot of them are new to this country or haven’t been in 
this country that long. At the end of this year, when I ask, ‘What are you?’ I want them to 
say ‘I’m an American. I’m as American as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln; I’m as 
American as Fredrick Douglass. I’m one of them.’” In his understanding of how the 
performance of Shakespeare functions as a rehabilitative tool, he collapses identity and 
being: to identify as Americans, the students must initiate themselves into a community 
of other Americans and claim membership with that community.  
 For Esquith, Shakespeare functions as a system of ethnic sameness that corrects 
the emphasis he sees in contemporary curriculum development on observing too 
stringently systems of cultural difference. He claims that the “political correctness” of 
adopting ethnic- and cultural-specific modes of pedagogy has instilled within youth 
educational programs an unnecessary, if not stifling, complication in how students grasp 
learning fundamentals and how teachers engage with their students: “We actually have 
classes now like ‘How to Teach Latino Kids Mathematics’ or ‘How to Reach Asian 
Children.’ You know, two and two is still four. We’re making it so complicated.” In 
Esquith’s estimation, if cultural differences overcomplicate a child’s developmental 
narrative, a return to essentials promises a cure. Shakespeare is that cure, and in his name 
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ethnic and cultural difference collapses under national identity.  As the students work 
toward an appropriate performance of the American identity, they are expected to defy 
their nation in the sense that they are asked to adopt the identity title of “American” 
rather than a hyphenated ones like “Korean-American” and “Mexican-American,” or 
hybrid ones like “Nisei” and “Chicano/a.”  To defy one’s nation in the cinematic space of 
The Hobart Shakespeareans is to refuse race and ethnicity as socio-cultural constructions, 
and instead to embrace “American” as a fixed and prediscursive signifier. 
 While these two meanings of national defiance seem paradoxical, they combine to 
construct the American identity as a performance of individuation that unites the 
individuals in a patriotic sense of resistance that escapes the normative logic the film 
works toward but can never fully establish. The film initiates a simultaneous project of 
recognition and misrecongition by positioning Shakespeare as a disciplinary state 
apparatus. The students turn toward Shakespeare, but this should not imply their 
recognition, compliance, or consent in turning toward the homogenizing vision of 
Americanism established by the film. Rather, the rehabilitative project positions 
Shakespeare as an alibi for the erasure of ethnic difference that can never full be erased. 
Because the film cannot represent an authentic image of what “American Shakespeare” 
would look like, it cannot effectively articulate the relation between Shakespeare and the 
American imago.  
 Over the past two decades, scholars have studied the idiosyncratic ways in which 
Shakespeare has come to inform and likewise be informed by ideal notions of American 
identity. As Michael D. Bristol has claimed, “a detailed critical history of Shakespeare’s 
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position within American culture has not yet been written.”52 This may be as impossible a 
task as writing a history of Shakespeare media adaptation. Rather, scholars have focused 
on localized and historically specific modes of Americanizing Shakespeare. While 
Lawrence Levine once claimed, “Nineteenth-century America swallowed Shakespeare, 
digested him and his plays, made them part of the cultural body,”53 scholars have since 
complicated this sense of gluttonous American consumption of Shakespeare. Frances 
Teague has made the claim that Shakespeare functioned in the colonial period as a sort of 
cultural “beard” behind which the national imaginary explored controversial issues, like 
their historical relation to England.54 Kim C. Sturgess argues that Shakespeare became 
particularly American because he became a sacred space in which Americans refused to 
displace onto him American contempt felt for England and the English.55 For Thomas 
Cartelli, postcolonial Shakespeare characteristically circulates within an ambivalent 
structure. The ways in which “Shakespeare” is made to signify at different moments 
(Englishness, British values, imperialism) are engaged and refashioned to serve 
particularly American social and political interests.56 However the position of 
Shakespeare in American identity formation changes across time, these scholars point 
toward the ways in which the relationship requires the opposition of Englishness. 
Through this opposition, the ideal of American individualism emerges as a community 
                                                
52 Michael D. Bristol, Shakespeare’s America, America’s Shakespeare (London and New York: Routledge, 
1990), 52. 
53 Lawrence Levine, High Brow/Low Brow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America (Boston: 
Harvard University Press, 1988) 24. 
54 Frances Teague, Shakespeare and the American Popular Stage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
55 Kim C. Sturgess, Shakespeare and the American Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
56 Thomas Cartelli, Repositioning Shakespeare: National Formations, Postcolonial Appropriations (New 
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making force. In The Hobart Shakespeareans, however, what reads as “proper 
Britishness” becomes a supplement to Americanism. 
 The actorly presence in The Hobart Shakespeareans demonstrates the way in 
which Shakespeare is not so much an effective synecdoche of American identity as much 
as a metonym for the American valuation of education. The American identity gives way 
to a consideration on how education serves as an American ideology of upward social 
mobility. And this mobility is particularly framed within British semiotics of celebrity. 
Both Ian McKellen and Michael York visit the Hobart Shakespeareans program and talk 
with the students about the beauty of Shakespeare’s works, the effects his works might 
have had on early modern audiences, and the importance of every character, big or small, 
in the complex workings of the playtexts. The students greet the learned actors with 
screams of glee and ask for their interpretations of particular lines. Tellingly, both these 
actors are famous for their work on the English stage. They aren’t Americanized by any 
stretch of the imagination. In fact, the film emphasizes their Englishness. The students 
giggle at McKellen’s pronunciation as he bids them “hullo.” Before Mckellen’s arrival, 
the camera zooms in on a close up shot of a poster in the classroom window advertising 
his one-man show A Knight out…In Los Angeles. The show, along with the camera’s 
depiction of the advertisement poster, puns on k/night in a way that draws attention to 
McKellen’s English national identity.57 When York enters the cheering room, Esquith 
affects an English accent: “You know how to make an entrance, sir!” York uses the 
moment to wittily reference Hamlet for the students in his response, “I come most 
                                                
57 In Knight Out one-man show series, McKellen weaves together two narratives: how he came to love 
acting, and his process of internationally coming out as gay. When he arrives in the classroom, his life 
partner also escorts him. While the film poster also plays on the term “out,” this pun doesn’t receive 
explicit attention in the film. 
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carefully upon my hour.” York offers the students a rather lengthy history lesson on 
Elizabethan theatrical practices, and McKellen commends the students for their rigorous 
study of the play. He praises, “The best thing about the Hobart Shakespeareans is they 
know what they’re saying….You understand every word, and that couldn’t be said of all 
actors who do Shakespeare.” 
 The actors operate as the guest experts on Shakespeare, thus figuring Shakespeare 
as particularly English. But a mutual love of Shakespeare, as well as dedicated study of 
the playtexts, unifies the students and the actors. It is unsurprising then that the form of 
American defiance that the students practice in making Shakespeare their own is the 
pursuit of education. The mimetic identification produced in the space of rehabilitative 
Shakespeare in the Hobart Shakespeareans operates as a paradigm of national 
reproductivity, and the outcome yields a potentially educated class from a school district 
with one of the lowest matriculation rates. Along with posters of Shakespeare and 
banners with slogans like “There are no shortcuts!!!” and “Take the Lead,” the walls of 
the Hobart Shakespeareans’ classroom are lined with college and university pennants and 
below each is a list naming former students who have studied there.  Esquith explains, 
“My students who go through the Shakespeare program come back to me five years later, 
ten years later, and tell me it’s what they learned on this stage that helped them get to 
Princeton, or to Harvard, or to UCLA or USC.” At one point in the film, the students tour 
the UCLA campus, during which Esquith reminds them, “This is the life you’re working 
for.” Several students pledge to complete their high school education and attend college. 
Statistically, the end point of this program is impressive; the documentary implies that the 
Hobart Shakespeareans program produces university-bound students, which is rather 
71 
exceptional given that the Los Angeles Unified School District averaged a drop out rate 
of just less than one quarter.58  
 In My Shakespeare, a Shakespearean mode of performative resistance takes a 
particularly unauthorized form, one that the film goes to great lengths to unsuccessfully 
mediate in its final sequence. While the space of the Harlesden street returns as the queer 
remainder in the subject’s attempt to dislocate from the local, it also acts as an 
interrogating and interrupting force in the program’s nationalistic project. Joseph 
describes Harlesden as a “ghetto,” “one of the least likely places to have Shakespeare, to 
have this high art.”  Thus, the film preconditions the rehabilitating Harlesden street 
citizens as an impossibility. In an early interview sequence, Joseph explains: 
What I’m trying to do is put a West End show on with people who have 
never even seen a show on the West End. I don’t want to do a church hall 
version of Romeo and Juliet because everybody thinks that’s what’s going 
to happen with it, that people from Harlesden are not going to be able to 
learn lines, that they’re not going to be able to articulate strange English 
words, they’re very limited, their imagination is small. That’s not true. I 
don’t believe that to be true. And I’m going to prove it’s wrong. 
 
Joseph poses the question, “Why can’t the people of Harlesden do Shakespeare?,” 
directly to the camera. Made for British television, the question implicates the audience 
in an operation of the national imaginary that would position Shakespeare as an icon of 
privilege, of exclusionary culture. His rhetorical question would rehabilitate on the level 
of spectatorship as well as the level of street subject. He would show the nation that 
Harlesden might be a lower-income and crime-ridden area, but that with hard work and 
dedication the people of Harlesden can perform Shakespeare as well as the professionals 
                                                
58 According to the most recent statistics available from the Los Angeles School District, in the academic 
year this film as released, 2005-06, 23% of students dropped out before graduating high school. This 
statistic rose in 2007-08 to 36%. For studies on district-wide matriculation rates, see: 
http://www.cde.ca.gov/. 
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on West End. The fantasy here is that the subject will perform English Shakespeare so 
well, that English cultural hierarchy structuring Shakespeare would likewise transform in 
the process to a more meritocratic system.  
 The process of vernacularizing Shakespeare in the desire for national 
legitimization positions the concept of the “authentic” Harlesden as the nodal point at 
which the non-normative and the queer meet in the most illuminatingly problematic 
moment in the film. During the early rehearsal with his cast, Meyers frames this 
production as a communal project in which Shakespeare and Harlesden become mutual 
surrogates for one another. Opening the first day of rehearsals, Meyers explains to his 
new cast, “basically we’re just going to find out who our characters are and what I really 
badly need, because I can’t make it all up myself, is the stuff that comes from you guys, 
what you think your character might be doing or who they are….Whatever we do, we’re 
going to have to replicate what people would do on the streets of Harlesden.” Through 
the process of adapting Shakespeare in a particularly Harlesden perspective, Joseph 
imagines that the nation, as the larger viewing audience, will come to view the subjects as 
authentically English, made into legible figures through the very process of reimaging 
Shakespeare in a different way. However, this process is less paradoxical than it is 
traditional of English treatments of Shakespeare. Michael Dobson notes that the 
processes of adaptation and canonization are less paradoxical than they are 
supplementary to the means by which Shakespeare has come to be fashioned as the 
English national poet. “[S]o far from being contradictory processes,” he explains, 
adaptation and canonization “were often mutually reinforcing ones…the claim of 
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Shakespeare as an Enlightenment cultural hero both profited from, and occasionally 
demanded, the substantial rewriting of his plays.”59 
 My Shakespeare calls upon the celebrity presence of Baz Luhrmann to authorize 
its insistence that adaptation can create national iconicity. When the made-for-television 
documentary was first released on DVD, it was advertised under the title My 
Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet with Baz Luhrmann.60 His ubiquitous presence acts as a 
long-distance inspiration for both Joseph and the cast, as he repeatedly conferences with 
them on tele-monitors.61 The documentary pays tribute to his film adaptation of Romeo 
and Juliet by offering a two-minute clip of the infamous brawl scene (which is given 
more cinematic time than the cast’s final performance of Romeo and Juliet). While 
lounging on the deck of his spacious colonial estate, Luhrmann traces his humble 
beginnings.  He casually recalls his first experience reading Shakespeare as a child and 
seeing Twelfth Night for the first time at the theater: “I could understand every word, I 
knew every person. It was the incredible moment when you realize that that is the power 
of the theater…” Serving as a match on action, the camera quickly cuts to an image of 
Luhrmann standing in front of the Sydney Opera House, as he finishes his sentence, 
“someone had drawn the curtain back on the mystery and the obstacle that stood between 
myself and the power of what Shakespeare has within his work.” The quick cut figures 
Luhrmann as a Shakespearean arriviste, a model of upward mobility, that which can be 
attained through a deep understanding of the inner and supposedly mystified workings of 
the Shakespearean playtext. But he is also visually marked as Australian, as much an icon 
                                                
59 Michael Dobson, The Making of the National Poet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 5.  
60 Now that the film is primarily marketed for educational purposes, it has since changed its title to My 
Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet for a New Generation.  
61 In this way, Luhrmann appears oddly like a Big Brother figure, while also referencing the opening frame-
within-a-television-frame sequence of his film.  
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of Australian national identity as the Sydney Opera House. Though not essentially 
characterized as English, the performance of adapting Shakespeare becomes synonymous 
in Luhrmann’s mentoring sequences with upward class mobility. The message is: he 
resisted perceived and traditional notions of how Shakespeare should be staged, and it 
paid off.  
 However, the performance of resistance takes a dramatically different form than 
Joseph or Luhrmann seem to imagine. As Joseph’s anxieties over the possibility of 
bringing a Harlesden Shakespeare to the West End give way to doubt, the cast members 
becoming increasingly unruly and resist the rehabilitative aim. Two female cast members 
in particular voice resistance to the Shakespeare playtext, and claim that Romeo and 
Juliet is too anachronistic for them to relate. One woman describes Shakespeare as 
“rubbish” and summarizes Juliet’s character as idiotic. She summarizes in a combative 
tone, “Juliet kills herself. That’s dumb,” effectively dismissing any sense of tragic 
romance from the playtext. (Unsurprisingly, she is assigned the role of Abraham.) The 
woman cast to play Juliet attempts to rehearse her kiss with her Romeo but cannot get 
through the scene without a grimace. Not only is she uncomfortable at the thought of 
having to kiss the young man, but she also considers the wooing scene ridiculous. “That’s 
so stupid,” she summarizes, “Who does that!” The most striking moment of resistance, 
however, takes place during the last week of rehearsals, when Joseph asks one of the 
older cast members, Karen, to leave the production. She was cast to play the Nurse and 
was charged to speak her lines with a Caribbean accent in a move to perform 
Shakespeare within specifically Harlesden culture. However, the amateur actress muddles 
through the accent in a way that frustrates Joseph. He believes that she refuses to 
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affectively relate to her character; after all, he notes, she is of Afro-Caribbean decent. 
Presented as a threat to the project, she is let go, and Joseph’s Londoner assistant steps in 
as understudy.  
 Joseph’s last minute casting decision begs the question of why Karen was asked 
to perform with a Caribbean accent in the first place. Such a directorial decision implies 
that casting young adults that Joseph found on the streets of Harlesden cannot actually 
produce an authentically “Harlesden” Shakespeare. Rather, a woman of African-
Caribbean decent must also speak with a Caribbean accent in order for the racial and 
ethnic diversity of Harlesden to register within the symbolic economy of West End stage 
Shakespeare. Karen’s struggle with the accent reveals the ways in which Harlesden itself 
becomes the primary site of resistance. Harlesden, materially represented through the cast 
members, must be rehabilitated in order to occupy “Harlesden,” the imagined urban 
space, as a cultural signifier. In other words, local identity is made to synchronize with 
the national ideal of how Harlesden functions in English culture. It becomes the 
retrospectively constructed space of opposition that supplements the normative project of 
“becoming British,” but it is also a space that cannot signify non-normativity in a way 
that clearly articulates rehabilitative success.  
Harlesden, then, comes in as a site of resistance, effectively undercutting the 
degree to which the cinematic focus can rest on rehabilitative efficacy. Instead, the film 
shifts it cinematic concern away from process and toward product: the West End 
performance. Fitting with the documentary’s melodramatic mode, the rehearsal process is 
framed in a pastiche of excitement, frustration, tears, and tantrums. In the final 
performance, the endpoint of the long awaited and painful filmic project, we get a 
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typically stage production of Romeo and Juliet in modern dress. There is nothing 
particularly surprising or unique about this performance, except that a group of young 
people from the Harlesden streets actually made it to the West End. In other words, 
Joseph never proves his would be critics wrong, as the tensions between the local and the 
national give way to what appears more like a modernized heritage approach to 
Shakespeare than a vernacular one.  
The most chilling consequence of Harlesden’s resistance to the nationalistic 
project is that there are no consequences. Despite the efforts of the cast members to 
convince Joseph that Shakespeare simply doesn’t work in their streets, the film delivers 
its message of hope in the form of class ascension. In the final interview sequence, cast 
members speak of their experiences in the performance project while the camera freezes 
frame to introduce in narrative subtitles where they are now. While their accounts of the 
program are less than enthusiastic, their post-program identities are made to temper what 
sounds like nonchalant observations into claims of transformation. For instance, the 
woman who earlier called Shakespeare “rubbish,” explains, “this was actually the fist 
thing I had started and finished, from beginning to end, that I actually completed.” The 
subtext reads: “Christina Emmanuel is now studying for a diploma in childcare and 
health.” The young man who played Tybalt is more enthusiastic, and speaks of his a 
newfound hunger to see more Shakespeare. We are told that he is now training to be a 
plumber. Perhaps most spectacularly, the Harlesden Juliet plans to visit the theater at 
least once a year, and we are informed: “Muska Khpal is now studying to become a 
doctor and plans to return to Afghanistan to practice medicine.” Of course, her 
transformation involves emigrating from England. To be fair, other cast members 
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describe the experience as “thrilling” and “fantastic.” The young man who played Romeo 
claims he has been bitten by the theater bug and is now pursuing acting.  
Whether the program was enjoyable to the subjects is of little concern; rather, in 
the absence of collective pleasure and consent, the queer subjectivity that emerges as a 
byproduct of the performance of rehabilitation allows us to witness cultural fantasies and 
their attending anxieties in motion. The cultural belief that Shakespeare can rehabilitate 
subjects implies that transformation into a better, more successful future is indeed 
possible. By extension, this also implies that normative identity is appropriable, rather 
than stable or given. If a subject can appropriate a normative identity, that subject might 
also possess the ability to occupy normative identity without faithfully adhering to that 
identity as normative, or the most socially successful identity position available in a given 
context. A subject who has indeed transformed may occupy a normative position by 
performing that role, rather than by internalizing it as naturalized. It might just be that the 
subject has appropriated normativity in a strategic way. The anxieties of infidelity that 
attend our cultural desire to believe in the possibility of a universally successful future 
depend upon a sense of limited agency, which the performance of rehabilitation cannot 
contain.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
WITNESSING PRISON REHABILITATION: ACT “V” AND SHAKESPEARE 
BEHIND BARS 
 
 
Whores and Thieues… 
All are like actors, in this wauering age, 
They enter all vpon the worlds great Stage: 
Some gaine applause, and some doe act amisse, 
And exit from the scaffold with a hisse.1 
 
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault sketches a genealogical picture of the 
transformation of disciplinary mechanisms of power, in which pre-nineteenth century 
public spectacles of torture gives rise to modern privatized and regimented institutions of 
discipline, like prisons, or what are more commonly referred to today as correctional 
complexes. He opens with a contemporary recounting of the spectacular violence of the 
public torture of Robert-François Damines, who was convicted of regicide in 1757. 
Drawing attention to the theatrical qualities of this public ritual, Foucault describes the 
performance of disciplinary power as intent on two particular social effects. First, the 
spectacle marked the violence of the crime onto the offender’s body as a public message 
of warning. The body thus became a site of individual punishment, but also one of mass 
discipline. Second, the torturous scene served to publicly align the social body with the 
sovereign body: presupposing state law as synonymous with sovereign law, the violation 
                                                
1 John Taylor, “A Comparison between a Thiefe and a Booke” in An arrant thiefe, vvhom euery man may 
trust in vvord and deed, exceeding true and iust. With a comparison betweene a thiefe and a booke 
(London, 1622), sig. C6r. 
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of one implies the violation of the other. Thus, the offender is violated for enacting the 
crime, just as the sovereign is in having his law violated.  
 Performances, theatrical or otherwise, however, invariably produce unintended 
consequences. Foucault explains that the spectacle of violence constructed the offender’s 
body as a public locus for spectator sympathy. Through the creation of public sympathy 
for the offender, the performance of discipline also, and without sovereign authorization, 
initiated a rift between the public mass and sovereign power. Discipline ultimately 
doubled back on itself. Thus, public torture was an ineffective use of the criminal body 
precisely because of its theatricality. As the eighteenth century gave way to the 
nineteenth, Foucault writes, “the entire economy of punishment was redistributed. It was 
a time of great ‘scandals’ for traditional justice, a time of innumerable projects for 
reform.”2 
 We can look askew, both backwards and forwards from the eighteenth century 
and the institutionalization of disciplinary “training,” to witness a mutually pre- and 
postmodern concern over the proper means of disciplining criminal offenders. In 1621, 
for instance, a draft bill was presented to British parliament that registers social desires to 
reform prison houses. The bill reads: 
Long imprisonment in common gaoles rendereth offenders the more 
obdurate and desperate when they are delivered out of the gaols, they 
being poor, miserable, and friendless, are in a manner exposed to the like 
mischiefs, they not having means of ther owne, nor place of habitation nor 
likely to gaigne so much credite from any honest householder as to 
interteyn them.3 
 
                                                
2 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).  
3 Commons debates, 1612, as quoted in J.A. Sharpe, Crime in Early Modern England, 1550-1750 (London 
and New York: Longman, 1984), 182. 
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The image of the reformed yet “obdurate” inmate signals early modern concerns not so 
much with the inhumane treatment of inmates but with the social problem of recidivism. 
Prisons, the bill suggests, place society outside of prison in the rather desperate situation 
of having to care for civil offenders when they are released and, the implication follows, 
until the former inmate offends again, this time perhaps against the very honest 
householder who would offer shelter and resource. Prison reform, in this context, calls for 
the creation of more self-reliant parolees. 
 In the present moment, numerous social activist projects operate with the desire to 
make public (again) the inhumane conditions of quotidian prison life.4 The rehabilitative 
Shakespeares I examine in this chapter join these activist discourses in the desire to 
publicly represent prison conditions and to foster increased social awareness. The first of 
these projects, a narrative audio segment entitled “Act V,”5 was released the same year 
that the U.S. media began to widely televise images of the inhumane treatment of 
detainees by U.S. military forces at Guantanamo Bay. “Act V” documents a group of all 
male adult inmates in a high-security prison in Missouri as they rehearse and stage the 
final act of Hamlet. While the inmates discuss their experiences in the program, they also 
share with listeners the contours of life inside. The second rehabilitative prison project I 
examine in this chapter, Shakespeare Behind Bars,6 was released a few months after the 
shocking images of prisoner abuse by U.S. military forces at Abu Ghraib hit mainstream 
media reports. Shakespeare Behind Bars offers a more aggressive critique of prison life, 
                                                
4 See, for instance: Paul Mason, “Cinematic Penal Discourse and Populism 1995-2005” in Social Semiotics 
16.4 (December 2006). 
5 “Act V,” This American Life. Prod. Ira Glass. Radio. Narr. Ira Glass (Audio. International Public Radio, 
08 August 2002; re-aired 12 October 2007). 
6 Shakespeare Behind Bars, Dir. Hank Rogerson (Film. Shout Factory, 2005). 
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suggesting that prison, as a social institution, works, in effect, to produce criminals rather 
than to rehabilitate them.  
 Certainly, considerations of the secretive and torturous practices of the prison 
industrial complex and the need for social justice have become particularly timely in the 
present moment, in mainstream media reports and politics. But it has also taken 
precedence in academia as well, clearly demonstrated in a recent special edition of 
PMLA, which was dedicated to an exploration of the role of the academic institution in 
the potential intervention of current prison practices sanctioned by the U.S. government.7  
 Though these considerations are particularly timely, the rehabilitative 
Shakespeares I examine in this project adopt a perversely anachronistic approach in their 
attempts to raise public discourse and awareness. “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars 
raise the question of how prisons function in the present moment. Do we imprison 
offenders to punish them or to rehabilitate them? This question continues to motivate 
popular debate, and in no way do I attempt to answer it here. Rather, I explore the ways 
in which rehabilitation itself operates as a mode of disciplinary power that, much like 
Foucault’s understanding of premodern spectacles of torture, fails to achieve the desired 
effects on its spectators. As rehabilitative Shakespeares demonstrate, mechanisms of 
modern power have become public once again. I describe the ways in which these two 
cultural artifacts offer the argument that prison should be a space of rehabilitation, in that 
it should operate in a way that allows inmates to critically question the events that led to 
their imprisonment. The argument suggests that prison should ultimately work to produce 
more remorseful and redeemed subjects, ones who can successfully navigate life outside 
of prison without the threat of recidivism. However, the way that Shakespeare gets used 
                                                
7 PMLA 123.3 (2008). 
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in these programs, which becomes a selling point in these projects, emerges as the 
primary problem in the rehabilitative impulse. 
 Both of these projects position Shakespeare as a particularly appropriate figure for 
proper training for life outside. Shakespeare, the argument goes, encapsulates within his 
dramatic texts the very essence of humanity, the most succinct image of “the human 
condition,” one that rings as true today as it did during the early modern period. As Curt 
Tofteland, director of the Shakespeare Behind Bars program, claims, “[Shakespeare’s] 
gift truly was insight into human behavior, because in his plays I can find human 
behavior that is as true now as it was four hundred years ago.” But what makes 
Shakespeare a particularly appropriate paradigm for inmate rehabilitation, these projects 
explain again and again, is that he was once himself considered a criminal.8 Speaking of 
his company of convicted actors, Tofteland insists, “Shakespeare would adore this group 
[because they are] very true to Shakespeare. People in the theatre back in Elizabethan 
times were thought of as pickpockets, thieves, rapists, murderers, so I think he’d be 
proud.”9  
 Tofteland points here to early modern pamphlets and laws on criminality, which 
frequently cited actors and “players” on their lists of undesirable and cozening civil 
subjects. The 1572 Act of Punishment of Vagabonds, for instance, declared that 
                                                
8 Shakespeare scholars make similar claims on the relation between Shakespeare and the figure of the 
criminal or the early modern concept of criminality. See: Derek Cohen, The Politics of Shakespeare (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), and Bryan Reynolds, Becoming Criminal: Transversal Performance and 
Cultural Dissidence in Early Modern England (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002). 
9 As I will discuss further, in this chapter and throughout this dissertation, rehabilitative Shakespeare 
formulaically frame the perversity of Shakespeare as an icon of both legitimate and “illegitimate” non-
normative culture, like criminality, by fracturing systems of historicity. As we see, Tofteland represents 
Shakespeare as a historical figure with which his cast of inmate actors should identify with precisely 
because he can occupy the acme of cultural privilege in the present moment, while still remaining marked 
by early modern understandings of criminal culture.  
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“common players in the interludes and minstrels, not belonging to any baron of this realm 
or towards any other honorable personage of greater degree…shall be deemed rogues, 
vagabonds and sturdy beggars” and would likewise “be deemed a felon in all respects and 
shall suffer and forfeit as a felon.”10 The political pamphlets of Robert Greene clearly 
address the social anxiety surrounding the figure of the stage player and this figure’s 
potential power to affect similarly theatrical effects even when off stage and out of 
character.11 Greene wrote extensively on the need for the public to educate themselves on 
the techniques of duplicitous criminals, or as he dubs them “connys,” and the ways in 
which they perform, much like stage actors, to manipulate sympathies and actions of 
ignorant citizens at large.12 In In Defense of Conny-Catching (1592), he writes from the 
assumed identity of Cuthbert Cunny-catcher, to warn: 
  
there was no more faith to be held with Plaiers, than with them that valued 
faith at the price of a feather: for as they were Comaedians to act· so the 
actions of their liues were Cameleon  like, that they were vncertaine, 
variable, time pleasers, men that measured honestie by profite, and that 
regarded their Authors not by desart, but by necessitie of time. If this may 
serue you for a shadow, let mee vse it for an excuse of our Single illegible 
letter  Conny-catching:  for when we meet a country Farmar with a 
fulpurse, a miserable Illegible word, that eyther rockes his Tenants rents, 
or selles his graine in the market at an vnreasonable rate: we hold it a 
deuotion to make him a Conny, in that he is a Caterpiller to others, and 
gets that by pilling and polling of the poore 13 
                                                
10 See: Select Statues and Other Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James 
I (2nd ed.), ed. G.W. Prothero (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 69-70. 
11 For a more comprehensive account of Greene’s anti-theatrical polemics, see: Kirk Melnikoff, Writing 
Greene: Essays on England’s First Notorious Professional Writer (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), and 
Werner Senn, Studies in the Dramatic Construction of Robert Greene and George Peele (Bern, Franke, 
1973). 
12 For a more comprehensive account of the ways in which Greene fetishizes the figure of the conny as a 
means of social regulation, see: Derek B. Alwes, Sons and Authors in Elizabethan England (Newark, DE: 
University of Delaware Press, 2004); and William C. Carroll, Fat King, Lean Beggar: Representations of 
Poverty in the Age of Shakespeare (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
13 Robert Greene, The Defense of Conny-Catching. Or A confutation of those two iniurious pamphlets 
published by R.G. against the practitioners of many nimble-witted and mysticall Sciences (London, 1592), 
sig. H.  
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Green characterizes players as eternal chameleons and caterpillars, always in the process 
of physically adapting and thus becoming a new identity that they may deploy for 
strategic ends, which, in most cases, takes the form of deceit in order to cozen others 
from their resources. Actors are “time pleasers” in that they have learned the witting 
ability to unwrite and thus rewrite their pasts to serve present desires.  
 The relation that Tofteland draws among Shakespeare, criminals, and actors, as I 
argue in what follows, raises more questions of how precisely Shakespeare functions in 
prison rehabilitation than it answers. In the process of publicizing the inhumanity of 
prison and Shakespeare’s intervention into these conditions, “Act V” and Shakespeare 
Behind Bars ultimately create anxieties similar to those evinced in early modern 
equations of criminals and actors. The rehabilitative projects operate with the goal of 
producing more humane, that is, redeemed, inmates through the use of humanist training. 
We watch as inmates memorize Shakespearean drama, learn proper modes of inflection 
and rhetorical delivery, and, as the projects imply, affectively identify with the individual 
Shakespearean characters they perform.14 In mimetically identifying with Shakespearean 
characters and themes, the inmates learn to imitate; they learn how to perform successful 
models of humanity and subjecthood. And yet, these subjectivities are performed. The 
initial question these rehabilitative Shakespeares address—that of the social function of 
prisons—shifts terms. By the end of the media documentations of these projects, the very 
                                                
14 The rehabilitative imperatives represented in both “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars begin to take 
on a distinctively “method acting” mode of performing Shakespeare. While method acting, however, 
depends upon the initiation of “authentic” emotion and past lived experience in the present moment, “Act 
V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars suggest that projects of rehabilitation would have inmates evoke the past 
in order to reject it, and it is in this latter move, they projects seem to presume, that the authenticity of 
emotion is created.  
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function of rehabilitation comes into question: does rehabilitation reproduce inmates in 
the state ideal, or does it simply create smarter criminals, ones who can potentially play 
the part of the redeemed and repentant subject without having faithfully internalized 
social systems of value and propriety?15 Again, this mode of subjectivity—what I call 
throughout this dissertation queer subjectivity—emerges as an unintentional byproduct of 
the process of rehabilitation, one that ultimately troubles the very transformative goals of 
rehabilitation. 
 As I explained earlier, one of the goals of these projects involves the spectator. 
We are to learn of the torturous conditions of prison life and sympathize with the inmates 
who are made to exist within these conditions. Can we sympathize with an inmate if we 
believe that he has learned to “work the system” rather than having been redeemed? In 
the previous chapter, I argued that the particular mode of queer subjectivity that emerges 
as a result of the conflicting desires to use rehabilitation in specifically nationalistic 
imperatives doubles back on the rehabilitative project. In effect, the subjects I examine in 
the previous chapter learn strategies that, as I speculate, ultimately serve them as they 
navigate through systems of cultural power and social desires for improvement and hope 
for the future. A similar strategy arises in the queerly positioned subjects of prison 
rehabilitation. But in this particular setting, we must take into account contemporary 
fantasies about how a legitimate subject performs. Prison-specific rehabilitative 
                                                
15 Two philosophers of law have recently staged a public debate on the performative demands of parole, 
and the likewise impossibility for parole boards to ever effectively evaluate parole as authentic or sincere. 
While Shakespeare Behind Bars, in particular, evokes this question without asking it explicitly, it 
nonetheless serves as a productive reminder that these rehabilitation projects, so steeped in ideological 
fantasies and anxieties of how identity and subjecthood should be properly performed, have specific 
referents outside of their systems of representation. On this debate, see: Steven Keith Tudor, “Why Should 
Remorse be a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing?” in Criminal Law and Philosophy (2008) 2:241-257; and 
Richard L. Lippke, “Response to Tudor: Remorse-based Sentence Reductions in Theory and Practice” in 
Criminal Law and Philosophy (2008) 2:259-268.  
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Shakespeares, I suggest, mark the limit of contemporary cultural fantasies that 
Shakespeare embodies a universal paradigm for utopian futurity. 
 Programmatically, rehabilitative Shakespeares document the uses of Shakespeare 
as an emergent technology of the self, a disciplinary model by which inappropriately 
positioned subjects may act on their own behalf (by acting Shakespeare) in order to move 
through social systems more successfully. But because rehabilitative Shakespeares are 
produced for public reception and consumption, they are also cultural performances. 
They are produced with the intended effect of communicating to the audience the 
possibility of both individual and social transformation. While disciplinary power, as 
Foucault argues, operates on the level of “the soul” in order to create docile bodies, 
rehabilitation must be made to register on the very bodies of the subjects as well, in order 
to cinematically perform the efficacy of rehabilitation as a cultural process.16 The parallel 
representations of psychical and material discipline come into conflict again and again in 
rehabilitative Shakespeares. Ultimately, the effect of this conflict troubles the very notion 
that rehabilitation can indeed liberate marginalized bodies from systems of domination in 
ways the ways rehabilitation intended—that is, in normative ways. Rehabilitation simply 
cannot signify the normative ends of its disciplinary project.  
 The double move of positioning prison as an inappropriate social space and the 
space wherein inmates come to appropriate more socially acceptable identities based on 
Shakespearean teachings gives way to a troubling move of displacement. Because the 
space of prison signifies both the non-normative point of resistance and the social context 
within which normative identity can be performed, it functions as a queer signifier. Is it 
                                                
16 For a further examination of the work of cinematic adaptation as a cultural process, see: Thomas Cartelli 
and Katherine Rowe, New Wave Shakespeare on Screen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).  
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not so much that prison cannot signify as either normativizing or non-normative. Rather 
prison oversignifies as both possibilities.17 The failure of rehabilitation to register the 
successful appropriation of normative identity as the successful endpoint of 
transformation or the effective dislocation of inmates from the non-normative social 
space of the prison marks these prison Shakespeare projects most clearly in the ways in 
which they represent prison identity within masculinist and heterosexual terms.  
 The epigraph of this chapter speaks to the ways in which early modern cultural 
imaginations link criminals to players, but also to figures of sexual perversion and excess. 
In his lyric poem “A Thiefe,” John Taylor equates thieves, actors, and whores on the 
level of performative expediency: all must perform strategically, hiding what they are 
from the law, if they are to continue existing as that which they are. But it is also this 
strategic ability to shade one’s identity that created public anxiety about the potential of 
actors, as thieves, to deceive the larger English society. Because prison rehabilitation 
links actors and inmates to naturalize Shakespeare’s presence in prison, prison sexuality 
represents the displaced term of identity in prison Shakespeares. While we wait in these 
projects for a sense of normative appropriation of redemption that never comes, we 
                                                
17 As critical works on Shakespeare media adaptation emerge as a major area of study, scholars have tended 
to focus primarily on Hollywood box office blockbusters, which subsequently narrows critical 
understandings of Shakespeare’ role in the cultural process of adaptation to dominant market forms. As a 
result, recent scholarship has called for an ‘escape from Hollywood,’ and for scholars to reformulate the 
critical scope to include emergent genres. Such a move of otherly-generic inclusion would treat the 
iconicity of Shakespeare as diachronic collaborations between the preponderance of audio-visual 
appropriations saturating popular culture in whatever form, and the playtext. The prison Shakespeares I 
examine here answer this call while also explicitly critiquing one of the most prolific markets operating in 
the U.S. today: the prison industrial complex. See: Thomas Cartelli and Katherine Rowe, New Wave 
Shakespeare on Screen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); Christy Desmet, “Introduction” in Shakespeare 
and Appropriation, eds. Christy Desmet and Robert Sawyer. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. 1-
12; Courtney Lehmann and Lisa A. Starks, “Introduction: Images of the ‘Reel’: Shakespeare and the Art of 
Cinema” in The Reel Shakespeare: Alternative Cinema and Theory (London: Associated University Press, 
2002) 9-24; and Sonia Massai, “Introduction: Defining Local Shakespeares.” World Wide Shakespeares: 
Local Appropriations in Film and Performance, ed. Sonia Massai (London and New York: Routledge, 
2005) 3-14. 
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witness, instead, the discipline of prison sexuality into conservatively masculinist and 
heteronormative terms.  
 
Conditioning Failure 
 Rehabilitation programmatically involves a double move of anachronistic 
construction. First, the programs establish normative goals in a future sense. In the case 
of prison Shakespeare programs, rehabilitative futurity is contingent upon redemption. 
Subjects work with Shakespearean playtexts in order to become better—that is, more 
self-implicating men. It is imagined that they learn by Shakespeare to take 
responsibilities for their crimes, and in the act of accepting responsibility, they will 
become more responsible social subjects. Rehabilitation also demands teleology, as it is a 
transformation toward a better future. Madhavi Menon explains: “Defined as the doctrine 
of ends or final causes, teleology depends on a sequence leading to an end that can 
retrospectively be seen as having had a beginning. Issues of time and consequence are 
paramount for such narratives.”18 This leads to the second move, which is specifically a 
belated one. For the normative to register, rehabilitation must belatedly construct a non-
normative and originary point of resistance. Performances of rehabilitation, in other 
words, are caught in a fissured sense of future projection and pre-conditioned 
retrospection (that is, retrospection built upon a desire to see future possibilities). In 
rehabilitative Shakespeares that document the use of Shakespeare as a therapeutic tool in 
prison settings, it is the social space of prison itself that comes to occupy the non-
normative point that inmates must resist. To understand the troubled and troubling 
                                                
18 Madhavi Menon, “Spurning Teleology in Venus and Adonis” in GLQ: Journal for Gay and Lesbian 
Studies 11.4 (2005): 491-519, 492. 
89 
teleology of prison Shakespeares and its failures, it is first necessary to understand how 
the originary point of resistance comes to be cinematically articulated.19 
 Both artifacts establish the space of prison as a social impossibility. Prison comes 
to be encoded in audio-visual form as a space in which intersubjective relations are 
foreclosed by the very structures of institutional culture. This is most apparent in “Act V” 
through the figure of Jack Hitt, narrator of the episode and regular journalist 
correspondent for This American Life. In the sixty-minute narrative drama, Hitt 
documents the progress of about thirty inmates at the high-security Missouri Eastern 
Correctional Complex (MECC) as they rehearse and stage the final act of Hamlet as part 
of a rehabilitation program dubbed “The Hamlet Project.” Prison Performing Arts, a 
grassroots non-profit organization operating out of St. Louis, Missouri, sponsored “The 
Hamlet Program” under the guidance of Director Agnes Wilcox, who has worked with 
the inmates at MECC for five years.20 Hitt spends a great portion of his initial recounting 
of the experience in discussing the preparations he was made to take by prison officials 
before he could meet with the company of convicted actors. He begins the episode: 
The first thing they hand me as I pass through the thick iron doors is a tiny 
black box called “a screamer.” Pull the cord attached and a phalanx of 
armed guards will sweep form all points of the prison and try to rescue 
me. I keep it in my pocket as I enter a yard of more than 1,000 prisoners 
wandering around. Some of the guys are playing handball against the wall 
as I walk across. Most are friendly. A couple of the skinheads, their arms 
dense with spider tattoos, narrow their eyes as I pass.  
 
                                                
19 As Michael Bristol argues, “Every staging of a Shakespeare play results from a dialogue between the 
historical moment of its creation and the contemporaneity of the mise-en-scene. At the same time, the 
thought of the author and of his community continues to resonate even in the most self-consciously 
modernizing interpretations” (13). See: Big-Time Shakespeare (New York and London: Routledge, 2005). 
20 For more information on Prison Performing Arts, see: http://www.prisonartsstl.org/. 
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While the prison guards explain to Hitt that the screamer is intended for his protection, he 
wonders how effective it actually is. The rate of time it would take to pull the screamer 
cord to set off its high pitched cry, compounded with the time it would take for guards to 
leave their posts and locate the source of the sound: odds, he explains, indicate it would 
be relative ineffective. At least, it would be ineffective in saving him from a vicious 
attack. This is not to say the equipment doesn’t have its intended effect, however. Hitt is 
so unnerved by wearing the screamer, and the potential of danger it indicates, that he is 
initially unable to interact with the men without intense fear. Subsequently, he explains, 
he avoids eye contact and conversation with the men for his first few trips to MECC.  
 When I worked with Wilcox and the MECC inmates on the opening day of their 
2006-07 season, I was also outfitted with the scream device that Hitt describes. However, 
because I am female and entering into an all-male, high-security prison, the prison guards 
explained, I would also have to be outfitted with additional precautions to ensure my 
safety. Unlike Hitt, I was not allowed to carry the screamer in my pocket. It was to 
remain in my left hand during the six-hour meeting, with the cord pre-extended into my 
right hand, to cut down on reaction time. The cord was to be held in my right hand 
underneath a handheld receiver, which was tuned into the nearest on-ground guard station 
directly opposite the learning annex in which the men rehearsed. I was also asked not to 
carry a pen, which MECC prison regulations allow, because writing devices could be 
used against me as a weapon. The final safety measure I was given came in the form of a 
verbal warning from several prison guards not get carried away by the inmates’ stories. I 
had planned to attend the opening rehearsal to take notes on the workings of the 
rehabilitation program and to discuss with the men their experiences in working with 
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Shakespeare. The prison made these activities virtually impossible. In fact, in an attempt 
to ensure my safety, the screamer and walkie-talkie effectively immobilized me as well. 
 My observations here are not intended to wistfully disregard the potential for 
violence in prison, but rather to point toward the very specific effect that such a well-
equipped regard for personal safety had, for both Hitt and myself. Namely, they made it 
impossible to interact with the inmates. While “Act V” documents Hitt’s experiences 
with the inmates at MECC, the episode is framed by the commentary of This American 
Life host Ira Glass, who explains that the inmates may have a unique understanding of 
Hamlet, and that we would do well to understand the ways they approach they play. He 
opens with a consideration of the relationship among the performance of identity, the 
place of (personal) history in subjectivity formation, and phenomenological knowledge—
knowledge that can be regulated but not erased by institutional power. Glass begins the 
show by summarizing Hamlet: 
Hamlet itself is sort of a weird play. The central character is in a situation 
very few of us are ever going to find ourselves in. His uncle killed his 
father and then married his mother in order to become the king….The 
main conflict of the play is this guy debating in long, complicated 
monologues whether or not he should kill somebody. What is there in that 
for most of us to relate to? Unless of course we happen to be murderers. 
And what would the play be like if it were actually performed by 
murderers and other violent criminals? What would they see that the rest 
of us do not? Well today on our program we answer that question and the 
answer is: a lot.  
  
In his prologue, Glass follows a solipsistic model of knowledge, bearing with it the 
fantasy that violent offenders own an unmediated access to violent material by virtue of 
their lived experiences and the subjectivity that performances of violence and reparation 
are imagined to create.  
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 In a very troubling sense, the episode presents the inmates as a type of other, a 
collective and symbolic entity who understands more radically and has the ability to 
access a less differentiated relation between the sign and signification. They are the 
others who understand Shakespeare’s otherness most completely, liberated from the 
problematic mediation of cultural process that would obscure Shakespeare’s meaning.21 
Hitt attends the MECC rehearsals and final performance precisely to interview the men 
on the different ways in which they approach Hamlet. The narrative is framed as a 
learning experience for both Hitt and the listener: we become familiar with the sounds of 
prison, the affective responses that a relatable figure like Hitt has—and by extension, the 
listener might have—to the scene of the prison yard, and to the vernaculars of inmates in 
multiple interview segments. We also learn about Hamlet. As Hitt surmises, “These days 
when people say ‘Hamlet’ it’s usually just a metaphor, shorthand for somebody who’s 
afraid to act, who dithers and thinks too much. We almost forget just what action Hamlet 
was contemplating. These actors haven’t forgotten.” In Hitt’s estimation, his—and again, 
by extension, the listeners’—participation in the prison rehabilitation scene opens a space 
                                                
21 In Remaking Shakespeare, Pascale Aebischer and Nigel Wheale argue that critics must rethink how 
issues of fidelity function in their critical works, or else the present becomes a stagnant construct: 
“Accepting today’s Shakespeares always implicitly asserts both their relation to and difference from their 
early modern pretexts means rejecting the value judgments that have haunted the form of performance 
criticism which seeks to establish degrees of ‘faithfulness’ to the Shakespearean original. It means 
accepting remade ‘Shakespeare’ as a modern performance or cultural text in its own right, looking not 
solely at the diachronic collaboration with the originating text, but, more importantly, at the context 
informing the modern version together with the cultural work in which it involves its audiences” (3). 
Similarly, Robert Shaughnessy cautions that a primary concern with fidelity to the Shakespearean playtext 
in readings of adaptations of Shakespearean works threatens to establish the field of Shakespeare media 
studies as a solely conservative regime in academia. He argues that “being ‘true to Shakespeare’ is as much 
about endorsing the conservative values with which his work has been traditionally associated—order, 
hierarchy, Christianity, nationalism, militarism, compulsory heterosexuality, and so on—as it is about 
preserving the letter of the ‘text’” (4). See: Pascale Aebischer and Nigel Wheale. “Introduction” in 
Remaking Shakespeare: Performance Across Media, Genres and Culture, eds. Pascale Aebischer, Edward 
J. Esche, and Nigel Wheale (New York: Palgrave, 2003) 1-17; and Robert Shaughnessy, “Introduction” in 
Shakespeare on Film, ed. Robert Shaughnessy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998) 1-17. 
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for reflection on the Shakespearean playtext; the inmate’s personal histories and tales of 
the haunting return of past crimes allow for a return to a grounded and more 
contextualized reading of Hamlet, one untainted by the inertia of history that would 
reduce the playtext to a simplified reading of impotency. Hitt’s vision here is a 
spectacular one: through the power of empathy and the mining of others’ pasts and modes 
of subjugated knowledge, pristine knowledge might be possible; this might be the 
moment in which the real Hamlet is finally revealed. Who among us wouldn’t want to 
know, once and for all, what Shakespeare was actually saying, or at least what he meant 
to say?  
 To position marginalized social bodies as those which may be mined for 
knowledge is a disturbing fantasy, to say the least.22 While I will theorize the cultural 
implications of this fantasy in more depth, what interests me here is the way in which the 
institution of prison is imagined to foreclose the possibility of ever achieving such 
fantastical knowledge. Because Hitt was so jarred by his initial experiences, he is forced 
to return to the prison for another attempt at interviewing the men. This return entails a 
six-month training course facilitated by the prison, whereby they may ensure that 
returning visitors internalize the regulations of the prison and learn techniques whereby 
they may safeguard themselves. This is a training program that, presumably, Hitt 
completed. I was less inclined. Instead, I worked with another prison, this time a 
medium-security subsidiary of MECC. While attending this correctional complex, which 
                                                
22 For H.R. Coursen, such commodification threatens to distance popular culture from the original playtext, 
even as it pays homage to the playtext. In a particularly apocalyptic moment, Coursen offers a warning: “I 
predict that Shakespeare will become more and more the servant of mere commerce, if not condemned 
outright as heretical and banned from production, that is, unless accommodated to reinforcement of 
powers-that-be (read: scholars and/or national/American political agendas)” (23). See: H.R. Coursen, 
Shakespeare Translated (New York: Peter Lang, 2005).  
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is also involved in the Prison Performing Arts program, one of my safety devices, in this 
case, a “panic button,” accidentally went off while I was facilitating a workshop on the 
decidedly unromantic qualities of Romeo and Juliet. Subsequently, armed guards entered 
the learning annex to rescue me. Upon learning that it was a false alarm, the guards 
decided to end the workshop prematurely (after fifteen minutes of an intended three-hour 
workshop), and I was escorted from the prison.23 While the intended unromantic message 
of Romeo and Juliet, I imagine, came across during the incident, I left, again, without 
having interviewed the inmates on their experiences in the Shakespeare-based 
rehabilitation program. 
While “Act V,” and the experiences I shared, position prison as a space of 
intersubjective impossibility most palpably through the use of safety equipment, 
Shakespeare Behind Bars figures the material space of prison as an intersubjective 
impossibility between inmates. The critically acclaimed documentary film explores what 
it means to rehabilitate from the inmate’s perspective.24 It explores the function that 
public and penal perception of rehabilitation as a cultural performance plays in the very 
efficacy of rehabilitation itself. The film markets itself to spectators as a revelatory trip 
into and around this prison production. Viewers embark on a year-long journey with the 
Shakespeare Behind Bars theatre troupe led by volunteer director Curt Tofteland whose 
innovative work with inmates at the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex (LLCC) began 
in the mid-1990s. As part of the program, inmates cast themselves in roles that most 
appropriately reflect their personal histories and transformative desires, or the kind of 
                                                
23 The premature ending of this workshop seemed oddly appropriate, given the playtext we were 
examining.  
24 As I discuss later in the chapter, however, the authenticity of the inmate perspective is always already 
mediated by the spectator’s understanding of the authenticity of the inmate subject.  
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people they are working toward becoming. Unique to this prison Shakespeare program, 
the all-male cast performs all of the roles, including the female characters, a practice that 
accounts for many moments of tension in the film.25 The documentary weaves together 
two narratives—that of the inmates and their crimes, as well as The Tempest—as each 
convicted actor delves intimately into the characters they portray while confronting their 
personal histories. The documentary works to spin a spectacular story about the 
individual creative process and the power of art to heal and redeem individual as well as 
collective bodies. 
While I will return to a discussion of how the playtext functions in the film, I 
want first to discuss the ways in which the social space of the prison emerges as a site of 
necessary resistance. For the social space of the prison will become both the non-
normative space of abjection, as well as the queerly signifying disturbance of the 
possibility of an inmate to reject, on his own terms, this space. The film’s opening 
sequence frames the inmate cast in cinematic semiotics of desolation and surveillance, 
semiotics that will return later in the film to trouble the question of whether Shakespeare 
can actually induce a transformative effect in the social institution of prison, and whether 
or not inmates can sincerely dislocate from their past crimes.  
The documentary opens with several expository shots of a stark prison yard 
outfitted with patches of withering grass, dilapidated benches, ominously sprawling chain 
link fences topped with barbed wire, and a single guard tower, centrally located in the 
prison yard. The silence is painfully palpable, but it is eventually broken, that is, filled up, 
by sounds of Shakespearean verse. The film formulaically juxtaposes interview 
                                                
25 It is the unique form of casting that accounts, in larger part, no doubt, to the homoerotic and homophobic 
tensions in particular.   
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sequences of the inmates and shots of the their final performance of The Tempest with 
similarly stark and threatening images. For these are the semiotics by which the film 
critiques the psychologically torturous conditions of prison life. Alone in the prison yard, 
we watch as three inmates huddle together. We may be conditioned at this point by 
popular prison films to expect the huddling of inmates to signify impending violence. But 
these inmates huddle so they can practice Shakespeare, in as much privacy from the 
larger prison yard that the yard can afford. Moving to a medium shot, the camera frames 
the inmates as they rehearse the revels speech:26 
Our revels now are ended. These our actors, 
As I foretold you, were all spirits and 
Are melted into air, into thin air: 
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, 
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve 
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded, 
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff 
As dreams are made on; and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep. (IV.i.148-58) 
 
As the convicted actors work toward an interpretation of the speech, the guard tower 
signals a warning message to them that their actions appear suspicious. After one guard 
in the tower watches over the scene with binoculars, ultimately deciding that the inmates 
appear suspicious but not necessarily dangerous or in violation of prison regulation, the 
inmates continue their rehearsal. The sequence suggests that the “baseless fabric of this 
vision” depends upon perspective. The viewer understands that the inmates are rehearsing 
                                                
26 The cinematic motivation of this cut to medium shot effectively serves to bring the spectator into a more 
seemingly intimate perspective with the inmate subjects. Important to an understanding of cinematic 
editing here, however, this cut serves as a match on action with the beginning of Shakespearean recitation. 
The implication is that the language of Shakespeare can overcome the intersubjective distancing on which 
prison regulation is built.  
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one of Shakespeare’s most famous speeches, but the prison system understands only that 
the inmates come dangerously close to violating the rule of the prison yard by segregating 
themselves from the larger population. Eventually the men are asked to disperse, and as 
they walk toward their housing barracks, one inmate offers a final interpretation of the 
speech: “it’s almost like, how big can you dream?” And the rest returns to silence. 
 The opening sequence frames the perversity of prison agency that will dominate 
the remaining ninety minutes of the film. Shakespeare Behind Bars presents the inmates’ 
collective dream as one of redemption. But redemption, the film suggests time and again, 
is an institutional indulgence, an act of tolerance that can be and indeed is withheld by the 
very institutions that would demand that inmates internalize the desire for redemption. As 
one inmate, Leonard, bluntly puts it in one of the most melodramatic sequences of the 
film, “What really speaks to me [in The Tempest] is the idea that that indulgence is 
actually one of the most remarkable things in the world, and that’s to redeem 
someone….That to me is the single greatest thing that I’ve desired since October of 1994, 
is to be redeemed. And that’s why [the revels speech] speaks to me so much.” 
 The program director Tofteland explains why Shakespeare Behind Bars chose to 
perform The Tempest during that particular season. “We’ve been on this journey of plays 
that have been leading us to this point of redemption and forgiveness—Othello, Titus 
Andronicus, Hamlet, The Tempest—because several of the key founding members are 
coming up to parole or serve out,” he explains. “I decided that The Tempest might be an 
apt play to do as a farewell to some of the guys.” Tofteland chose The Tempest for the 
men to perform because the message of redemption and forgiveness has a particular 
resonance as three of the founding members must present themselves within the next 
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twelve months to the parole board, who will decide whether the men will receive the 
chance to acculturate back into society or if they will receive what has become the LLCC 
standard three-to-eight-year deferment. For the men to receive parole, they must prove 
that they have taken responsibility for their past actions, that they have truly forgiven 
themselves in the present moment, and that they will continue to actively seek the 
forgiveness of society in the future. 
 The spectator is continually reminded that while redemption involves individual 
agency, this agency must register within the systems of signification established by the 
institution. The film ends with a message of impossibility. Of the two men who went 
before the parole board during the shooting of the film, neither receives parole. One 
inmate, Howard, joins his fellow cast mates after meeting with the parole board. The men 
are trying to figure out how to have a going-away celebration for Howard to honor his 
parole without violating prison regulations of fraternization. But the celebration never 
takes place. Howard returns to explain that the board denied his parole. The other men 
are clearly shocked and noticeably fearful, for no one questioned whether or not Howard 
would be granted parole. To their understanding, he had followed prison regulations well 
and excelled in his multiple rehabilitation programs. He breaks the news, “they gave me 
sixty months, five years. I don’t go back up for five years from now. I thought they were 
going to let me go, the way they were talking at first, but then they brought up a lot about 
my past history.” In one of the most shocking moments of the film, an inmate named 
Sammie is also denied parole. Throughout the film, Sammie unquestionably emerges as 
the “break out” star, an image of the ideal inmate. He is never late to his prison job in the 
computer center, which he also manages; he has even secured employment managing a 
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technology center when he leaves prison. He continually preaches to the other men in 
Shakespeare Behind Bars the need to take responsibility for their crimes while following 
prison regulations without deviation. The most senior member of the rehabilitation 
program, Sammie comes to embody the prime example of how to successfully navigate 
prison regulations. And yet he, too, is denied parole. In response, one of the inmates 
rhetorically asks his fellow cast members “What more is a man supposed to give? When 
is he forgiven?....We try to embrace society as best we can but it seems like they just 
want to eat us up.” What is a man who is caught within the power relations of prison 
expected to do? 
 Both films suggest an answer to this question. We watch as the men construct 
particularly queer spaces, or alternate place-making strategies in which they may carve 
out a space to act on their own behalf. More specifically, Shakespeare is the paradigm of 
cultural capital that allows for the creation of this alternative space. “Act V” presents the 
men’s work on Hamlet with particularly queer spatial terms. It is facilitated by the prison 
and facilitated by the Prison Performing Arts program. But within the institutionally 
sanctioned space the inmates are imagined as a sort of subaltern collective. We might 
think here of what José David Saldivar identifies as the “School of Calibán.” He explains, 
“The phrase suggests a group of engaged writers, scholars, and professors of literature 
who work under common political influence….The phrase also emblematizes not just the 
group’s shared subaltern subject positions, but the ‘schooling’ that their enrollment in 
such an institution provides.”27 By exploring Hamlet, the men offer a unique take on the 
playtext for the public audience. But they are also imagined to defy prison norms by 
                                                
27 Saldivar, José David. The Dialectics of Our America: Genealogy, Cultural Critique, and Literary History 
(Duke University Press, 1991), 123. 
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acting according to prison regulations. One inmate, Big Hutch, explains that the prison 
yard is divided into particular groups. He analogies the prison yard to an ocean, in which 
you have guppies (what he identities as inmates who have committed lesser crimes), 
sharks (basically, the murders), and the killer whales (a self-ascribed identity that Big 
Hutch adopts for himself). Big Hutch explains that these groups cannot meet in the prison 
yard. The prison itself ensures this. If a guppy is witnessed fraternizing with a killer 
whale, Hutch explains, both will be thrown into solitary confinement, since the guards 
will assume that their differential status on the prison yard presupposes an impending 
scene of violence. Rehearsing Hamlet, however, allows different groups of men to come 
together in the space of the theater, not only to defy prison class sects but also to analyze 
the ways in which the prison forces these sects. 
 The queer spatiality of Shakespeare Behind Bars takes a more individualized 
form. The use of the Shakespearean playtext demonstrates this most clearly. In the dual 
cinematic narrative, The Tempest becomes a subtext on the inmate actors who understand 
it as individual characters—an inciting pressure as important in the cinematic effects as 
the camera’s solicitation of the inmates to record and repent their crimes. Just as the 
characters within The Tempest are individualized by the sufferings Prospero causes them, 
so, too, these inmate actors are driven through theatrical playing enactively to engage the 
tragedy that put them behind bars in the first place. This process, however, does not 
always run as smoothly as Prospero’s design does in the Shakespearean playtext. As I 
will discuss in the following section, the queer space of the Shakespeare rehabilitation 
programs comes into conflict with the teleologies of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation 
demands teleologies: the sequencing of cause and effect events, from inappropriate to 
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more socially authorized. In order to demonstrate the men’s teleological transformation, 
both “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars represent the redeemed inmate as caught 
within a temporal loop, willingly haunted by their past in the present. And it is precisely 
through these multiple temporalities that we witness queer subjectivity emerge to trouble 
the rehabilitative narrative. 
 
Queerly Repositioning the Other 
 The rehabilitative Shakespeares I examine in this chapter position prison as a 
space of social impossibility. The men in “Act V” construct an alternate space through 
Shakespeare in which they may explore the conditions of their imprisonment, but this 
belated construction of the non-normative fails to address the issue of redemption. This 
the normalizing goal of rehabilitation in Shakespeare Behind Bars, which is in turn made 
impossible by the structure of the institution of prison. Both films displace the system of 
evaluation by which an inmate can be redeemed from the regulations of prison and onto 
the implied figure of the spectator. The spectator, then, is situated in these projects in the 
position of power. We become the figures who are made to witness the ways in which the 
inmate subjects have dislocated from their pasts—that which they were—and have 
become more repentant. In this way, “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars position the 
spectator as judge and student: we are made to learn of the ways in which prison 
positions inmates to fail, but also to bare witness to the ways in which they work toward 
remorse in the face of such failure. In the process, the films assume, the spectator, too, 
102 
will come to learn that prison is not a social space that sincerely attempts to affect 
rehabilitation.28  
 I am most interested here in examining the queer subjectivity that emerges as a 
byproduct of the doubled and displacing move of shifting redemptive power from the 
social space of the prison to the implied figure of the spectator. It is with an 
understanding of the ways in which the spectator must authorize these projects as 
successful that we witness the queerness of rehabilitative prison subjectivity, and the 
agency it is imagined to produce, in its most troubled form. As I will argue, in order to 
occupy the role of both student and judge, the spectator is forced to understand 
rehabilitative prison subjects as simultaneously self-alienated and self-possessed, both 
altered and in the process of altering, strategically working on his own behalf. And it is 
this dual process of self-representation that doubles back on the efficacy of rehabilitation. 
The spectator must question whether or not the transformed and transforming subjects 
presented to us retain the possibility of unbecoming the redemptive subjects they are 
imagined to have already become.  
 The narratives of progress adopted by both “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars 
operate on different temporal levels to register rehabilitative success to the spectator.29 
                                                
28 Philip Auslander makes the argument that in the contemporary, multimedia-saturate moment, ontological 
differences between the “live” event and the virtual recording of the event (streaming live or not) no longer 
retain recognizable distinction. What’s more, he argues that the cultural place of the live event has receded 
into near oblivion. This may hold some truth, if we imagine, for instance, what witnessing a sporting event 
or music show as a large venue entails today: most often we watch the live performance on the jumbo 
screen that magnifies it so that spectators can feel close and more intimately apart of the event. However, 
prison Shakespeare remind us that in some social spaces, the live event still retains a fetishized 
understanding. Because we are repeatedly reminded that the inmates are just that, inmates, the film 
continually evokes and displaces the idea of a real-life crime that occurred in social space. This narrative 
looping accounts, at least in part, for the impossibility of the spectator to engage in the cinematic demand 
of Shakespeare Behind Bars. See: Philip Auslander, Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1999). 
29 Scholars of Shakespeare on film approach the multiple temporalities of today’s Shakespeare as endemic 
to the cultural process of adaptation—which I consider part of a broader conceptualization of the 
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First, the projects are structured by a sense of progressive time. This sense of progress 
becomes the mechanism by which the spectator may judge rehabilitative efficacy. For 
instance, the cinematic structure of Shakespeare Behind Bars serves to emphasize the 
notion of teleological transformation. It is divided into temporal segments, from 
September to May, the length of each Luther Luckett Shakespeare season. As each 
segment gives way to another, the spectator witnesses each inmate’s progress of self-
discovery and understanding. “Act V” is similarly structured, but by scenes of the final 
act of Hamlet. In the case of “Act V,” then, a sense of teleological development follows 
the structure of the Shakespearean playtext. Regardless of the fact that the play ends in a 
tragic vision of numerous dead bodies, the recitations of each inmate actor sound more 
sophisticated toward the end of the act than the beginning. The audio representation of 
rhetorical skill operates in the same way that progressive seasons operate in Shakespeare 
Behind Bars: both serve to establish a teleology of betterment. 
 However, what we are imagined to learn as spectators is a new understanding of 
humanity. In her book Shakespeare Inside, Amy Scott-Douglass documents the three 
years she spent and continues to spend working with prison Shakespeare programs. On 
the potential of prison Shakespeare, Scott-Douglass writes: “Shakespeare programs can 
provide an intellectually stimulating environment and enriching community, a fraternity 
or sorority of friends who are there to offer support…. Shakespeare is a creative, social, 
and spiritual life force; a vital and necessary reminder that, no matter what, we are all 
human beings.”30 For Scott-Douglass, Shakespeare becomes potential itself: to humanize, 
                                                                                                                                            
performance of rehabilitation itself. See: Deborah Cartmell, ed. Interpreting Shakespeare on Screen (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), and Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Adaptation (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2006).  
30 Amy Scott-Douglass, Shakespeare Inside: The Bard Behind Bars (Continuum, 2007), 129. 
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educate, and (re)create the subjectivity of both the inmate as well as those outside of 
prison. Included in the special issue of PMLA, Jonathan Shailor details his experience as 
facilitator in the of Muddy Flowers Theatre Troupe, a company of convicted actors in 
medium-maximum-security Racine Correctional Institution, that performs Shakespeare 
among other dramatists. Like Scott-Douglass, Shailor emphasizes the intersubjecivity-
effects possible when witnessing a prison Shakespeare performance: “While 
Shakespeare’s language at first seems formidably complex and alien, through making it 
their own they find a new voice. Those of us who witness their performance can no 
longer see them as base.”31 Also included, Jean Trounstine discusses the ways in which 
she continued her work with incarcerated women to co-found the women’s branch of 
Changing Lives through Literature, an alternative-sentencing program for probationers.32 
Trounstine’s Shakespeare Behind Bars: The Power of Drama in a Women’s Prison33 
reads like a memoir, a first-person reflection on the experiences of working with inmate 
populations, and the relationship between performing Shakespeare and individual and 
social change.  
 Programmatically, rehabilitation depends on difference and agency. It is one thing 
to represent the inmate actors within narrative structures of progress, but the inmates 
must also speak to the ways in which they have learned to unbecome that which they 
were. This process of unbecoming is as crucial to the performance of rehabilitation as 
linear progress. In other words, this process of unbecoming cannot register exclusively 
                                                
31 Jonathan Shailor, “When Muddy Flowers Bloom: The Shakespeare Project at Racine Correctional 
Institution.” PMLA 124.3 (2008): 623-41. 641. 
32 Jean Trounstine, “Beyond Prison Education.” PMLA 123.3 (2008): 674-77. 
33 Jean Trounstine, Shakespeare Behind Bars: The Power of Drama in a Women’s Prison (St. Martin’s, 
2001). 
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within a linear temporal frame. Rehabilitative difference must be established as a 
dislocation from the past. As such, both “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars rely on 
confessionals and personal testimonies to represent the ways in which inmates have 
unbecome that which they were. And it is through the confessional sequences that the 
spectator also learns most compellingly about the conditions of prison life and the ways 
in which individual are imagined to excel in the face of these conditions.  
 One of the major tenets of the Shakespeare Behind Bars program states that the 
inmates must work to “relate the universal human themes contained in Shakespeare’s 
works to themselves (their past experiences, their present situation and their future 
possibility), to other human beings and to society at-large.”34 Shakespeare Behind Bars 
teaches that redemption is only possible when one works to allow the past to erupt into 
the present, to confront past horrors in the present and prepare to face them in the future. 
In this way, the documentary figures the subject-under-rehabilitation within queer 
temporal terms, in which past, present, and future coalesce. And the spectator learns 
about the conditions of prison life most palpably and most compellingly through the 
confessional sequences. We learn that, as the men rehearse The Tempest, each cast 
member reflects on his past in hope of representing his crime in the future moment 
without reproducing the crime.  
 The documentary features four cast members who share confessional asides with 
the camera and become encoded within the documentary form as temporally fissured, 
allowing themselves to exist with the past, present, and a hopeful future in the name of 
rehabilitation. The most prominently featured cast member, Sammie, speaks candidly 
                                                
34 As quoted from supplementary materials provided on the DVD. 
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about the physical and sexual abuse he experienced as a child. He shares, “All this here 
pain and anger and frustration that lived inside of me, I had no outlet so I just shut it out. 
But inside there’s all of this rage, this anger.” Sammy has served a total of twenty years 
behind bars; initially he was sentenced to eight years with the possibility of parole. In one 
of his many tear-laden confessionals, Sammie explains that he is in prison for killing his 
mistress, Carol, after she threatened to divulge the details of their affair to his wife. In a 
fit of rage, Sammie strangled Carol and left her body in a vacant motel room outside of 
town. “The hardest damned thing I’ve ever had to do is forgive myself,” Sammie 
explains. “Each year I go through this experience, it seems to get harder and harder. I 
really have to fight to see the goodness in me.” But Sammie is a good actor; in fact, 
several of his peers call him “Alpha Male” because his acting ability far surpasses most 
others. Simply allowing himself to be good at something—in his case, acting—has 
become Sammie’s primary mode of rehabilitation and continues to force him to work 
through the events of his past–and in particular, his past crime—and question why he 
harbors such self-resentment.  
 Another inmate prominently featured in Shakespeare Behind Bars, Hal, explains 
that performing Tempest allows him to work through what he refers to as a history of 
silence and resentment that dominated his life before prison. “Not talking is what got me 
here,” he explains. The very act of performing, of speaking lines and speaking about his 
past has been Hal’s primary mode of rehabilitation. Hal was elected to play Prospero in 
the production because, as he explains, the role demands confession. Prospero must 
divulge to Miranda the previously undisclosed details of their banishment and the secret 
of his identity, that he was Duke of Milan. Hal identifies with the sense of secrecy 
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surrounding Prospero. He was sent to prison for killing his wife. When she told him that 
she was pregnant with their second child, Hal explains that he felt trapped in a life that he 
never wanted. In an attempt to escape, he dropped a hairdryer into his wife’s bathwater, 
killing her and their expected second child. Hal now identifies his rage with the fact that 
he felt forced to conceal his homosexual tendencies. In the documentary Hal speaks 
candidly of his sexual orientation—he now openly identifies as gay—but works to 
continually remember the rage that his past silence caused. His past silence and present 
candor become a productive tension that Hal embraces in his pursuit of a rehabilitated 
future.   
The inmates of Shakespeare Behind Bars are represented within a queer temporal 
logic, haunted, but willingly so, by their pasts. Carla Freccero explains the temporal 
structure of uncertainty as queer temporality. She writes, “the willingness to be haunted is 
an ethical relation to the world, motivated by a concern not only for the past but also for 
the future, for those who live on in the borderlands without a home.”35 Figured as an 
identity-less, border-crossing figure caught in the future-perfect, the haunted subject 
allows for a queered and queering occupation of temporal uncertainty, both within and 
without. I worked with the inmate of Shakespeare Behind Bars for approximately one 
month during their 2007-08 season, to specifically talk with them about the queer 
temporality in which the film figures them. Most figured themselves as willfully haunted 
by a sense of temporal and spatial decontextualization.  
One inmate, Louie, explained that the process of rehabilitation forces a subject 
into a sort of temporal void that allows for self-reflection: “I guess you would say it’s one 
singular moment. The past, present, future, it’s all right there. It’s like a black hole I 
                                                
35 Carla Freccero, Queer/Early/Modern (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 75.  
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guess. You kind of have to think about where you came from and where you’re going to 
go.” In Louie’s self-representation as a subject of rehabilitation, he figures himself as out 
of time, both caught and liberated between past, present, and future. He echoes the self-
representation of Larry, who is beginning his second year in Shakespeare Behind Bars. 
For Larry, the past takes on a spectral significance that ominously drives him to 
aggressively figure his own personal history in the present moment. As Larry describes, 
“The problem is that, like some ghoul in a horror flick, it [the past] just keeps hanging 
around. You can’t get rid of it. You know, that dead part of you just stays there and it 
stinks up the place. And it chases you everywhere you go. That’s the past. For a long time 
I let that just kill me. I let that just drag me down. That ghoul kept pulling me down into 
the grave with it. And I finally had enough.” For Larry, the past acts like a specter that 
continually haunts the present, and it is only at the moment in which one acknowledges 
the phantasmatic structure of temporality that he can work toward redemption and 
leading a socially-responsible lifestyle.  
For Big G, who plays Caliban in the film’s documented performance of The 
Tempest, queer temporality is figured as a simultaneously consensual and coercive 
Dickensian force of imprisonment and empowerment. “It’s the chains, especially in our 
case, that bind us,” he explained. “We are caught in time, forever linked with the crimes 
we have committed, so we always carry them with us. If you ever think they’re gone, 
somehow they will raise their ugly head and say ‘here we are. You can’t escape us. We’re 
the ghost of Christmas past.’ You can’t ever get away from that, not just as prisoners but 
any person.” Big G dislocates the haunted temporality of rehabilitation as an egalitarian 
construct imposed on more than the prison population; rather, phantasmatic time becomes 
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a product of subjectivity formation more generally, belonging to everybody by virtue of 
existing in time and space. Thus, in both the self-representations and the documentary, 
the inmate-actor is represented as a palimpsest, at once an embodiment of past 
experiences, present situations, and future possibilities. As the inmate attempts to propel 
himself into an ideal future—a future, for instance, involving self-sufficiency and life 
outside of a prison—he must account for the ways in which past actions have led to a 
present situation that demands rehabilitation. Put another way, rehabilitation demands 
causality; it demands that the subject repetitively take stock of past experiences in order 
to identify how and why he or she has arrived at their present situation. The necessary 
coexistence of past and present in rehabilitated subjectivity promises the projection into 
an emotionally and intellectually independent future.  
In the act of giving personal accounts of transformation, the inmates represent 
themselves as selves differentiated, self-possessed in a way that registers as self-
alienated. The effects of this double move, however, are as troubling to the rehabilitative 
project as they are authorizing. Judith Butler’s account of account-giving is helpful in 
understanding this paradox. In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler explore the problem 
of appropriating a system of norms—how to square away the adoption of an Other’s 
sense of morality as one’s own in a way that registers intelligibly—as most clearly 
evident in the performance of personal testimony. Giving an account of oneself, she 
explains, is never just that, but rather is a means of demonstrating that the account is 
connected to something much bigger than oneself. It is the “something” in this 
formulation that points toward relationality. Specifically, to give an account of oneself is 
to give an account to another and in language that is not one’s own. Butler writes: 
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An account of oneself is always given to another, whether conjured or 
existing, and this other establishes the scene of address as a more primary 
ethical relation than a reflexive effort to give an account of oneself. 
Moreover, the very terms by which we give an account, by which we make 
ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to others, are not of our own 
making. They are social in character and they establish social norms.36 
 
To give our account is to present ourselves to an other or others and to do so in an 
intelligible way, which means not only that the account must somehow be made coherent 
but that we as subjects must cohere in terms of the norms of intelligibility. To make 
ourselves intelligible means to conform to prior terms of intelligibility. Thus, the account 
precedes the subject within the terms that both precede and exceed our use of them. In 
one sense, this seems intuitive enough. An account of myself must have an addressee, 
even if only implied, and must be given using the discourses available to me.  
 In another sense, however, these facets of giving an account prove quite radical in 
the performance of prison rehabilitation. Though this claim may sound intuitive, as Butler 
acknowledges, it is also and problematically limited, in that it fails to account for the 
ways in which subjects are both restrained and constituted by systems of power. This 
leads Butler to deconstruct the very title of her book. She rehearses Foucault’s 
understanding of subjects as existing through the adoption of subject positions, specific 
and legible identity positions, by which subjects are in turn constituted and reconstituted 
by prior discursive practices. Butler paraphrases Foucault’s claim as follows” what “I” 
can be is quite literally and materially constrained in advance by a regime of truth that 
decides what will and will not be recognized as a form of being, as legible “I” in the first 
place. The “I,” in other words, depends upon antecedent constraints placed on the self. 
And these constrains of constitution appear most visibly when the subject attempts itself 
                                                
36 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University press, 2005), 21. 
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to offer a personal accounting for its being. In Butler’s paraphrased evocation of 
Foucault, we see that she is concerned with questions of ontology, since, as she explains, 
the performance of account-giving broaches the question of being. This entails an 
increased consideration of “the other” (which Butler claims that Foucault neglects) to 
whom an account must be given, imagined or otherwise. But Butler and Foucault seem to 
agree with the notion that the reflexive relation between any challenge to norms, or what 
Foucault would call a “regime of truth,” depends upon the establishment of identity 
positions from which subjects speak. Butler views this relation within extremely stark 
terms: “if I question the regime of truth, I question, too, the regime through which being, 
and my own ontological status, is allocated. Critique is not merely of a given social 
practice or a certain horizon of intelligibility within which practices and institutions 
appear, it also implies that I come into question for myself.”37 Which is to say: when one 
calls a set of norms into question, one always runs the risk of calling the self’s stability 
into question as well. 
 But is this always a risk? Might we see this risk as a strategy built upon risking 
the self’s very sense of stability? This possibility is the very foundational principle of 
rehabilitation—that which makes it an incredibly appealing paradigm of hope and 
futurity, as well as that which makes it a particularly troubled narrative in which the 
cultural imagination can invest. The spectator must understand the rehabilitative prison 
subject of rehabilitation as destabilized if we are to believe his personal account, and thus 
offer our power of redemption. We must understand that he retains the ability to act of his 
behalf, specifically to dislocate from that which he once was, in order to justify the offer 
                                                
37 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 23. 
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of redemption according to logics of the rehabilitation projects. This move of dislocating 
from the past becomes the basis on which rehabilitative reality is built. 
Yet, the represented rehabilitation programs aims to teach inmates what is and is 
not acceptable in society. There is a disciplining effect produced in the performance of 
rehabilitation, one that propels the subject into a sense of queer subjectivity. The 
rehabilitative impulse behind these texts rests on the demand to mimic (or refuse to 
mimic, in some cases) subjectivities espoused in the Shakespearean playtext. As Homi 
Bhabha argues, “Mimicry is … the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of 
reform, regulation and discipline, which ‘appropriates’ the Other as it visualizes power. 
Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however; a difference of recalcitrance 
which coheres the dominant strategic function.”38 The very performance of rehabilitation 
demands that the subject-in-process adopts a queer subjectivity, somewhere between 
appropriate and appropriated. The linear temporal structure of the film serves to register 
to the spectator that inmates have indeed appropriated the need to unbecome the person 
who committed crimes. Through the emergence of this queer subjectivity, inmates are 
imagined to operate on their own behalf, with the aid of the Shakespearean playtext.  
 
Coercions of Agency 
There is a paradox of agency operating in the interview sequences of “Act V’ and 
Shakespeare Behind Bars. “Act V” represents this most aggressively through the figure 
of Hitt, who continually asks the men about the details of their crimes. For Hitt, the social 
space of prison operates as an obstacle in his empathetic engagement with the inmates, 
                                                
38 Bhabha, Homi. “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” Modern Literary 
Theory: A Reader. Eds. Philip Rice and Patricia Waugh (Arnold, 1989) 234-41. 
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but so, too, does the willful agency of the inmates. They repeatedly refuse to fully 
disclose the nature of their crimes, details of their pasts, or offer confessions. Hitt’s 
narrative primarily follows a participatory mode of documentation, in which he shares 
with the company of convicted actors and his listeners alike the anxieties he feels upon 
entering a prison. However, history begins to haunt Hitt as much as it does the inmates, 
and threatens to undercut his documentary project. Nearing the close of the documentary, 
Hitt describes a gnawing curiosity about the inmates’ crimes and the details of their 
personal histories. He reflects: “Although I found myself playing a constant guessing 
game about this [their crimes], they wouldn’t discuss the past. ‘That was then,’ they said. 
‘This is now.’ But I had to know.” Hitt describes his horror when visiting the records 
depository and finally knowing the details of his new friends’ crimes. Still haunted by 
that familiar sense of alienation, he decides to confront the inmates with his partial 
knowledge as an attempt to seek out the real truth, not what is listed in court transcripts. 
Again, Hitt receives little satisfaction when the men answer his confrontation and the 
desire to know the details of their crimes.  
Because Hitt, along with the spectator, is positioned as the new Other, the entity 
which has the capability of evaluating rehabilitative efficacy because prisons cannot, the 
personal testimonials of the inmates are as much a product demanded by rehabilitation as 
much as they are of personal agency. In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry argues that the 
agency of personal testimony is always a displaced one. For Scarry, three features 
characterize modern disciplines of torture and serve to distinguish it from other forms of 
pain or interrogation: 
First, pain is inflicted on a person in ever-intensifying ways. Second, that 
pain, continually amplified within the person’s body, is also amplified in 
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the sense that it is objectified, made visible to those outside the person’s 
body (thus rendering pain communicable in a way that is highly atypical). 
Third, the objectified pain is denied as pain and read as power, a 
translation made possible by the obsessive mediation of agency. 
 
In situations of violence or oppression, she explains, language is always disciplined. 
Modern torture has taken on a primarily rhetorical function, rather than a particularly 
material one. Tortured bodies tend to metaphorize violence away from the body and onto 
matters of agency. The assault of the body does not register within semantics of the body, 
but rather as points of rhetorical acts. 
Like “Act V.” Shakespeare Behind Bars aggressively maintains that rehabilitation 
does indeed produce willfully remorseful subjects, but it troubles its own construction of 
reality by posing it back to the viewing audience: can society accept the offer of 
redemption from an inmate? What if that inmate is a statutory sex offender? While the 
film primarily follows expository and observational modes of documentation, it briefly 
gives way to performative mode in the climactic moment in the filmic argument over the 
necessity of giving and receiving redemption in the larger narrative of human survival. 
During an interview sequence with Leonard, one of the long-time members of the group 
who is only featured briefly because he is in solitary confinement, the documentary 
relates the dramatic structure of Tempest directly to the lived experiences of the members 
of Shakespeare Behind Bars. In a sequence announced with the intertitle “Week Eighteen 
(January) The Hole (Solitary Confinement)” the camera opens with an extreme close up 
on Leonard’s identification tag displayed in the small window of his solitary confinement 
cell. While maintaining a sense of unobtrusiveness commonly associated with 
observational mode documentary filmmaking, the mobile camera pulls back, still 
shooting through the window, as the spectator watches Leonard perform his daily routine: 
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he makes the bed (small cot), organizes reading materials, washes his hands, cleans the 
aluminum wash basin. As the camera observes Leonard’s routine, the film presents his 
words in voiceover: “I’ve been rehearsing my lines and things. Blank walls. That’s about 
all I can do. I’ve been going through all of Tempest, I’ve been doing all of my 
translations but that last speech by Prospero I’ve worked on memorizing and it really, 
really speaks to me. Unless you’ve really needed to be redeemed or shown some mercy, I 
don’t know if you really, truly appreciate those last few lines that he said.” 
At this point the documentary briefly, and only at this moment, enters into 
performative mode. As the camera cuts to a close up of Leonard, a disembodied male 
voice asks him, “So, why are you here?” After taking a twenty-five second pause, 
Leonard confesses, “I sexually abused seven girls. That’s the worst thing I’ve ever done.” 
The camera continues its long take as Leonard contemplates his response in silence; yet, 
filling the cinematic silence the film plays the audio of another interview with Leonard in 
which he says, “I’m hoping to successfully complete the treatment program…”  
 This moment is particularly disconcerting, not only because the film deploys the 
confession of a pedophile to confront the spectator, but also because Leonard sits in 
silence while he appears to be made to speak for himself, without actually speaking in the 
cinematic present. Finishing his own sentence, the camera cuts to a close up of Leonard 
motivated by a match on narrative rather than a match on action, leaving his 
cinematically represented materiality fractured. The film returns to a physically and 
vocally unified representation of Leonard as completes his sentence: “…and then after 
that, to be paroled. So that in some way, being freely given a choice, that I could live 
honorably and do something to make amends….to redeem my life so that I am not 
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remembered for the very worst thing that I’ve done.” In this single sequence, 
Shakespeare Behind Bars moves almost mechanically between observational and 
participatory modes of documentation. The filmic flirtation with participatory mode in 
Shakespeare Behind Bars serves to denaturalize the larger argument on the relationship 
between performance and rehabilitation in the linear narrative until this point, focusing 
spectator attention on Leonard’s confessional moment by troubling modal expectation 
and calling attention to the constructedness of the documentary form. For Scott-Douglass, 
Leonard’s confessional sequence embodies the narrative climax of the film and performs 
its central argument on the necessity and difficulty of offering redemption. She makes the 
case that “[i]n a documentary that is structured around the theme of forgiveness and 
redemption, the film delivers its ultimate challenge by putting the message of forgiveness 
into the mouth of an inmate that may be the most difficult to forgive, a convicted 
pedophile.”39  
If in “Act V” the inmates at the Eastern Missouri Correctional Complex become a 
potential “school of Calibans,” Shakespeare Behind Bars transforms the filmic spectator 
into something of a potential “school of Mirandas.” In Act One, scene two of The 
Tempest, Miranda pleads with her father to end the illusory shipwreck he created. She 
appeals, “O, I have suffered/With those that I saw suffer: a brave vessel” (5-6). Miranda 
acknowledges the constructed reality of the shipwreck: “If by your art, my dearest father, 
you have/Put the wild waters in this roar, allay them” (1-2). Acknowledging that the 
constructed quality of the image has little consequence on the reality-effect the image 
produces, Miranda still suffers at the sight. Because the film spends little cinematic 
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energy exploring the lives of the inmates’ victims and the details surrounding the 
affective consequences of crimes on those outside of bars, the affective economy 
circulates between the inmate and the spectator. By exclusively focusing on the 
experience of the inmates, the documentary adopts a mode of narration that relies upon a 
closed vantage point, presenting the inmates themselves as victims. 
The construction of Leonard’s confessional as well as Howard and Sammie’s 
deferment asks the spectator to sympathize with the fractured subjectivity and the 
fissured cultural standing of the inmate subject. Yet, as Scott-Douglass points out, the 
sequence also asks for spectator empathy, to affectively relate to the remorseful figure of 
a statutory sex offender. Leonard’s confession sequence offers a representation of the 
rehabilitative process and a reminder of the inability to (re)produce it. To produce the end 
point of rehabilitation is to embody remorse. Yet the problem is that remorse can only be 
embodied; it cannot be externalized in any objective form. The viewer cannot know if 
rehabilitation has “worked” for the men of “Act V” or Shakespeare Behind Bars. We are 
positioned as queerly alienated from knowledge of the inmate as he is of his self-
knowledge. Rehabilitation is as subjective as its pursuits. And still there is the issue of 
mediation. After all, Shakespeare Behind Bars is a documentary film, a representation of 
a particular historico-social aspect of cultural, not a reproduction of reality.  
 Whether or not the audience viewer is willing to offer redemption to Leonard or 
any of the convicted actors in prison Shakespeare rehabilitation programs, the film opens 
an intersubjective space for questioning the relationship among subjectivity, knowledge, 
and truth of an unmediated real—a real encounter (first-hand or mediatized) with the 
inmate, a real sense of intersubjectivity, a real Shakespeare. And yet accessing the truth 
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of the real is precisely what is demanded by both the performance of rehabilitation and 
the very use of Shakespeare in those pursuits. Bryan Reynolds argues that some popular 
“truths” have a profound impact on people without also having much credibility in terms 
of an academically approved history or a readily substantiated historical reality.40 In other 
words, if a particular culture believes in a “truth,” such as Shakespeare as the ultimate 
arbiter of cultural legitimacy or Shakespeare as a criminal, and its members live in 
accordance with that cultural fantasy, one could say that that cultural fantasy becomes—
indeed constitutes—authority and legitimacy itself.  In this respect, cultural fantasies 
become legitimate as they inform the lived experience of a society’s members. When the 
authority in question relates to unknowable subject matter—such as the author-figure of 
Shakespeare or whether or not a subject can become rehabilitated (with or without the 
Shakespearean playtext)—the possibility of that authority’s material substantiation may 
become diminished, but the same does not necessarily hold true for its cultural influence.   
 To be sure, Shakespeare comes to be constructed in the image of each inmate in 
the process of rehabilitation, however destabilized that image might be. The malleability 
of Shakespeare illuminates the fact that the cultural capital conferred upon him is 
necessarily both actual and imaginary; so is his lack of cultural capital. Thus, the 
transformative or authorizing power of the Bard is always both in and out of context. He 
represents the space in which the actual and the imaginary simultaneously collide and 
coalesce, a space in which the subjective meets everything that it is not. The oscillation 
between what is real and what is sensational and spectacular speaks to the texture of 
representation, and how cultural legitimization becomes authorized and de-authorized. 
Shakespeare Behind Bars asks the spectator to quest for an origin, to discover “the real,” 
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that which escapes the very imaginative fabric that weaves together these narratives of 
rehabilitation in prison, both its possibilities and limitations. We are asked to question 
whether the inmates really are repentant, as well as whether rehabilitation is possible. 
Likewise, the spectator must navigate his or her assumptions of what Shakespeare might 
signify. As critics—as well as spectators and cultural producers and consumers of the 
prison Shakespeare phenomenon—we would do well to question the real and imagined 
degree of cultural capital, if any, that follows not only the figure of Shakespeare, but also 
the culture figures in whose name Shakespeare iconicity is deployed. 
 
Disciplining Homosociality 
 In a recent episode of The Colbert Report, a political parody of The O’Reilly 
Factor, Steven Colbert reports on a recently established rehabilitation program 
implemented by the state of Massachusetts, entitled Shakespeare & Co.41 Colbert 
hyperbolizes, “I’ve never been a fan of “rehab”—it’s just a fancy word for coddling. This 
Shakespeare program…is the worst kind of rehab—look at the guy they’re using as a role 
model. Shakespeare was a debtor and a blackguard. His plays are immoral and they’ll 
only encourage our at-risk youth to engage in lesbianism, homicide, regicide, fratricide, 
matricide, suicide, and cannibalism.” As is the tradition of the Colbert Report, Colbert 
snarkily rehearses what he imagines to be the reaction from conservative media. This 
particular episode, entitled “Bard, as in these kids should be barred away,” explores the 
current cultural phenomenon of Shakespeare therapy in institutionalized rehabilitation 
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programs and the seeming inappropriateness of using Shakespeare to rehabilitate inmates. 
However, when the figure of Shakespeare enters the debate on whether or not 
rehabilitation works, the discussion lapses into a laundry-listing of non-normative 
identities and performances: lesbianism, regicide, even cannibalism. Each of these 
perverse performances threatens to dismantle the very project of rehabilitation: to 
reestablish a subject into society and to help that subject internalize societal regulations 
on what performances are and are not acceptable in various contexts.  
 In this respect, Shakespeare becomes a double signifier. On the one hand, he 
marks the potential for social degeneration and the threat of non-normative cultural 
practices as contagions. Part of the efficacy of the rehabilitation program represented in 
Shakespeare Behind Bars depends upon the cultural positioning of Shakespeare as a 
criminal, an identity-position that helps to authorize the rehabilitation space by creating 
an empathetic connection between the inmate and the literature he studies. This, the film 
suggests, is historical accuracy. But so, too, is the cultural anxiety that stage players can 
incite non-normative erotic engagements on the part of the spectator.  
Jean Howard has (in)famously asked, “how many people crossdressed in 
Renaissance England?”42 For Howard, the cross-dresser embodies a subversive or 
transgressive potential to call attention to cultural anxieties over an emerging sex-gender 
system. Certainly, cultural artifacts of the period suggest such anxieties. For instance, Hic 
Mulier speaks of the female crossdressers (or at least the imagination of it) on the streets 
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of London as “amazing mens mindes with their strange proportions.”43 Similarly, Puritan 
anti-theatrical tracts, such as John Rainbold’s Th’ Overthrow of Stage-Playes, warns 
against “what inconvenience and danger of vncleannesse cleaueth to this practice.”44  
On one level, Shakespeare Behind Bars represents the convicted as a company of 
men that rejects a Foucaultian dislocation of power, willfully empowering themselves 
precisely through their classification and commodification as an all-male ensemble of 
“convicted criminals” by developing a collectivist epistemology based on their mutual 
bondage, censorship, and drive to defy the “social death” so often associated with 
incarceration. Yet there are telling moments that undercut the depiction of an empowered 
homosocial male space with the anxiety of homosexual contagion. It is precisely because 
normative redemption cannot signify stably in the performance of rehabilitation that the 
film offers the spectator as consolation. Normativity, by films ends, comes in the form of 
heteronormative sexuality. During the initial casting process, the company decided that 
one of the cast mates, Red, is to play Miranda. It makes sense to everyone that Hal should 
play Prospero, Big G should play Caliban, and DeMond should play Ferdinand. The role 
of Miranda is the last to be cast, and Red is the last inmate to be assigned a role.  When 
asked about this casting choice, Red fumes, “They put the role on me. I rebelled against it 
because I said, ‘let me make the choice. Don’t make the choice for me,’ you know. But 
they made the choice for me because everybody else in a sense, it’s like the role didn’t fit 
them.” Red not only performs the only female role in Tempest but also embodies the only 
voice of dissent and disempowerment with the rehabilitation program. In prison, where 
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the act of consent is always a highly mediated performance, Shakespeare Behind Bars 
works to help inmates develop decision-making, problem solving and creative thinking 
skills; Red, however, describes feeling as though his ability to make a decision, a crucial 
decision—to cast himself in a role, as is the practice of the rehabilitation program—is 
foreclosed. Of course, not all the men are assigned the role they most want; the difference 
with Red is that he must play a woman. During rehearsals the other men taunt Red for 
playing Miranda. One unidentified cast member tells Red, “Come on girl, we’ll play with 
you. We’ll wait for you.” While Red continues to rehearse, he is clearly affected by these 
taunts, as he anxiously looks down and stammers through his lines. And Tofteland never 
intervenes; after all, the men are encouraged to resolve conflicts in the rehearsal space on 
their own. Tofteland only intervenes if there is impending physical violence (which is 
never represented in the documentary). And though the men’s taunts sounds suspiciously 
close to threats of sexual violence, these taunts are understood as part of the rehabilitative 
atmosphere: the men must learn to communicate with one another without a figure of 
authority acting as mediator.  
Toward the end of the season, however, Red affectively connects with his role as 
the ingénue. Despite himself, one day in rehearsal he realizes that, like Miranda, he was 
fifteen years old when he was told the truth of his father’s identity, discovering the father 
he had never known was white. The parallel between Miranda’s relationship with 
Prospero and Red’s relationship with his father opens a space of self-reflection for Red. 
In the rehearsal space, he discusses with his cast members the pain he felt in never 
knowing his father and in his mother’s refusal to answers questions about his father’s 
identity. Red’s affective connection with Miranda leads him to reconsider the company’s 
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casting choice as a coercive dynamic. Instead, Red describes his encounter with the 
figure of Miranda as an instance of fate in motion: “It’s hard to explain. This part here is 
just perfectly, truly for me… these virtues, and these feelings I’m having.” Red struggles 
to articulate his connection with the role of Miranda in front of the other men who at once 
support him and tease him for identifying with a young woman’s pain.  
Though Red’s initial voice of dissent marks Shakespeare Behind Bars as a trace, 
dissipating as quickly as they are represented. For Red, conviction—his formal 
declaration that Miranda was indeed the perfect role for him to play—is a retrospective 
construction. In an interview sequence after the final performance, Red explains, 
“Miranda helped me to deal with some of the things inside of me that needed to be 
developed, that needed to come out. It just helped me to be able to understand how caring 
and loving this young lady is, coming from the situation that she came from and the 
tragedy that she’s seen within her own. It’s just that you can be able to forgive someone 
no matter what type of situation it is.” Miranda teaches a quality of forgiveness necessary 
for Red’s successful rehabilitation, and marks the act of “playing the woman’s part” as 
performance caught within the dialectic of coercion and consent. The film focuses on the 
end result of playing the women’s role—a lesson in forgiveness and virtue—in a way that 
retrospectively deconstructs Red’s initial frustration and sense of powerlessness at being 
cast into a role he did not want.  
 When I met with the men of Shakespeare Behind Bars, I asked if they would 
elaborate on the anxiety over playing the woman’s part. Many avoided the question, 
explained that there was no anxiety, or passed on answering the question entirely. 
However, Hal was very candid on the topic. Hal explains that performing Shakespeare at 
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LLCC means finding an affective connection with one’s role. The problem lies in the 
equation between performance and embodiment, and the demand of the rehabilitative 
project to fully embody one’s role. Yet, the project of a male inmate embodying a female 
character reads as queer and dangerous within the prison walls. Hal explains, “Here you 
have to be macho. That’s the convict law. And if you’re seen as queer, you’re seen as 
less. There are very distinct roles. There’s punks and sissies and bitches. There’s no room 
in the society that’s here for a gay man….Playing a woman is seen as, you must then be a 
woman, if you can access that part of your persona.”   
 It would appear that there is little room in society outside of prison for 
homosexual representation of Shakespeare either. While Shakespeare can be made in any 
image, both “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars imply that there is a social limit to 
remaking Shakespeare, and that this limit is conditioned by what the implied spectator is 
willing to accept. Such a move implies that Shakespeare has become a particularly and 
troublingly conservative, heteronormative paradigm in the contemporary moment.  But 
other screen Shakespeares, not necessarily produced with a rehabilitative aim, seem to 
suggest otherwise. This raises the question: has Shakespeare become a strictly 
heteronormatively disciplining force in the contemporary moment? This is this question I 
explore in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
DREAMING JULIET: THE IMPOSSIBLE CONJUNCTION BETWEEN 
 
 SHAKESPEARE AND PORNOGRPAHY 
 
 
In 2002, the Supreme Court struck down a supplementary statute to the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996. The provision targeted the production, distribution, 
and consumption of “virtual” child pornography, or images of young adults in sexually 
explicit situations who have the appearance of minors. The law extended beyond 
traditional federal notions of obscenity—material so inappropriate according to national 
standards that it cannot be rehabilitated to possess any possible sense of social value. 
Larger in scope, the provision applied to “any visual depiction [that] is, or appears to be, 
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”1 In his majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy described the law as unconstitutional, in that its language is so broad it has the 
potential to censor some of the most canonical texts that may represent young people in 
sexual situations, but in ways that exhibit obvious artistic merit: “the statute prohibits the 
visual depiction of an idea—that of teenagers engaging in sexual activity—that is a fact 
of modern society and has been a theme in art and literature throughout the ages.”  
Kennedy turned to Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet to ground his point. He 
argued that Shakespeare’s Juliet is thirteen years old, and because of this, modern 
productions of Romeo and Juliet could theoretically fall within the parameters of virtual 
child pornography. Dissenting Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that the law was 
                                                
1 Quotes taken from Sandra Greenhouse’s “’Virtual’ Child Pornography Ban Overturned” in the New York 
Times (17 April 2002, A18). The law also made it a crime to advertise or promote material “in such a 
manner that conveys the impression” that it is real child pornography.  
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(potentially) constitutionally troublesome, but argued that a narrower reading rather than 
eradication should have been applied to the provision. He explains, “We should be loath 
to construe a statute as banning film portrayals of Shakespearean tragedies without some 
indication—from text or legislative history—that such a result was intended.”  
 In previous chapters, I have argued that Shakespeare acts with chillingly 
normative effects as a rehabilitation tool in urban youth and inmate communities. The 
queer subjectivity that a rehabilitated subject must adopt in the imperative to perform 
Shakespeare offers mediation on the ideologically-laden identity-effects that operate 
under the radar of the rehabilitative project as sanctioned by both Shakespeare iconicity 
and the Shakespeare playtext. Shakespeare becomes that which would coerce subjects 
into normative identities, but only insofar as the subjects consent to entering into the 
rehabilitative contract. In The Hobart Shakespeareans and My Shakespeare, the drive to 
produce properly nationalized subjects places systems of ethnic and cultural difference 
under erasure while producing an emergent socioeconomic middleclass. In This 
American Life’s “Act V” and Shakespeare Behind Bars, institutionally sanctioned 
programs designed to rehabilitate inmates into remorseful subjects who take 
accountability for their crime and who will resist a recidivistic return to prison, instill a 
doctrine of what it means to perform normative ideas of masculinity, to act like a man. In 
the claim, then, that Shakespeare is a transcendental signifier, it would seem that such 
transcendentalism comes with a heavy price, for there is a thin line between “acting out” 
through Shakespeare and falling in line.   
However, these rehabilitative performances are as troubled as they are troubling. 
Rehabilitation serves to buttress the fantasy that normative identity positions can indeed 
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be appropriated. In order to register such fantasies, rehabilitation belatedly produces the 
non-normative as a point of resistance against which rehabilitative success can be 
measured. We can think of queer subjectivity as a mode of multiplicitous identification: a 
subject must identify with the proleptically constructed non-normative identity position, 
but strategically so and to effect: only to the degree that such an identification can 
register as rejected, in the past, othered. But, of course, the act of occupying a non-
normative identity positions, even strategically, troubles the very logic that a subject can 
successfully dislocate from one identity position to another. Identification, then, becomes 
the unwieldy practice that the process of rehabilitation cannot fully subsume or control in 
its desire both to conceptualize and visually register transformative possibility. 
In the case of the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of a provision that would add 
further restrictions to arguably the most taboo mode of explicit sexual display, child 
pornography, Shakespeare enters into the debate as mediation on theory and practice. In 
theory, the Justices were in favor of banning virtual child pornography, of allowing the 
statute to operate as originally drafted; in practice, however, such restrictions threaten to 
censor Shakespeare. In the tension between theory and practice, Shakespeare’s position 
as arbiter of cultural legitimacy is as much under threat as it is threatening. What does it 
mean to link pedophilic pornography and Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet on the level of 
representation? And what are the consequences in separating theory and practice in this 
respect by claiming that, in practice, Shakespeare and pornography represent oppositional 
positions in culture but that, in theory, they traffic in a similar mode of potentially 
dangerous representation? Because a majority of the Justices believe that there is an 
intrinsic relation between the two, Shakespeare becomes that which forces them to strike 
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down the provision, and thus opens the door to pornographic play with virtual 
representations of children in explicit sexual situations. Put another way, to save 
Shakespeare and reaffirm his cultural position, the Supreme Court had to refuse the 
restriction of virtual child porn.  
This is an extremely perverse claim. The Supreme Court’s decision implies that 
the maintenance of Shakespeare’s position as the pinnacle of Western cultural legitimacy 
demands reiteration; but, in this necessary process of reiteration, they must necessarily 
legitimize a particular brand of pornography previously and legally defined as 
illegitimate. This is perhaps the most axiomatic demonstration of the ways in which the 
assertion of Shakespeare’s cultural legitimacy can rebound as a perlocutionary act, 
producing consequences both unexpected and in many cases unacknowledged. 
Shakespeare remains at the heart of the Western canon: this is less an argument than an 
observation; but the Supreme Court’s ruling demonstrates precisely how stating such an 
observation can cause unintended consequences.  
Here I shift my discussion of rehabilitation on the level of genre. In my previous 
chapters, I focus on contemporary audio-visual documentary and its self-avowed ability 
to represent the “real” Shakespeare in the process of institutionally sanctioned 
rehabilitation. In this chapter, I examine pornography, a “trash genre” equally obsessed 
with the real.2 Documentary theorist Bill Nicholas has noted the similarities between the 
                                                
2 In my deployment of the term trash genre, I evoke the work of media theorists like Philip Auslander and 
Rick Altman, who argue that all media genres are discarded or rejected to some degree. Genres emerge 
within a metonymic process that is always in conversation with and in opposition to more established 
modes of narrative. What is discarded today will likely catalyze genres tomorrow. Put another way, all 
media genres are queer hybrids, working with and resisting dominant modes of narrative in cultural 
imaginations. However, I want here to rethink this dynamic by separating the terms trash and recycling. 
While I agree that all media genres at some point involve recycling of previous forms, this is not to say 
certain genres are not “trashed” or relegated to obscure status in popular imaginations, usually because 
these genres are not made visible in popular culture or in critical treatments. And, as one person’s trash in 
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genres of documentary and pornography, and indeed considers pornography one of many 
modes of documentary filmmaking: “pornography idealizes sexual relations (imbuing sex 
with both a documentary realism and a mythic idealism). Each offers its idealizations as 
moments of contemplation that comply to their own internal norms for rhythm, pace, and 
duration rather than to those of the surrounding narrative.”3 In other words, pornography 
and documentary film may involve different means of representation, but both work to 
imbue their means of representation with the effect of a direct, or as direct as possible, 
relation to reality. It is because of pornography’s obsession with the real that the genre 
represents the ultimate test of Shakespeare’s rehabilitative potential. While Shakespeare 
may occupy the acme of cultural legitimacy, pornography occupies a decidedly 
oppositional space. Pornography offers a fascinating examination of Shakespeare’s 
culturally transformative potential because it is one of the most paradoxically positioned 
genres in contemporary culture. It remains one of the highest grossing modes of 
contemporary film, and many cultural critics have discussed the ways in which 
pornography saturates contemporary media, to the point that avowedly un-pornographic 
materials in mainstream popular culture have adopted pornographic aesthetics.4  
                                                                                                                                            
another’s treasure, the genres I classify here as trash will, no doubt, trouble my classification as the process 
of making and inhabiting genre continues through time and space. For the current moment I dub the texts I 
treat as representative of “trash genre,” or hybrid modes of narration that are neither made visible in 
contemporary theaters and media venues, and are rarely examined within the field. See: Philip Auslander, 
Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture (New York and London: Routledge, 1999) and Rick 
Altman, Film/Genre (London: British Film Institute Publishing, 1999). 
3 Bill Nichols, Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary (Indiana University Press: 
Bloomington. 1991), 213. 
4 For a discussion on the ways in which mainstream popular culture has adopted pornographic aesthetics, 
see: Kaarina Kikunen and Susanna Paasonen. “Porn Star as Brand: Pornification and the Intermedia Career 
of Rakel Liekki” in The Velvet Light Trap 59 (Spring 2007): 30-41; and Heather Butler, “What do you call 
a Lesbian with Long Fingernails? The Development of Lesbian and Dyke Pornography” in Porn Studies, 
ed. Linda Williams (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 167-197.  
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Yet, pornography is critically positioned as a cultural limit case, a cultural artifact 
with little to say beyond the offensive self-announcement “I am porn.”5 I present 
pornography as the limit case in the examination of Shakespeare’s ability to cross 
boundaries, to blur culturally sanctioned lines of propriety and impropriety. In witnessing 
the ability of Shakespeare to cross generic boundaries and move into the realm of the 
pornographic feature, I suggest, we also witness an ideological mediation on what 
particular sexual identities cannot be crossed, either by Shakespeare or by pornographic 
features, without producing particularly spectacular cultural anxieties.6  
                                                
5 Andrew Ross points out that in always declaring itself as pornography, pornography is not only what it 
says but also how it names itself. In other words, pornography is always metapornographic, always 
performatively self-announcing. In what follows, I take a cue from Ross. The ways Shakespeare 
pornographic films name themselves as “adult features,” “sometime Shakespeare adaptations,” and when 
they refuse nominations, present telling moments in how Shakespeare comes to be performed by 
marginalized subjects in the current historical juncture. See: “The Popularity of Pornography” in No 
Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 171-208.  
6 It has become customary to offer as an epilogue to academic treatments of pornography. Somewhere near 
the beginning of the average scholastic text on porn comes a small explanation of the project that reads like 
an apologia. They all read differently, but somehow the same. For instance, from Linda William’s 
Hardcore: Power, Pleasure, and the Frenzy of the Visible: “[…] even though I know that the slightest 
admission that not every image of every film was absolutely disgusting to me may render my insights 
worthless to many women, I also know that not to admit some enjoyment is to perpetuate an equally 
insidious double standard […]” (xvii). And from Denis Gile’s “Angel on Fire: Three Texts of Desire”: 
“Once the film ends, [the viewer of pornography] must return to the ‘real’ world. What is he to do outside 
the theater with his aroused libido? He can redirect it from the fantasy love object on the screen and to a 
real sexual partner who may or may not live up to the fantasy. He can once again repress his desire, or it 
can be sublimated into such tasks as writing this paper” (41). These little libidinal acknowledgments and 
scholastic qualifiers are set apart from the body of the text in the preface or introduction, and they function 
to declare the content of the tract itself: "Scholastic ruminations on the nature of pornography informed by 
acknowledgment of scholar's own sexual drives appended. Please continue.” 
 I find this trend disheartening, but necessary, if only because the apologetic trend of these projects 
demonstrates that academic work on pornography must formulaically confront skepticism of intellectual 
legitimacy from inside the field. Let me offer this: in this chapter I do not engage in questions of the ethical 
or moral quality of pornography as a genre. I distance myself from these debates here because it seems 
whenever this topic is posed, there is no way out of it. Judith Butler’s work on pornography has 
demonstrated as much. Rather, I analyze pornography here based on how pornography represents itself as a 
genre and as a marginalized genre inappropriately read by dominant society. As in my previous chapters, I 
am little concerned with the truth of the many ideological claims evoked either implicitly or explicitly by 
rehabilitative Shakespeares or the cultural process of rehabilitation. Instead, I continue my work of 
analyzing the discursive conditions within which such truth claims may be posed. See: Judith Butler, 
Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York and London: Routledge, 1997); Denis Gile, 
“Angel on Fire: Three Texts of Desire” in The Velvet Light Trap, 16 (Fall 1976): 41-45; and Linda 
Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989). 
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Pornography and documentary relate on a mutually paradoxical relation to the 
real and what it means to represent reality as a documented event independent of the 
camera’s presence. Pornography remains firmly anchored in the “real world,” not least in 
the way the genre strives to make desired objects visible and achievable. It is obsessed 
with the real—with demonstrating the empirical reality of arousal and orgasm, even to 
the point of overdetermining these performances until they resemble no one’s real life.7 
Indeed, its “realistic” portrayal of sexual display or sex acts is pornography’s central 
problem, both in terms of how its manages its own systems of representation as well as 
how its manages itself within legal restrictions.8 In legal contexts, visual images are more 
liable to be found pornographic for this reason, and anti-porn activism is no more 
committed than pornography itself to the idea that porn has real effects. For both pro- and 
anti-porn activists, as Judith Butler notes, “the real is positioned both before and after its 
representation: and representation becomes a moment of the reproduction and 
consolidation of the real.”9 The realism of pornography is, however, always under strain. 
Despite this emphasis on the real, pornography tends toward the elimination of external 
or social reality. The real on which pornography relies is a claim about bodily presence, 
but this realism is still evaluated by affect: Do you believe the sex act actually happened? 
And did it get you off, or at least, did it get you going? 
When it comes to the conjunction between Shakespeare and pornography, these 
questions mutate into something like: Are there really Shakespeare porn films? But are 
they really Shakespeare porn films? The notion of Shakespeare pornography might 
                                                
7 Williams, Linda. Hard Core 
8 Hunt, Lynn. “Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800” in Feminism and Pornography, ed. 
Drucilla Cornell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 355-80, 363. 
9 Butler, Judith. “The Force of Fantasy: Feminism, Mapplethorpe, and Discursive Excess” in Feminism and 
Pornography, ed. Drucilla Cornell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 487-508, 488. 
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sounds as novel as it does absurd. To be sure, though, these films do exist, and in prolific 
numbers. Pornographic adaptations of Shakespearean playtexts are as abounding as other 
subgenres of both pornography and Shakespeare adaptations. To cite a few: Shakespeare 
In and Out (dir. Peter Sushitari, 1999) is shot in “mockumentary” mode and follows 
aspiring Shakespearean actor Richard Longfellow as he works in the porn business but 
just until he gets his big break on the real stage, while Live Nude Shakespeare (dir. 
Michael D. Fox and Dale Evans, 1997) sets Shakespearean verse to strip tease and in the 
process points up particularly bawdy double entendres. Shakespeare Revealed (dir. Ren 
Savant, 2001), Romeo and Juliet and Romeo and Juliet II (dir. Paul Thomas, 1997 and 
1998) document how rehearsing Shakespeare can act as a sexual contagion for the actors 
and spectators. Others adapt the playtexts to address specific modes of erotics: West Side 
(dir. Ren Savant, 2000) rewrites Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story (dir. Jerome 
Robbins, 1961) as a hardcore interracial sexual affair; Romeo and Julian (dir. Sam Abdul, 
1993) references Romeo and Juliet to create a musical pornographic feature about two 
West Hollywood gay male lovers who experiment with polyamory and grapple with 
problems of infidelity; A Midsummer Night’s Cream (dir. Stuart Canterbury, 2000) 
imagines the green world as an erotic play space in which the fairies explore their lesbian 
desires, Titania realizes her affinity for bestiality, and a transgender Puck revels in self-
love; A Midsummer Night’s Bondage (dir. Art Crow, 1993) images that the tensions 
between Titania and Oberon can be remedied by introducing the queen to the intricacies 
and pleasures of BDSM10 rope play; and Taming of the Screw  (dir. Jim Powers, 1997) 
operates within a blatantly misogynistic imaginary that stages Peter and Kate’s 
                                                
10 For clarification, I use “BDSM” as a complex acronym derived from the terms bondage and discipline 
(B&D, B/D, or BD), dominance and submission (D&S, D/S, or DS), sadism and masochism (S&M, S/M, 
or SM). 
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relationship in consensual sadomasochistic terms: he forces her to have sex with two of 
his male friends to break her will, and with two women so that she can learn to be a better 
lover, but because Kate has entered into an S/M contract with Peter, the viewer can only 
assume that she desires and enjoys the abusive treatment.  
As the titles suggest, these films most often flaunt in their taglines that as 
Shakespeare pornography, they are merely calling upon Shakespeare as a pretext for 
depicting explicit sexual display. For instance, from A Midsummer Night’s Cream: “What 
(Horny) Fools these Mortals Be.” Live Nude Shakespeare ponders: “To Bare or not to 
Bare.” Others purport to have little to do with Shakespeare beyond titular reference. 
Shakespeare In and Out markets itself as “The Spinal Tap of the Porn Industry,” which 
plays up its parodic quality without any direct reference to Shakespeare.11  The Secret Sex 
Lives of Romeo and Juliet (dir. Bethel Buckalew, 1969) offers in its tagline an 
advertisement of its acclaim: “Winner Best Erotic Film Cannes Film Festival.”  
Yet there remains a select group of pornographic adaptations that market 
themselves as rehabilitations of Shakespeare, direct engagements with either the playtext 
or Shakespeare’s iconicity in a way that offers an historical intervention in the reception 
of the classics. In this particular context, rehabilitation takes the performative form of 
dislocating a subject—namely, the subject of Shakespeare’s reception in the 
contemporary moment—from non-normative understandings—those that would 
understand Shakespeare as an emblematic figure of conservative cultural values. 
Rehabilitation operates on the level of the spectator. We become the would-be docile 
                                                
11 My understanding of the parodic and the use of humor in pornography is heavily indebted to the work of 
Constance Penley and Laura Kipnis. See: Penley, “Crackers and Wackers: The White Trashing of Porn” in 
White Trash: Race and Class in America, eds. Matt Wray and Annalee Newitz (New York: Routledge, 
1997) 89-112; and Kipnis, “(Male) Desire and (Female) Disgust: Reading Hustler” in Cultural Studies, eds. 
Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler (New York: Routledge, 1992) 373-91. 
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subjects of this disciplinary mechanism. And the “normalizing” goal toward which these 
projects work demands of us that we internalize the inherent perversity not only of the 
Shakespeare playtexts, but more to the point, the ways in which Shakespeare’s cultural 
capital can and is refashioned in incredibly perverse ways—ways that destabilize the very 
notion that Shakespeare can indeed embody conservative values. The pornographic mode 
of rehabilitation in these films, then, is incredibly perverse, not in the least because they 
invert traditional understandings of normativity and non-normativity as related to 
conservative and liberal ideologies, respectfully.  
In this chapter, I argue that select pornographic adaptations deploy Shakespeare as 
a figure of cultural legitimacy to rehabilitate their cinematic project, that is, to give their 
screen traffic the seeming appearance of being something more than explicit sexual 
images moving though celluloid and strung together with a tenuous or nonexistent 
narrative. For instance, in its tagline Shakespeare Revealed suggests that as a film it 
offers: “The classic laid bare.” Tromeo and Juliet (dir. Lloyd Kaufmann, 1998) crows 
itself as playing fast and loose with historical accuracy: “Body Piercing. Kinky Sex. 
Dismemberment. The Things that Made Shakespeare Great!” Both films propose to strip 
Shakespeare of restrictive cultural conventions and return the playtexts to an original 
meaning, to reinstall his greatness. Of course, this is a perverse notion in of itself. 
Shakespeare functions as a paradigm of rehabilitation, not only in pornographic 
adaptations but in rehabilitative Shakespeares more generally, precisely because the 
signifier Shakespeare is imagined to occupy the acme of legitimate cultural authority. 
These films propose to reinstall his greatness by refashioning it in a particularly 
countercultural tone. The implication here is that Shakespeare has been made particularly 
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conservative in his contemporary image, an image that the films briefly suggest (and only 
in their taglines) as an attempt to unsuccessfully suture over the sexual perversity of the 
early modern period. The rehabilitative performance is also imagined to cut both ways. 
Perhaps porn legend Nina Hartley describes Shakespeare’s transformative potential on 
pornography most succinctly. In an interview on her experiences working on A 
Midsummer Night’s Cream, Hartley makes the claim, “By adding Shakespeare to 
anything you automatically class it up.”12  
Can Shakespeare actually rehabilitate pornography, that is, “class it up” and out of 
the cultural position of bad taste spectacle? And can pornography actually say something 
meaningful about Shakespeare? Though slightly different questions, both intersect at the 
nodal point of spectator reception and the problem of history. The rehabilitative project 
that these films purport to enact exists on the level of appearance only. While filmic 
taglines like those of Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet propose that the films 
rehabilitate Shakespeare in some significant—or at least signifiable—way, neither film 
offers an engagement with the Shakespearean playtext that registers as particularly 
faithful or sincere. Rather, they parody their engagements by refusing to reference 
Shakespeare beyond a recycling of culturally conservative understandings of his 
playtexts. Parody, of course, is a mode of engagement, but one with a particularly 
ideological agenda, a desire to engage with ideology as its primary object of engagement. 
Popular parody of Shakespeare often coexists with the notion that Shakespeare has 
emerged in the contemporary moment as an aesthetic touchstone or ethical resource, and 
as such the object of parody is not so much Shakespeare as a historical figure or the 
                                                
12 As quoted in Douglass Lanier’s Shakespeare and Modern Popular Culture (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 43. 
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intricacies of playtexts themselves, but rather the ideologically restrictive systems of 
cultural value in which Shakespeare circulates as a historical figure and as the author of 
such intricacies.13 For instance, in both films the figures of Romeo and Juliet are 
condensed to the cliché notions in which they operate in contemporary mythology: the 
star-crossed lovers who ascend to cultural imagination as the arbiters of heterosexually 
normative romantic love. These films evoke Shakespeare and offer a tongue-in-cheek 
promise toward rehabilitative aim, to ultimately stage the claim that Shakespeare as a 
signifier has been subsumed within particularly conservative and heteronormative 
ideologies.  
They stage the conjunction between Shakespeare and pornography, both as a 
refusal and an impossibility. In Richard Burt’s analysis of Shakespeare pornography, he 
notes that the conjunction between the two forms inevitably results in failure: “For the 
pornographic to signify in relation to Shakespeare one would have to be able to construct 
a love scene, say between Romeo and Juliet, as specifically Shakespearean sex. I can see 
no way this could be done. While it is possible to ‘porn’ Shakespeare, it would appear 
that porn cannot be ‘Shakespeared.’”14 It would seem, then, that ultimately Shakespeare 
has little to say to pornography, while pornography refuses to say anything about 
Shakespeare. The films I examine follow this logic, but to effect. Burt’s conclusion 
registers a rather tired critical understanding of pornography as having nothing really to 
say. Zizek epitomizes this stance. He describes pornography as that which always goes 
                                                
13 For more on popular Shakespeare parody, see Lanier’s Shakespeare and Modern Popular Culture, esp. 
chs. 1 and 4, and Thomas Cartelli and Katherine Rowe’s New Wave Shakespeare on Screen (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2007), esp. chs. 2 and 5.  
14 Burt, Richard. “Deep Inside William Shakespeare: Pornographic Film and Video ‘Classics’ and the 
Castrated Gaze” in Unspeakable ShaXXXspeares (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998) 77-125, 121. 
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too far, and in the process “it misses what remains concealed in the ‘normal,’ 
nonpornographic love scene.” He writes:15 
The unattainable/forbidden object approached but never reached by the ‘normal’ 
love story—the sex act—exists only as concealed, indicated, ‘faked.’ As soon as 
we ‘show it,’ its charm is dispelled, we have ‘gone too far.’ Instead of the sublime 
Thing, we are stuck with vulgar, groaning fornication. The consequence is that 
harmony, congruence between the filmic narrative (the unfolding story) and the 
immediate display of the sexual act, is structurally impossible: if we choose one, 
we necessarily lose the other. In other words, if we want to have a love story that 
‘takes,’ that moves us, we must not ‘go all the way’ and ‘show it all’ (the details 
of the sex act), because as soon as we ‘show it all,’ the story is no longer ‘taken 
seriously’ and starts to function as only a pretext for introducing acts of 
copulation…The fantasy ideal of a perfect work of pornography would be 
precisely to preserve this impossible harmony, the balance between narration and 
explicit depiction of the sexual act, i.e. to avoid the necessary vel that condemns 
us to lose one of the two poles. 16 
 
For Zizek, the failure of porn lies in its dependence upon simulacra rather than seduction. 
Pornography “shows it all,” “real sex,” and for that very reason produces the mere 
simulacrum of sexuality, while the process of seduction consists entirely in the play of 
appearances, hints and promises, that is, textually seductive effects. It is notable that 
when discussing the ways in which pornography “goes too far,” Zizek’s language lapses 
into a system of euphemisms that would substitute mild or vague terms—“normal,” “love 
scene,” “gone too far,” “faked,” “show it”—for the harsh, blunt and sometimes offensive 
quality of the pornographic image. In this respect, his language performs what he argues: 
that pornography has no narrative, and thus cannot produce discourse because it doesn’t 
say anything. It only shows. While pornography traditionally has no or little narrative, 
this should not be confused with the claim that it has no teleology. Indeed, as Zizek’s 
                                                
15 Zizek, Slavoj. “Pornography, Nostalgia, Montage: A Triad of the Gaze” in Looking Awry: An 
Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991) 107-22, 110. 
16 ibid. 
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claim references, the problem with pornography is that is has multiple teleologies. It 
depicts multiple sex acts that achieve multiple climaxes, one after another.  
But what might it mean for a pornographic film to stage its refusal to produce 
discourse on a subject, specifically a subject like Shakespeare who is considered as 
having produced some of the most culturally valued and recognizable narratives? To 
stage an impossibility is to construct that impossibility, and in the process of 
construction, establish possibility as a threat, one that continually haunts from the inside. 
To stage the impossible, then, is to open the door to the return of possibility. It is to insist 
on impossible possibilities as inevitable returns. The impossible may prove its own 
possibility against the subject’s desire. In staging the impossible relation between 
Shakespeare and porn, these films go to great lengths to cordon off the language of the 
Shakespearean playtext from the visual semiotics associated with soft- and hardcore 
pornographic imagery. Ultimately, the staged impossibility of Shakespeare’s 
rehabilitative influence on pornography becomes failed enterprise. Regardless of the 
pornographic will to irreverence, as I will argue, Shakespeare ultimately does function as 
a defiantly rehabilitative force in the representation of explicit sexuality and the forms 
that sexuality takes. It would seem that even when a culturally marginalized genre like 
pornography refuses to faithfully adopt Shakespeare as a rehabilitative tool, the 
rehabilitation takes place regardless, with or without authorization.  
As a means into the transformative potential in the conjunction between 
Shakespeare and pornography, I limit my conversation on pornographic Shakespeares to 
adaptations of Romeo and Juliet. In what follows I trace the ways in which these 
adaptations stage the conjunction between Shakespeare and pornography as radically 
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disparate genres that are too opposed in cultural imaginations of legitimacy to co-exist in 
a hybrid form. I also call attention to the ways in which this staging of impossibility 
rebounds as a rehabilitative project.  
Richard Burt has noted the adult film industry’s intense attraction to Romeo and 
Juliet in particular, which has spawned its own pornographic commercial following.17 
While these X-rated adaptations are prolific, I am most interested in the ways in which 
the pornographic imagination comes into conflict with the playtext’s place in 
contemporary mythology. Jonathan Goldberg has brilliantly argued that in suspending 
systems of historical inevitability, there opens a possibility of reading what he calls “the 
history that will be,” or the potential to disrupt teleological narrative that draw distinct 
and unyielding lines of development from the past to the present, as well as from the 
present to the future.18 There exists the possibility, in other words, of representing the 
myth of Romeo and Juliet without specifically situating history and cultural myth as 
inalienable. Romeo and Juliet is a story that popular culture, from Hollywood blockbuster 
to amateur porn, cannot resist telling. These stories are transformed in their reiterations 
from anecdote to archetype, from entertainment to myth. In the process of reiteration, as 
Goldberg suggests, the terms of historical inevitability can also transform. Pornographic 
retellings faithfully traffic in the myth of Romeo and Juliet as both romantic lovers and 
culturally defiant. They become mythologized figures who are faithful to one another but 
also whose rebellion is most pointedly directed against what Shakespeare is made to 
represent in the pornographic imaginations of these films: authority, propriety, age, and 
                                                
17 Burt, Unspeakable ShXXXspeares, 89-91. 
18 Jonathan Goldberg, “The History that will Be” in Premodern Sexualities, eds. Louise Fradenberg and 
Carla Freccero (New York and London: Routledge, 1996) 1-21. 
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respect for tradition. The latter explicitly caters to pornographic storylines, while the 
former seems to pose a threat to the pornographic economy. 
The rehabilitative tensions of conjoining Shakespeare and pornography are most 
apparent in the figure of Juliet and the ways in which her sexuality comes to be encoded 
in the pornographic imagination. From cinematic open to close, her sexuality moves from 
what I consider here “perversely pornographic lesbianism”—ultimately disavowed girl-
on-girl sex represented as preparatory for heteronormative love—to what is perhaps the 
most perverse mode of sexuality in a pornographic film: heteronormative sexuality in its 
most “vanilla”—or straightened out and decidedly non-kinky—and romantic 
representation. What I’m suggesting, then, is that Shakespeare becomes the unimaginable 
beard under which pornography traffics in perverse play. It represents a mode of 
performing Shakespeare in order to shock and tantalize the spectator; but ultimately, and 
in the process of representing Shakespeare as hopelessly conservative, the films offer the 
spectator a mode of pornography that cannot close the deal. The films I examine evoke 
Shakespeare as a figure that authorizes heteronormativity, but in evoking such 
teleological modes of sexuality, the films cannot escape the normative loop they wish to 
dismiss. 19  
                                                
19 For the sake of space, I have confined my argument specifically to pornographic revisions of Romeo and 
Juliet, but this should not suggest that pornographic handlings of other Shakespearean playtexts do not 
follow a similar logic. Though this is not necessarily a totalizing logic, other notable pornographic 
rehabilitations likewise produce perversely heteronormative teleologies, particularly displaced on female 
characters whose self-determination often thwarts easy understanding of successful performances of 
marriage or feminine duty. In this chapter I reference other films that work within a similar logic as 
Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet, but at the moment, they remain traces. As of yet, there is no 
critical work on the queerness of the heteronormativity operating in pornographic Shakespeares, but three 
scholars have worked to understand the larger systems of heteronormative logic operating within this 
subgenre more generally. See: Richard Burt’s Unspeakable ShXXXspeares, esp. ch. 2; Douglass Lanier’s 
Shakespeare and Modern Popular, ch. 4; and Courtney Lehmann’s “Out Damned Scot: Dislocating 
Macbeth in Transnational Film and Media Culture” in Shakespeare, the Movie II: Popularizing the Plays 
on Film, TV, and DVD, eds. Lynda E. Boose and Richard Burt (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 
231-51. I maintain that pornographic adaptations represent a relatively unexamined and productive site 
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Setting the Stage of Impossibility 
 Here I present two pornographic adaptations of Romeo and Juliet that I consider 
emblematic of the rehabilitative tensions in the larger tradition of rewriting the playtext 
into a sexually explicit vernacular. The first, Shakespeare Revealed, is a hardcore 
adaptation that follows a fictional cast of amateur actors as they work to produce a 
legitimate staging of Romeo and Juliet in modern dress. Like many adaptations that 
dramatize the rehearsal process of a Shakespearean playtext, the actors’ lives begin to 
resemble those of their characters.20 Primarily, the film’s Juliet figure (conveniently 
enough named Julie) whose sexual proclivities transform from what one would expect in 
hardcore pornography—multiple partners, multiple positions, multiple orgasms—to a 
sexuality more in line with cultural understandings of Juliet as the sign of monogamous 
heterosexual union. The second pornographic Shakespeare, Tromeo and Juliet, is a 
decidedly parodic adaptation written in the fantastical vernacular of post-apocalyptic 
Manhattan punk subculture. Like Julie in Shakespeare Revealed, Juliet’s sexuality 
becomes a point of contention in the adaptive project.  
While the films differ in their mode of engagement with the Shakespearean 
playtext—one is a backstage adaptation and the other a vernacularization—both mark 
their cinematic engagements and disengagements in their treatment of the Juliet figure. 
The Juliet comes to represent the anxiety of performing within two prescripted 
                                                                                                                                            
wherein we might explore the ways in which heteronormativity desires produce queer logics as unintended 
byproducts.  
20 In the term “back stage adaptations,” I refer to film adaptations of Shakespeare’s works like: To Be or 
Not to Be (dir. Ernst Lubitsch, 1942), Children of Paradise (dir. Marcel Carne, 1945), Double Life (dir. 
George Cukor, 1947), Shakespeare Wallah! (dir. James Ivory, 1965), Throne of Blood (dir. Douglas 
Hickox, 1973), and Get Over It (dir. Tommy O’Haver, 2001), to note only a few of these films. More 
specifically, pornographic films that adopt a “back stage” mode of adaptation include the films I have 
previously described: Shakespeare In and Out, Live Nude Shakespeare, and Romeo and Juliet I and II.  
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discourses, Shakespearean filmic tradition and pornographic film convention. What 
emerges from the ambivalent cinematic projects is a Juliet whose sexuality becomes an 
anxiety for the other characters as well as herself. For both films create a dreaming Juliet, 
an overly passionate young woman haunted by nightmares in which her sexuality 
threatens to becomes uncontrollable. The impossibility of mediating Shakespeare and 
pornography and the threats involved in such mediation condense in Juliet’s dream 
sequences. 
Shakespeare Revealed takes a radically conservative stance in the film’s opening 
sequence by unequivocally positioning Shakespeare and porn as mutually exclusive 
terms. Both the narrative conflict and climax rest on the cast’s ability to produce a 
successful performance of Shakespeare on stage, but hardcore sex continually undercuts 
these pursuits. The film opens with a close up of Julie who offers a sober recitation of the 
balcony speech, which goes surprising well until she is distracted by offstage sucking and 
slurping sounds. When she realizes that her castmates are having sex against the wall 
stage right, she breaks character and waits in frustration for the two to finish their vulgar 
scene, absolutely refusing to continue the serious work of Shakespeare in the presence of 
such unprofessional carnality. Julie wants to be a legitimate actress. At this point, the film 
lapses into pornographic mode. No longer discernibly Shakespeare-related, the film 
becomes hardcore sexual fantasy, including close up shots of various modes of 
penetration, multiple and frequent sexual positioning and repositioning, and, of course, 
the quintessential “money shot” (visible ejaculation, frequently on the body of the 
woman). When the hardcore sex scene ends, Julie attempts to resume her recitation. In 
yet another moment of deferral, an offstage voice demands that she take a break to regain 
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her composure. A confused Julie wonders why she is accused of losing composure, since 
she refused to perform during or participate in the sex scene, until she realizes she is 
standing naked on stage. With a scream of horror—which sounds curiously similar to a 
moan of ecstasy—she wakes to find the entire sequence was a dream.21  
Julie’s nightmares recur throughout the film. In one sequence, she cuts short her 
performance as six cast members are so turned on by her recitation of and dedication to 
Shakespeare that they collectively tag-team her. In another, she breaks character when 
she realizes that in addition to delivering a beautiful recitation she is also inadvertently 
riding the actor playing Romeo. These recurring dreams weave in and out of the filmic 
narrative to structure the hardcore sex scenes. They effectively blur the lines between the 
tenuous storyline of the cast’s rehearsal sequences and Julie’s anxious fantasies about 
Shakespeare’s power to sway the wayward subject. Her nightmares of the mutual 
incompatibility between Shakespeare and pornography coalesce with her dream of 
becoming a legitimate actress. 
Through the dreaming Juliet figure, the film establishes an easy hierarchy of 
cultural legitimacy. For aspiring young Julie, porn represents illegitimacy and that which 
would impede her ascension to professional success, while Shakespeare comes to 
represent the idealization of cultural transformation. Shakespeare belongs upstage and 
behind the proscenium; representations of explicit, hardcore sex belong offstage, in the 
wings, out of the way. Shakespeare represents the structure of social apotheosis, the 
climax of legitimacy, while pornography remains firmly set at the base level of cultural 
                                                
21 Perhaps unsurprising, pornographic adaptations of A Midsummer Night’s Dream also use dream 
sequences to structure sex scenes, and particularly all-female ones. For instance, A Midsummer Night’s 
Cream opens with a soft fade in on a lesbian fairy grotto, where Titania teaches her train in the ways of 
self-love. The next shot fades out to an image of a transgender puck masturbating the now disappeared 
fairies, which offers the impression that the lesbian circle jerk was an onanistic transgender fantasy.  
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performance and spectacle. It is the destructive opposition to all that “doing Shakespeare” 
promises. By refusing to allow Shakespeare and porn to share the same space of 
theatrical spectacle, the film positions Shakespeare as a sublime object of desire, that 
which is repeatedly approached but never quite got at. The hardcore sex merely gets in 
the way of Julie’s dreams of becoming a legitimate actress, and the pornographic content 
merely defers the Shakespearean content.  
 And yet, the impossible conjunction between Shakespeare and pornography exists 
as a dream project, or more precisely a recurring nightmare. What does it mean to stage 
Shakespeare’s position of cultural legitimacy as a horrific dream? To stage the very 
impossibility upon which the film begins? Julie’s dream that dogged dedication to 
Shakespeare can become a mode of legitimization is representative of the programmatic 
impulses in the larger body of rehabilitative Shakespeares. Yet in the pornographic world 
of Shakespeare Revealed, this dream of legitimization becomes a haunting enterprise, a 
nightmarish trap. The question then becomes: how is it that for Julie a dream of 
legitimacy slides so easily into a nightmare of sexual impropriety? While it would offer 
little insight to put the character of Julie “on the couch,” it is important to note how her 
dreams function in the film. In Interpretation of Dreams, Freud describes what he calls 
“dreams of convenience”: “I am a good sleeper and not accustomed to be woken by any 
physical need. I can succeed in appeasing my thirst by dreaming that I am drinking, then 
I need not wake up in order to quench it. This, then, is a dream of convenience. Dreaming 
has taken the place of action, as it often does elsewhere in life.”22 In the case of dreams of 
convenience, discourses of psychological wish and motive are irrelevant; instead, Freud’s 
                                                
22 Sigmund Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Avon Books, 
1998), 157. 
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discussion centers on the effects of the dream, how it function in the performance of 
everyday life: it allows one to continue dreaming. The dream of convenience functions as 
virtual satisfaction enacted through a surrogated, virtual performance.23 In Shakespeare 
Revealed, Julie’s dreams offer a convenient structure of substitution, displacing the 
Shakespearean pornographic sex for the fantasy of Shakespearean pornographic sex.  
Like any other surrogate, however, Julie’s dream fails to displace the latent dream 
content. In order to exclude Shakespeare from the explicit sexuality of the pornographic 
feature, the film must necessarily bring the two together. While the dream sequences 
position Shakespeare and pornography at odds, in the very act of staging their opposition 
the film must allow both the Shakespearean and the pornographic content to share 
cinematic space. While they are kept at bay on the theatrical stage, Shakespeare and porn 
must mutually occupy the cinematic focus before their differences can be established. In 
this way, then, the positioning of the difference between Shakespeare and pornography is 
as constructed as it is convenient for the parodic cinematic project. The performance of 
positioning the difference between Shakespeare and pornography becomes a failed 
project, one that the film flaunts in its very use of dream sequences as that which would 
cordon off boundaries of legitimacy. In order to cinematically represent Shakespeare and 
pornography as mutually exclusive cultural signifiers, the film must represent the two in 
conjunction before it can establish their differences, thus undermining their differences 
                                                
23 In my use of the term “surrogation,” I take a cue from Paul Roach work on the relation between history, 
memory, and cultural performance. He describes surrogation as the process of substitution that is made as 
“actual or perceived vacancies occur in the network of relations that constitutes the social fabric” of a 
culture (2). This process is manifested through effigies, rites and rituals, and everyday practices, as well as 
theatre. “The key to understanding how performances worked within a culture, recognizing that a fixed and 
unified culture exists only as a convenient but dangerous fiction, is to illuminate the process of surrogation 
as it operated between the participating cultures” (5). See: Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic 
Performance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). For an example of the ways in which this 
term has been productive in opening discussion on contemporary Shakespeare, see Cartelli and Rowe’s 
New Wave Shakespeare on Screen, esp. ch. 2. 
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on the level of legitimacy. If the conjunction between Shakespeare and pornography is a 
project of impossibility, then, it is a project of staged impossibility, which doubles back 
on itself.  
While Shakespeare Revealed produces a staged disappearance of Shakespeare, 
Tromeo and Juliet parodies what it would mean to dismantle the hierarchy of legitimacy 
between pornography and Shakespeare entirely. The film plays upon the cultural anxiety 
that conjoining Shakespeare and pornography will erase social boundaries to dire effects. 
Douglas Lanier has noted the way in which the film blatantly spoofs Baz Luhrmann’s 
William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet (which was released the previous year), and in the 
process of parody marks its refusal to signify within the economy of the popular 
Shakespeare film adaptation tradition.24 But it also markets itself as a softcore feature that 
refuses to circulate within the pornographic tradition. Operating as a sort of pornographic 
anti-porn, the film represents explicit sexual content but only after recursively saturating 
its Manhattan cityscape with the threat of incest.  
The film deploys the threat of incest to undermine its position both as 
Shakespeare adaptation and pornographic feature. In the film’s opening sequence, the 
Tybalt figure, Sammy, tries to persuade his sister—with rhetoric and drugs—to have sex 
with him. He gropes her breasts while preemptively retorting her apprehension:  “Heck, 
you, know, the way the world is now, we’ve got gang bangers, we’ve got perverts, we’ve 
got anorexia. Everything’s in style. If we just add a little incest into the mix, pretty soon 
the world will be like one great big hug.” Sammy fails to seduce his sister, and the incest 
taboo remains a threat until we meet Juliet. Her father, Cappy Capulet, repeatedly 
threatens to rape her, and it is suggested that he already has. During one of her “time 
                                                
24 Lanier, Shakespeare and Modern Popular Culture, 101. 
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outs,” Cappy drives home his lesson that Juliet should be a dutiful daughter and obey him 
by dressing her in pink leather wrist and ankle shackles, with a matching pillbox hat. The 
next shot cuts to a sweat drenched Cappy in his underwear and a dejected looking Juliet, 
which offers the fair assumption that Cappy has just raped his daughter. And in the most 
grotesque realization of the incest threat in the film, Juliet realizes only after she falls in 
love and has sex with Tromeo that they are brother and sister. While incest pornography 
may have its own cult following, the threat is hardly sexy in this film; instead, incest is 
positioned as a consequence of social deterioration, and this deterioration itself has 
consequences: at film’s end Tromeo and Juliet have given birth to three monstrous 
progeny. In this observation, I don’t mean to imply that the notion of social deterioration 
is not particularly sexy; queer theory as a field of critical examination itself suggest 
otherwise. Rather, to consider incest sexy in this film, we must also take with it 
heterosexual reproduction, which, as I mention earlier, is explicitly marked as the 
monstrous, but nonetheless final scene of the film. 
 In its recursive return to the threat of father-daughter and brother-sister incest, 
Tromeo and Juliet overdetermines cultural anxieties of what might happen when 
structures of legitimacy and illegitimacy collide, when the regulations of high and low, 
good taste and bad taste, and other binaries of cultural propriety are suspended.25 To 
bring Shakespeare into a pornographic realm is to lose all that Shakespeare is imagined to 
signify: the foundations of humanity and civilization as we know it. In Michel Foucault’s 
                                                
25 Margaret Jane Kidnie refers to Tromeo and Juliet as “a vehicle for the articulation of distinctly end-of-
the-century social anxieties” (112), and argues that the film reveals the historical and cultural determination 
of the “essentialist category of true love” (119). See: “The Way the World is Now: Love in the Troma 
Zone” in Shakespeare, Film, and Fin de Siecle, ed. Mark Thornton Burnett (St. Martin’s Press, 2000) 102-
20. 
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formulation, incest “occupies a central place in western culture” in that “it is constantly 
being solicited and refused; it is an object of obsession and attraction, a dreadful secret 
and indispensable pivot.”26 In Totem and Taboo, Freud describes the incest taboo as a 
foundational aspect of civilization because it governs the appetites, delays gratification of 
desire, allowing the “primal horde” to emerge from a competitive and murderous 
existence to one in which fraternal identification and restraint order the social 
community. It is important to note the ways in which Freud’s narrative of social 
regulation is prior in the sense that he constructs the process from prehistoric times 
through successive stages of social organization: from the “primal horde” to the return of 
patriarchy in familial and political organization. He must explain the stages of human 
history by construing a prior stage, as well as subsequent ones, in order to put together a 
coherent narrative, a causal explanation on the essential “truth” of the present time. To 
dismantle the incest taboo in the present time—or at least in the cinematic world of 
Tromeo and Juliet—is to deconstruct the originating premise: that the foundation of 
civilization needs the incest taboo. By first erasing cultural taxonomies of propriety and 
performance—like the mixing of Shakespeare and porn—the film takes the threat to its 
most extreme vision: that “everything’s in style.” Incest operates as a sardonic warning in 
Tromeo and Juliet: this is what happens when Shakespeare is made to perform 
pornography. 
While Tromeo and Juliet constructs the conjunction between Shakespeare and 
pornography as a social crisis in the form of an erosion of the incest taboo, it is nowhere 
as horrifying as it is in representations of Juliet’s sexual experiences. The film condenses 
                                                
26 Foucault, History of Sexuality. Volume One: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, Vintage, 
1990), 108-9. 
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the threat of social deterioration in the figure of Juliet. During the day, the dreamy young 
woman fantasizes of a life free from her father’s control, one in which lines of sexual 
propriety are respected and publicly acknowledged; at night she becomes trapped in 
reminders of the pornographic cosmos in which she is scripted. In one dream sequence, 
she gives birth to rats that claw their way out of her belly. In another, she seductively 
approaches a rather Fabio-looking would-be lover, but recoils in horror when she 
discovers that his penis is actually a snarling serpent ready to devour her.  
The film clearly represents Juliet as the female sexual hysteric who conflates her 
fear of the phallus with a fear of the penis, and the anxiety that she will be consumed and 
subsumed in the pornographic economy that surrounds her; it doesn’t take Freud to see 
that. But here Lacan is helpful. He has famously argued that neither men nor women have 
the phallus because all subjectivity is constituted by lack upon entering the system of 
language. The alignment of phallus with penis veils lack in the male, a veiling which is 
facilitated by the organizing principle of kinship known as the Name-of-the-Father, that 
which equates the father with the Law of Kinship and so exempts the male from the 
“castration” instated by the Law of Language. In other words, the structuring language 
does not inherently accord lack to women and plentitude to men, but rather it comes to 
participate in ideologies of sexual difference through the equations of phallus with desire, 
and penis with phallus. As Lacan puts it: “[W]hen the Name-of-the-Father organizes the 
rules determining marriage, reproduction, lineality, abode, and inheritance, the Law of 
Kinship Structure exists in a contradictory relationship to the Law of Language” (42). 
The dominant fiction hides this disparity between “castrated” masculinity by equating the 
penis with the phallus, and in the process conflates the actual and symbolic father. Judith 
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Butler explains, “In Lacan…sexual difference is not a simple binary that retains the 
metaphysics of substance as its foundation. The masculine ‘subject’ is a fictive 
construction produced by the law that prohibits incest and forces an infinite displacement 
of a heterosexualizing desire.”27 
In the grotesque space of Tromeo and Juliet, psychoanalytic theories of sexuality 
are as parodied as Shakespeare and pornography. This film traffics in overdetermined 
visual literalizations, so it is perhaps unsurprising, but nonetheless grotesque, that the 
film deploys father-daughter incest to frame its metapornographic moments of parody. 
When Juliet wakes screaming after her nightmares, her father enters her room in both an 
excited and disciplinary mode. Misrecognizing her screams of horror as moans of 
ecstasy, he chides her, “How many times have I told you not to wake me with your 
screams? If you wake me with another of your screaming orgasms, young lady, it’s the 
time out room again.” After Juliet wakes in terror after her penis/serpent dream, her 
father incorrectly surmises, “You horny little girl. Probably dreaming of getting fucked in 
the ass, hmm?...You and those little punk rock friends, with juices coming out of every 
orifice in your body.”  Having already been not-so-subtly conflated with the symbolic 
father, Cappy demands after his chiding that Juliet name herself aloud before he leaves 
her bedroom as “Daddy’s little Crenshaw melon.”  
The paternal threat only ends when Tromeo and Juliet collectively and literally 
kill the pornographic father. Following the perverse logic of the film, the mode of 
sacrifice they choose is particularly Shakespearean—but not in the sense that they kill 
him according to Shakespearean plot. Rather, Juliet bashes her father’s face in with her 
sardonically enormous copy of the Yale Complete Shakespeare. The Shakespearean tome, 
                                                
27 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990), 37.  
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then, ushers the pornographic father of the law into the tomb. In the process, the film 
likewise bashes the spectator over the head with the notion that Shakespeare may 
disappear on the level of plot but he continually reappears as a symbolic remainder, one 
that the film uses toward violent ends.   
Cappy occupies the clichéd position of the porn spectator, in that he cannot 
properly read the climax of feminine desire, and thus lapses by default to the fantasy that 
the female subject in the pornographic project must be experiencing pleasure. 
Representing the female body has long been a point of contention in film studies, and 
pornography is little exception. However, in porn, the female body becomes a primary 
point of contention between the real and the simulacrum. Linda Williams has famously 
argued that one of the central contradictions of pornography is its “inability to make the 
invisible pleasure of woman manifestly visible and quantifiable.”28 The crisis of the real 
becomes a particularly gendered crux, and the displacement of the real by the simulacra 
presupposes the inability of the female body to signify sexual pleasure. Elsewhere in the 
film, female sexuality becomes the insatiable and uncontrollable erotic mode. For 
instance, Tromeo’s former love object, Rosie, repeatedly switches out male lovers, whose 
subtle dismemberment marks the film as a joke on the critique of female sexuality as a 
male anxiety. At the Capulet ball, she parades around a young man who is missing his 
middle finger, in a semiotic wink to the paranoid fantasy of the vagina dentata, the 
sexually insatiable woman who depletes men of their sexual resources. The film calls 
attention to itself as porn—in this way becoming metaporn—and, in so doing, deflates 
the fantasy that signifiers of real sex should be taken as the real performance. And yet, as 
I will discuss, this move likewise makes it particularly impotent as a pornographic film.  
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Pornographic Lesbianism 
I made the point earlier that pornography is traditionally read by critics as having 
no narrative, and is subsequently considered unable to produce discourse. Porn scholars 
like Linda Williams have troubled this claim, arguing that whether or not pornography 
offers a recognizable narrative has little bearing on modes of spectator pleasure to be had. 
In Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible,” she draws a connection 
between pornographic films and other Hollywood genres, primarily the musical.29 
Musicals use moments of affective excess—song and dance numbers motivated by an 
exuberant and uncontrollable emotion—to engage the spectator in ways that exceed 
cinematic narrative. In other words, evaluating pornography on the grounds of its 
narrative structure forecloses an understanding of how pornography operates on the level 
of spectator reception.  
In traditional handlings of pornography, the spectacular and the narrative are 
positioned as mutually exclusive modes of receptive engagement and cinematic structure. 
The assumption is that the (most often already tenuous) plot of the film stops at the 
spectacle of sex, a move that Shakespeare Revealed overdetermines in its opening scene. 
The unmotivated visual excess of the spectacle of explicit sex acts overpowers the 
linearity of meaningful acts that narrative is meant to organize. What’s more, the 
spectacular undermining of narrative is supported by the very materiality of cinematic 
production. Blocking changes, as do camera angels, sound, and often times lighting 
design, while the film focuses its cinematic energies on the choreography of highly visual 
sexualized bodies. Sex acts, in other words, are understood as compromising the holistic 
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contextual reality of the film. Pornographic sex acts as a semiotic marker of the trauma of 
the failure of narrative, a trauma that pornography memorializes to spectator affect. 
Without narrative, the spectator engages with the film on the most affective, that is, 
carnal level.  
Pornographic rehabilitative Shakespeares, however, trouble easy delineations 
between spectacle and narrative, and their presupposed mutual exclusion. In both 
Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet, there is a recognizable (and recognizably 
tenuous) narrative, one borrowed from the most boiled down pulp fictions of what Romeo 
and Juliet is about: boy meets girl, boy and girl fall in love, boy and girl defy societal 
regulations to be together. (In these films, like in most other references to Romeo and 
Juliet in contemporary culture, forget the lovers’ suicidal end.30)  
While this structure offers a cursory narrative, the films deploy the Shakespeare 
narrative not so much as a pretext for the display of explicit sex acts, but as yet another 
display of irreverence and explicitness. Neither the narrative nor the sex acts stand in a 
pretextual relationship, but both serve as a mode of spectacle. Both the irreverent 
handling of Shakespeare as well as the sexual explicitness becomes a means of attracting 
the spectator. For better or worse, these films are far dirtier than Williams would have it, 
and more structurally complex than Zizek would recognize. They are far more concerned 
with spectacle than with mediating spectacle with narrative pleasure; Shakespeare 
pornography produces pleasure by both withholding and going too far. Thus, an 
understanding of their narrative structures offers little purchase here. As Diana Fuss has 
argued, “the idea that porn has no narrative or aesthetic pleasure beyond mere ‘getting 
                                                
30 The vernacular pornographic adaptation West Side is the only self-identified pornographic reworking of a 
Romeo and Juliet that incorporates Juliet’s suicide.  
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off’ has suggested the wrong criteria for evaluation.”31 Instead, an exploration of how the 
narrative becomes a spectacular attraction for the spectator offers an understanding of 
how Shakespeare becomes an unexpected rehabilitative force against the pornographic 
will to treat the playtext with irreverence.  
If the staged disappearance of Shakespeare as a narrative drive becomes a means 
of attraction for the spectator, then reading these films as examples of “cinema of 
attractions” offers a means of exploring how the tenuous narrative structure operates in 
the films. In his concept of the cinema of attractions, Tom Gunning relates the 
development of cinema to forces other than storytelling, such as new experiences of 
space and time in modernity, and an emerging modern visual culture.32 He describes the 
cinema of attractions as one of display rather than storytelling. Attractions function more 
as exhibitions than voyeuristic projects, as they explicitly engage the spectator’s sense of 
wonder. They also have a different sense of time: rather than building upon a linear 
temporal pattern, they work to display and remove series of images, replacing what has 
been seen in the past with something new and not directly related. Gunning explains that, 
“Rather than a development which links the past with the present in such as way as to 
define a specific anticipation of the future [as an unfolding linear narrative does], the 
attraction seems limited to sudden bursts of presence.”33 As such, attractions are 
characteristically brief and do not develop expectations based upon patterning. The 
suspense of attraction is not how but when it will occur: “The act of display on which the 
                                                
31 Diana Fuss, “Visualizing Safe Sex: When Pedagogy and Pornography Collide” in Inside/Out: Lesbian 
Theories, Gay Theories (New York: Routledge, 1991) 373-386, 378. 
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and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991). 
33 Ibid., 6. 
155 
cinema of attractions is founded presents itself as a temporal irruption rather than a 
temporal development.”34  
Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet operate similarly to Gunning’s 
understanding of cinema of attractions in that they call upon moments of Shakespearean 
narrative to engage and disengage the spectator on the level of Shakespeare. But there is 
an importance difference in their operation. In the cinema of attractions, present images 
are understood as replacing past ones, and thus engaging the spectator in an aggressively 
present manner. In the pornographic adaptation I examine, however, the past irrupts into 
the present. And while there is no discernibly linear temporal structure, there is a distinct 
and, more to the point, excessively troubling teleology in play.   
The playtext comes in as a previously authorized text, an anxiety of influence to 
some degree, but in a way that patterns the film’s parody rather than organizing its 
narrative. Certainly, in Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet, the sexual display 
is anything but a short burst. Indeed, there are perhaps more predictable pornographic 
conventions motivating the lingering camera, like “money shots” (close up shots of 
usually male ejaculation) and “meat shots” (close-ups of the penis thrusting in and out). 
This patterning is not the same as declaring a narrative development. While lingering 
shots, meat shots, and money shots are a distinctive pattern in pornography, they have 
little to nothing to do with the Shakespearean narrative. The films also deploy a cursory 
version of the playtext structure to open and close the film, in order to represent 
themselves as decidedly unShakespearean—that is, in parodying the ways in which 
Shakespeare has come to represent heteronormative, romantic love in the present 
moment.  
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The films call upon the myth of Romeo and Juliet in their patterning of sex acts. 
Again, they pattern the filmic project without producing a discernable narrative; rather 
the film uses the clichéd understandings of Romeo and Juliet as a paradigm for 
heterosexual love in a way that creates a distinct teleology, from first meeting to 
heterosexual consummation. There are only two narrative moments these films follow: 
first, both Romeo and Juliet are sexually unsatisfied before they meet; and second, they 
fall in love. The two points of meeting and falling in love work like the lingering sex 
scenes. Instead of “money shots” or “meat shots” we might think of them as “plot shots,” 
moments of the playtext that irrupt in a way that creates conditioned spectator affect. 
What lies at the heart of Shakespeare pornographic features is a queer dialectic whereby 
the attraction that is still based upon the exhibitionist display of the body and taboo 
subject is both extended and patterned, but with a pattern of curiosity, shock, arousal, 
display, and satisfaction rather than one within a diegetic framework. Pornographic 
rehabilitative Shakespeare promise of rehabilitation is intensely if not queerly 
contradictory. It is torn apart at its very center by conflicting impulses that shatter even its 
strongest illusions of meaningful cohesion and allusions to meaningful commentary, as 
well as efficacious resistance or irreverence. For in claiming that Shakespeare is made to 
represent heterosexual love, the film must represent specifically Shakespeare 
heterosexual love. But such representation cannot be taken as previously naturalized. 
Rather, the “plot shots” of Romeo and Juliet operate as narrative interruptions to the 
multiple teleologies of pornography. Heteronormative Shakespeare becomes a 
representable “event” framed as a proleptic flash-forward, an anticipation that never quite 
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registers as a successful teleology precisely because it can never quite signify as a stable 
past moment.  
These films, true to pornographic convention, are films that string together one 
explicit display after another, with plot points acting as bookends in the pornographic 
play on the playtext. However, in the stringing together, the very progression of 
organizing the sex acts, there emerges a distinctive teleology in both films. Juliet’s sex 
acts are softcore and lesbian in the beginning of the film, and move toward decidedly 
monogamous heteronormative love, which ends both adult features. Each film ends with 
the Juliet figure defying the structuring forces around her in the pursuit of true love. 
While the relationship is not always consummated, it is nonetheless monogamous and 
heteronormative romantic love. And it is this romantically normative move the ends the 
sexual acts organizing the features. Everything before Romeo and Juliet’s faithful 
coupling is fair game: vowed abstinence, incest, masturbation, same-sex flirtation. But 
the programmatic sexual act that opens these films is lesbianism. To mark the Juliets’ 
sexual dissatisfaction before meeting her Romeo, both films depict the would-be 
heteronormative lover as involved in what the spectator can only imagine to be a long-
term lesbian relationship with the films’ Nurse figures. What is troubling however, is that 
both films rewrite true love not only as heterosexual sex but also as dependent upon the 
rejection of same-sex female sexuality. 
In Shakespeare Revealed, Julie’s nightmarish visions of hardcore Shakespearean 
sex are as programmatic as what follows: softcore lesbian sex. After each nightmare she 
wakes to the comforting arms of her roommate who plays the Nurse in the amateur 
production. The roommate’s attempts to assuage Julie’s terror initially takes on a 
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maternal semiotic. For instance, in one scene she brushes the frightened woman’s hair. In 
another, she cradles Julie in her arms; and in a third, the roommate spoons Julie until she 
falls back to sleep. But what begins as a seemingly innocuous attempt at maternal 
comfort turns into the tease of lesbian sex. While the roommate brushes Julie’s hair, for 
instance, the camera pans down to reveal that she is not wearing panties, and the camera 
cuts away as Julie moans with the delicate yet surprisingly erotic sensation of having her 
hair brushed. Perhaps it goes without saying that while the Nurse caresses Julie back to 
sleep, both women are, we are to assume, naked under the covers. The viewer recognizes 
movements of the women’s hands beneath the covers, tantalizingly blocked from view, 
but the camera cuts away before the scene moves from anything other than highly 
suggestive. And while cradling Julie, the tender strokes of the topless roommate move 
from Julie’s temple to her breasts, eventually to resemble softcore nipple play. Again, the 
camera cuts away from these scenes prematurely, leaving the representation of lesbian 
sexual activity as something more suggested than suggestive. These lesbian-lite scenes 
are as numerous as they are (barely) softcore; but unlike the film’s parodic promise to 
present “The classic laid bare” by staging the impossibility of representing what 
Shakespearean sex looks like, it presents the lesbian sex scenes as (sometimes literally) 
undercover.  
There are two disparate but interrelated effects of failed representation at play 
here. First, the film stages its (failed) refusal to conjoin Shakespeare and pornography, 
only to repeatedly represent the two in sexually explicit conjunction; second, the film 
represents lesbian sex in the pornographic cosmos as that which is merely nodded at, that 
which is ultimately evoked but placed out of the frame. This suggests that Shakespeare 
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lends rather easily to the pornographic cinematic imagination, but in a way that acts as an 
alibi under which heteronormative ideologies of the insignifiability of lesbian sexuality as 
a discrete, or identifiable mode of practice.  
Julie’s nightmare sequences end—and along with them, the hardcore sex—after 
she falls in love with the actor who plays Romeo in the amateur production. She ends her 
sexual affairs with her roommate, the Nurse. Instead, she finds love in the arms of the 
actor who plays her Romeo on and off stage. Their relationship is written in the semiotics 
of modern romantic love. For instance, after rehearsals the amateur Romeo greets Julie 
with a bouquet of roses. And she greets him in return with a loving embrace, rather than, 
say, a lap dance or blowjob. Romantic and monogamous courtship supplants her 
previously softcore lesbian desire.  
While Tromeo and Juliet extends bad taste to every element of its satirical 
remaking of popular Shakespeare and pornographic Shakespeare, the film’s assault on 
tastefulness is nowhere more apparent than in the systems of sexuality that circulate 
within the film, especially its representation of same-sex female sexuality. Critics have 
noted in the film that neither Romeo nor Juliet is particularly chaste in a way that satisfies 
cultural demands of the young lover as primers on heteronormative love.35 In one scene, 
Tromeo flips through a stack of Shakespeare computer porn, perusing CD-ROM titles 
like “Merchant of Penis,” “Et Tu Blow Job,” and “Much Ado About Humping,” to settle 
on “As You Lick It.” The film represents Shakespearean sex as both a virtual and 
masturbatory fantasy, the unrealistic possibility. It also establishes early on that Juliet has 
had a long-term sexual relationship with Ness, the Nurse figure. While Juliet sits in her 
room trying to ignore the sounds of her father beating her mother downstairs, Ness 
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sexually comforts her young ward. Sitting astride Juliet, Ness offers tender kisses until 
the dejected Juliet responds in turn, and the scene quickly moves to heavy petting and 
nipple play. The lesbian sex scene ends with Juliet and Ness in side-by-side position, 
face-to-face with eye contact locked, as they simultaneously stimulate each other to 
synchronized orgasm.  
The film intersplices shots of Tromeo’s masturbation scenes with Juliet and 
Ness’s sex scene, which serves to analogize lesbian sex with the virtual Shakespeare sex 
and masturbatory practices of Tromeo. Cinematic editing represents the two as similar 
practices. Both become modes of non-sex, sex without reproductive threat, distanced 
from the sex that will be once Juliet and Tromeo finally meet in star-crossed fashion. 
Both become a virtual surrogate sexual act for romantic heterosexuality. The film goes to 
great lengths to represent the young lovers as virginal by positioning their early sex 
against their prenuptial sex. For instance, Tromeo chooses the “romantic love” option on 
his CD-ROM pornography rather than the other two available fantasies: pedophilia and 
coprophilia (fetish for fecal matter). In his sexual fantasy, marital fidelity must be 
promised before sexual intercourse. He vows marriage between his masturbatory groans 
and before he waves his computer cursor over the onscreen virtual woman’s breasts. The 
film also positions lesbian sex as equally masturbatory by virtue of its distance from the 
love contract. Juliet briefly interrupts her sex scene with Ness by offering the confession, 
“When you touch me, I dream about men.” Far from turning the scene into a parody of 
lesbian bed death, however, Juliet’s confession of heterosexual desire proves the ultimate 
kink Ness needs to finish the sex scene with satisfaction. In the vast archive of sexual 
possibilities in Tromeo and Juliet, it is Juliet’s sex acts that cannot signify on their own 
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terms, as the stably non-normative point of pasthood. Unlike Tromeo, Juliet engages in 
screen sex with someone other than herself, but in order for the film to maintain her 
figuration as the virtuous young woman, the lesbian sex scene is derided as both 
masturbatory and preparatory.  During sex with Ness, Juliet thinks about men, and when 
she finally has sex with Tromeo, she is well prepared thanks to her lesbian nursemaid. In 
Tromeo and Juliet, after Juliet finds Romeo, she ends her sexual relationship with Ness, 
who watches the two having sex with a tear in her eye to mark her broken heart. 
The act of placing lesbianism under erasure metacritically resonates with 
Shakespeare in a way that the films don’t address, nor do I believe they recognize. 
Impossible, unthinkable, made invisible: the descriptive qualifiers that prescribe the 
unintelligibility of conjoining Shakespeare and pornography echo those used in early 
modern studies more generally in accounts of how female-female sexuality has been 
traditionally read. Some scholars of premodern gender and sexuality have argued that the 
term “lesbian” represents a perverse anachronism, one that works to suture over historical 
difference. As the argument goes: “lesbian” is a particularly modern neologism born in 
the drive to create taxonomies of erotic identity, and thus stands as an imposition on the 
historical text which could possibly occlude the nuances between different historical 
understanding of sex, erotics, and sexuality, and the relation between early modern 
representation and practice more generally. Most often such scholarly exclusions look to 
Foucault’s claim in History of Sexuality that scentia sexualis begins a particularly 
modern, and specifically eighteenth-century, practice. Thus, for scholars looking for 
lesbians—or perhaps finding them in unexpected places—this poses a double problem. 
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First, lesbian invokes a translation issue, and invisibility introduces a problem in a 
representational crisis. How does one find that which is not there?  
In her important work The Renaissance of Lesbianism, Valerie Traub addresses 
this two-fold problem by indexing what she calls a “renaissance of representation” that 
“contravene[s] the standard critical orthodoxy . . . regarding the invisibility of lesbianism 
in Western Europe prior to modernity.”36 Traub explores the roles of women in the 
construction of sexual knowledge to make the claim that “the ways that social agents 
appropriated and deployed prior rhetorics . . . has been thus far an under-appreciated 
aspect of how the past was able to be queer,” and that the history of sexuality involves 
temporal crossings and identifications as well as ruptures and breaks. 37 (360). In her 
earlier article, Traub notes of the “(in)significance” of lesbian desire that female-female 
sexuality “only became oppositional when perceived as a threat to the reproductive 
designs of heterosexual marriage.”38 Attempts to place lesbian sexual practices under 
erasure signify as a particularly threatened patriarchal practice, the response to an 
infringement on heteronormative ideological. 
This helps us to understand more clearly that the failed lesbian love reflects back 
on the ways in which Shakespeare Revealed handles the figures both of Shakespeare and 
the spectator. In the same move, the film parodies porn conventions and the amazing 
cultural contortions that must mediate the positioning of Romeo and Juliet as 
heteronormative lovers. The effect is relatively simple and likewise incredibly troubling 
to the film’s cinematic project: in order to make the claim that Shakespeare cannot 
                                                
36 Valerie Traub, The Renaissance of Lesbianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7, 3.  
37 Ibid., 360. 
38 Valerie Traub, “The (In)Significance of ‘Lesbian” Desire in Early Modern England” in Erotic Politics: 
Desire on the Renaissance Stage (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), 150-169, 164.  
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represent lesbian sex, the film must likewise suture over lesbian sex as insignificant. In 
doing so, however, this film doesn’t perform anything particularly new. The inability to 
represent lesbian sexuality in Shakespeare registers instead as the pornographic refusal to 
do so. Shakespeare’ textuality becomes a displaced straw man, in other words, through 
which the film reproduces a relatively standard pornographic tradition of the disappearing 
lesbian. 
Heather Butler has noted the popular pornographic convention, from softcore to 
hardcore, of deploying lesbian sexuality as a primer for heterosexual sex scenes. 
Exploring the figure of the lesbian with long fingernails in mainstream (read: 
heterosexual) pornography, she argues: “In the hetero cosmos, the lesbian does not exist 
as a discrete being, and lesbian sexuality seems to serve as a comical substitute, with her 
sex tools merely serving as a reference to the heterosexual counterpart. The ‘lesbian,’ as 
she is typically represented in heterosexual pornography, is most often used as a warm-up 
for sex between a man and a woman.”39 The film deploys the often-cited figure of female 
sexuality in pornography as the problematic component, the figure of spectral anxiety in 
the erotic economy. Typically the pornographic “lesbian” is conflated as “one of the 
boys” or a surrogate male figure whose long fingernails or dildos metonymically stands 
in for the penetrative organ of choice for her counterpart, the heterosexual, virile male.  
While the same-sex female sexual displays in Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo 
and Juliet act as preparatory to the heteronormative unions, they are decidedly not 
precursors to heterosexual sex. Lesbian sex precedes heteronormative love—romantic 
love between a man and a woman—rather than acting as a catalyst for heterosexual sex.  
                                                
39 Heather Butler, “What do you call a Lesbian with Long Fingernails? The Development of Lesbian and 
Dyke Pornography,”168. 
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The Romeo figure never watches the lesbian spectacle for sexual arousal. Even when a 
Romeo figure does encounter same-sex female sexual display, his reaction is one of 
disinterest. This is most evident in Ren Savant’s recent adaptation of Romeo and Juliet, a 
full-length adult feature entitled West Side (2000), which in many ways becomes the 
sequel to his earlier Shakespeare Revealed.40 Disgusted by her parental guardians’ regular 
BDSM parties, Jules shares her frustration with her two best friends who collectively 
stand in for the Nurse figure. To comfort their friend, the two women playfully hold Jules 
down and strip her bare, as one bites her nipples and the other sucks her clitoris. Laughs 
and moans follow as the three-way progresses from soft- to hardcore. The Romeo figure, 
Ray, walks in on the scene to talk with his new love, and upon seeing her in an all-female 
three-way he shows neither shock nor excitement. When Jules notices Ray in the 
doorway, she simply leaves the bed and the two lovers get to the work of reciting the 
balcony scene in contemporary language. Pornographic lesbianism fails to function as a 
warm up for the Romeo and Juliet figures’ sexual escapades, nor does it signify shame, 
disgust, or transgression in any way that can be understood as sexy. It simply does not 
signify according to pornographic tradition.  
In pornographic Romeo and Juliet adaptations, Juliet and the Nurse 
programmatically fuck each other in ways that the films will not register as sexually 
enticing for Romeo. Less of a preparatory performance for heterosexual sex (“Practice 
makes perfect”), sex between woman registers as perversely naturalized (“That’s just 
what girls do”). What makes lesbianism particularly pornographic in these films is not 
                                                
40 Ren Savant adapts Romeo and Juliet in West Side and Shakespeare Revealed by using a similar cast: 
infamous male porn lead Wilde Oscar plays the Shakespearean authority (in both films his authority is 
marked by the fact that he has a British accent). He is the father figure in West Side and the director in 
Shakespeare Revealed. Michael J. Cox plays Romeo in Shakespeare Revealed and the unidentified gimp at 
the Capulet fetish party in West Side. And Dillon Day plays the Tybalt figure in both films. 
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that it is simply contextualized within the pornographic genre. Rather, it is excessive of 
the pornographic projects. While the representation of lesbian sex in pornographic 
adaptations of Romeo and Juliet resembles what Heather Butler describes as 
pornographic lesbianism, it is important to note the perverse ends it serves. I consider the 
sexual relationships between the Juliet and Nurse figures perversely pornographic 
because it serves to end the films in a queerly normative tone, which is to say, a 
normative end that can never be realized.  
In their refusal to operate by the rehabilitative guidelines establish in their 
taglines, Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet operate in an utterly clichéd mode 
of stringing together explicit sex acts with a narrative that is such a reduction of the 
Shakespearean playtext structure that it becomes almost unrecognizable. In the very 
move of irreverently effacing the playtext, however, the films operate within the very 
rehabilitative logic they attempt to reject. Both Juliet figures move from dissatisfaction 
with lesbian sex to monogamous and heteronormative union with their Romeos. By 
ending the film with the primary signifier of Romeo and Juliet in the contemporary 
imagination—heteronormative romance—the film forces the spectator to retrospectively 
reflect on the pornographic play that has come earlier. But because each film 
programmatically deploys a lesbian sex scene between Juliet and her Nurse, the films 
create a teleology, beginning with queerness and ending with heterosexuality. 
The teleological drive toward heteronormative sex retrospectively highlights the 
function of both the lesbian sex acts as well as the heterosexual ones. In pornographic 
adaptations of Shakespeare that position Shakespeare within heteronormative terms, 
Shakespeare emerges as normative but only to the point of perversity. By the end of 
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Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet, Shakespeare is straight to the point of 
warping. And we are left to wonder, what sort of porn is this? In comparison to the 
previous “meat shots” and “money shots,” the “plot shots” rehabilitate these films into 
unrecognizable pornography, pornography which ends with monogamy, romance, and 
heteronormative love. In Shakespeare Revealed, the spectator is to assume that Julie and 
her Romeo have yet to have sex, but are “taking it slow,” for they have both learned from 
previous experience that rushing sex can ruin a relationship. In West Side, the lovers 
consummate their love, which is catalyzed when they realized their mutual distain for 
kinky sex. They revel in their transgressive “vanilla” lifestyle, in their normativity, which 
becomes the queer mode of sexuality in the adult feature. Tromeo and Juliet ends on a 
somewhat more interesting tone. Since Tromeo and Juliet are brother and sister, their 
relationship is certainly non-normative; yet the final scene shows the two settled down in 
suburbia with three children, as Shakespeare watches on the scene with a smile and laugh 
of approval. The perversity of pornographic lesbianism, then, lies in its function as the 
mode of sexuality that leads to normative ends, representations of sexual unions that are 
perhaps the most perverse displays of erotics that a pornographic film can display. Is 
there anything more perverse than a pornography that ends in unconsummated love or 
pledged monogamy? 
While the representation of lesbian sex in pornographic adaptations of Romeo and 
Juliet resembles what Heather Butler describes as pornographic lesbianism, it is 
important to note the perverse ends it serves. I consider the sexual relationships between 
the Juliet and Nurse figures perversely pornographic because it serves to end the films in 
a queerly normative tone. Both films end as romantic comedies. The previous chaos and 
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confusion, moments of mistaken identity, and potential sexual digressions, are wrapped 
up in a heteronormative bow. But they certainly are not wrapped up neatly or completely 
in any stretch of the imagination. Much like Shakespeare’s romantic comedies, the 
endings are never quite as exciting as the moments of chaos and confusion. As the screen 
fades to black in Shakespeare Revealed, the camera lingers briefly on the cast of actors as 
they take their final curtain call after having, it is suggested, successfully performed their 
updated version of Romeo and Juliet before a live theater audience. Just before the frame 
fades to black, we see in the corners of the frame the first rows of the foldout chairs 
standing in for the theater audience. The seats are empty. Like the imagined theater 
audience, the spectator cannot authorize the filmic project as a successful one.  
 
Rehabilitative Desires 
Linda Williams argues that modes of moving image pornography, especially 
those that traffic in hardcore conventions that would place the confessions of real sex acts 
in the cinematic forefront in what she calls the “frenzy of the visible,”41 enact what 
Foucault has called scientia sexualis, scientific or ordered discourses that develop 
procedures for telling the truths of sex, truths that are geared to a form of knowledge-
power found in the confession. Foucault describes modern culture as proliferate with 
discourse that would purport to reveal the truth of sex, wrestle from it a confessional 
answer as that which it is. Along with the incitement to sexuality contained in the modern 
age’s proliferating discourses on the subject of sexuality comes an increasing tendency to 
                                                
41 Here Williams is working off Jean-Louis Comolli’s term “machines of the visible” to destabilize 
Foucault’s distinction between scientia sexualis and ars erotica. She explains, “Discourses of sexuality 
elaborated in the modern age reach a kind of crescendo in what film historian Jean-Louis Comolli has 
called ‘machines of the Visible”….a cinematic hard core emerges more from this scientia sexualis an its 
construction of new forms of body knowledge than from ancient traditions of erotic art” (35-6). 
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identify and address many different specialized sexual practices. In the process of 
identification and address, there follows the implantation within the truth of sex certain 
perversions, acts that within the power structure of knowledge and pleasure fall decidedly 
without the scope of sexual truth. Yet this revealing is also a mode of production; power 
operates in regard to sex not simply by forbidding desire or refusing to recognize it, but 
by putting into circulation a whole mechanism by which “true” discourses of sex are 
continually produced, which in turn continue to produce the subject.  
In this dialectic between production of discourses and the reproduction of the 
sexual subject, representations of sexual subjects come to reflect upon their construction 
and the systems of power that would purport to stabilize the truths of sexuality. The 
question in the conjunction between Shakespeare and pornography, then, becomes: what 
is the truth of Shakespeare sex, sex represented as specifically Shakespearean, sex 
demanded and unwillingly represented by an engagement, however irreverent, with the 
playtext? In Shakespeare Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet, the truth of Shakespeare sex is 
that it is perversely normative and depends upon the retrospective classification of same-
sex female sexuality as insignificant. Which is the more perverse move, rewriting Romeo 
and Juliet into a pornographic vernacular, or the ways in which the playtext has been 
reduced to culturally sanctioned narratives of heteronormative love? Put another way: 
Which is the more troubling cultural process, pornification—the ways in which 
mainstream culture has becomes increasingly represented within pornographic 
aesthetics42—or the process and compulsions of literary inheritance? The unwilling and 
unacknowledged rehabilitative project in these pornographic Shakespeares highlights the 
                                                
42 For a discussion of the contemporary process of “pornification,” see Kaarina Nikunen and Susanna 
Paasonen. 
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perverse relationship between the process of becoming, the adoption—however 
unfaithful—of normative identities.  
With these normative identities inevitably come anxieties of futurity. This is most 
clear in a more typical example of rehabilitative Shakespeare: a documentary television 
drama entitled My Bare Lady (Fox Reality, 2007). In the short-lived, four-episode reality 
drama, television producers and theater directors hold an open cattle call for female porn 
stars who wish to leave their pornographic pasts behind them in hopes of becoming 
legitimate actresses. The program directors select four relatively well-know porn stars 
and fly them to London to study serious acting, which unsurprisingly consists primarily 
of Shakespeare. In the final episode, the women perform in a variety show on London’s 
West End, and, as a reward, the most advanced porn star is selected to recite the balcony 
speech, which is positioned as the ultimate test of legitimate female acting. Thus, the 
Pygmalion project positions Shakespeare as the generator of cultural legitimacy, and 
Juliet as the pinnacle of female propriety. But for the porn stars it’s a hard road, one 
involving tears, tantrums, and the occasional girl-on-girl pillow fight. By the show’s end, 
the women meet with minor setbacks and mild success; though the variety show attracts a 
huge audience, eager to see the women as porn stars rather than legitimate Shakespearean 
actresses. Perhaps most detrimental to the program’s project, there is no clear sense of 
whether or not the women plan to leave their pornographic pasts for good.  
I offer My Bare Lady as a rehabilitative Shakespeare that, like Shakespeare 
Revealed and Tromeo and Juliet, poses the provocative question: can Shakespeare 
rehabilitate pornography? Is the Shakespearean playtext sexy enough to seduce the porn 
star from a career of sex work? My Bare Lady represents the contested interplay between 
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terms of authority within which rehabilitative Shakespeares circulate more largely. It 
exploits the contemporary belief that Shakespeare and porn are conflicting discourses, 
and in the space of such conflict, rehabilitation is possible. Such a move depends upon 
two presuppositions: first, that Shakespeare and pornography are indeed mutually 
exclusive discourses; and second, that Shakespeare acts as a transitional discourse that 
can cross into the pornographic without losing categorical integrity and legitimacy. For 
rehabilitative subjectivity is a process caught between opposing discourses. The act of 
disowning one discourse, say a lifestyle that includes recording your sexuality on 
celluloid, for another, say a lifestyle in which your sexuality is kept under the covers, 
becomes a project of disavowal. Through the rehabilitative imperative comes the demand 
that a subject must perform a causal transformation built upon the fantasy of turning from 
and to discourses, leaving one for the other. The causal narrative is found in the act of 
turning, the performance of choice.  
As a cultural performance, rehabilitation is a never-ending process of reiteration. 
To perform rehabilitation one must always be turning, must always be establishing and 
re-establishing the teleological markers of the causality of transformation. The subject, in 
the desire to perform his or her rehabilitation—which is the same as saying that the 
subject is demanded to perform the self-efficacy and self-authorization of his or her 
rehabilitation in a way that meaningfully signifies—must continually circulate within this 
topsy-turvy roundabout. The subject must always come to be represented as the 
intersubject in the future perfect: the subject who will no longer be caught between 
discourses, who will no longer signify the site of linguistic conflict and contestation. By 
virtue of rehabilitation’s performative structure, then, the subject is always caught 
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between discourses, and will always come to be represented within the future perfect, 
always already the subject in the process of establishing the causal teleology demanded 
by rehabilitative transformation. To take My Bare Lady as an example, the would-be 
legitimate actress will always have been a porn star who will always work to become a 
legitimate Shakespearean actress. Regardless of the number of West End performances 
she lists on her headshot, she will always be represented within a process of rehabilitative 
becoming. 
Yet in the season finale of My Bare Lady (entitled “Another Opening”), the 
program undercuts the celebration of the women’s success with what we might think of 
as the rehabilitative hangover: the dulling discomfort that comes from excessive 
indulgence in belief that Shakespeare is a transcendental signifier, and the anxiety over 
the direction that his influence might take. In a particularly un-pornographic concern, the 
program poses the question of what happens the morning after. The women perform a 
successful variety show and do some justice to the Shakespeare playtext, but after a night 
of celebration, what then? Will the women return to pornography, or will they pursue 
legitimate (read as non-pornographic) performances? (Presumably viewers want to know 
what happens next because My Bare Lady 2 is currently in post-production.) In the 
previous chapters I have outlined the cultural fantasies that underwrite the proposition 
that Shakespeare can rehabilitate marginalized subjects, those subjects who exist within a 
queer positionality to structures of authority and legitimacy, and the anxieties such 
progress narratives perform over the futurity of the subject of rehabilitation. If 
Shakespearean theater owns a transformative power, then the directionality of such 
transformation becomes a central concern in the rehabilitative imperative.  
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Pornographic adaptations of Romeo and Juliet push the process of identifying by 
Shakespeare to its most perverse limits. The teleological progression of lesbianism to 
heteronormative sexuality in the representation of the Juliet figure demonstrates that, 
against its will, pornography is indeed susceptible to Shakespeare’ rehabilitative powers. 
What does it mean that Shakespeare rehabilitates the pornographic imagination 
seemingly against its will, and defies its attempts at irreverence? One must wonder, then, 
about the issue of agency in successful rehabilitation. For subjects marginalized in 
systems of cultural representations, like immigrant youth communities and inmates, when 
Shakespeare is presented as a rehabilitative tool, was it possible that he was a tool 
unwanted, undesired, not asked for but put on them in the first place, a tool that 
rehabilitative subject learn to love out of necessity? These porn adaptations both trouble 
their positioning of Shakespeare as the pinnacle of cultural legitimacy and the ways in 
which his legitimacy is bestowed upon—which begins to sounds suspiciously similar to 
forced upon—wayward subjects.  
And yet pornography is decidedly absent in considerations of how Shakespeare’s 
position as cultural authority comes to be represented in audiovisual artifacts in the 
contemporary moment. The pejorative treatment of Shakespeare pornography is at least 
in part a result of two simple observations of texts like Shakespeare Revealed and 
Tromeo and Juliet. First, they are utterly vulgar in general and their representations of 
female sexuality are incredibly troubled in particular. Simply put: these are bad films, not 
bad because they are pornography but because they are relatively boring pornographic 
films. Second, they don’t seem to have much to say about the Shakespeare playtext. They 
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represent Shakespeare as “turned out” in the most literal and unapologetic means 
possible.  
Let me be as explicit here as the films I treat in this chapter: pornography, indeed, 
has nothing to say about the playtext; but it speaks volumes on how the playtext is 
received and transmitted in the contemporary moment and the ideological imperatives 
that maintain Shakespeare’s position as a standard of cultural legitimacy. The films 
produce a series of character-effects that revolve around the figure of the dreaming Juliet. 
She can occupy the position of heteronormative and romantic lover only if at least one of 
two ideologically charged reductions precedes the claim. Either the bawdy interactions 
with her Nurse are edited out of the playtext more generally, or we decide more 
specifically that bawdy interaction between women are not necessarily sexually charged 
but are alternately either innocuous or serve a heteronormative teleology. Like any other 
either/or structure, one is left with only the possibility of making an incriminating choice: 
either reduce the playtext or rehearse tired reductions of queer sexuality to an indiscrete 
or insignificant performance.  
Romeo and Juliet obsessively questions what is means to act within prescripted 
and pre-authorized narratives and literary histories in its obsessive return to the metaphor 
of performing “by the book.”43 Thus, Romeo and Juliet offers a complex historical 
examination of the tensions between agency (particularly sexual) and prescription. For all 
the complexities of the playtext, however, Romeo and Juliet has also entered the point of 
cultural legend to the point that is repeatedly reduced to cultural clichés of youthful 
rebellion, loyalty, fidelity, and romantic love. “Romeo” has become a pejorative form for 
                                                
43 In his chapter on Romeo and Juliet in Shakespearean Metadrama (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1971), James Calderwood was perhaps the first critic to point out that this play contains an unusual 
number of references to books.  
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a gigolo, seducer, man-whore of unreliable disposition. But what of “Juliet”? In her 
analysis of popular adaptations of the playtext, Phillipa Hawker notes that Juliet has 
nearly vanished in the cultural imaginary. She observes: 
The figures of Romeo and Juliet are already inscribed into contemporary 
high and popular culture, in contexts ranging from West Side Story to 
Ashton’s ballet, from Bugs Bunny cartoons to the Everclear song on the 
film’s [Luhrmann’s William Shakespeare’s Romeo + Juliet] soundtrack. 
How many countless times has the balcony scene been the subject of 
parody and homage? How many overt references are there in popular song 
to the figure of Romeo? (And, for that matter, isn’t it interesting how the 
word has acquired a pejorative, dismissive meaning: a ‘Romeo’ is a 
gigolo, a Latin lover of unreliable disposition. Juliet, however, has 
disappeared from view, remembered by little more than the bridal 
accessory known as the Juliet cap). 44 
 
If “Romeo” can signify a gigolo in the contemporary moment, could Shakespeare remain 
culturally valuable as a rehabilitative tool if “Juliet” became shorthand for slut or lesbian 
or bi-curious fetishist? The pornographic films answer this for us: no, this would have 
absolutely no impact whatsoever, but to take the chance is to misrecognize how 
Shakespeare’s Juliet functions in the contemporary moment. The question then doubles 
back on the spectator. Why is it impossible to have a lesbian Juliet without also inevitably 
including heteronormative teleology? The very performance of rehabilitation suggests an 
answer. Shakespeare cannot occupy the position of normativity without the use of 
multiple supplements. And in the process of supplementing Shakespeare, rehabilitation 
inevitably (though without the authorizations of the rehabilitative projects) represents 
Shakespeare as inherently exceeding the normative ends to which he is made to perform. 
 
                                                
44 Phillipa Hawker, “DiCaprio, DiCaprio, Wherefore art Thou, DiCaprio?” in Meanjin (March 1997): 6-15, 
9. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
REHABILITATING THE CLASSROOM: PEDAGOGY AND  
 
THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY 
 
 
 Rehabilitative Shakespeares produce uncanny effects, both in their 
programmatically and politically troubling utopian concept of what it means to 
appropriately perform subjecthood, and in terms of the reception effects they produce. 
They familiarize the spectator with Shakespearean agency in places where we least 
expect to find it, like inner-city community projects, elementary afterschool programs, 
prison learning annexes, and even pornographic film. As I will argue in this chapter, they 
also work to defamiliarize the ways in which Shakespeare is used in the space we are 
most inclined to imaginatively situate his works, namely in the literature classroom. 
While the reach of rehabilitative Shakespeares is as socio-contextually vast as it is 
diverse, the terms of its conceptual intervention remain constant. Rehabilitative 
Shakespeares work to educate social bodies. Rehabilitation is a performative process that 
intends to create specific products, namely the (re)production of knowledgeable subjects 
who inhabit prescribed identity positions authorized by ideologies of social success and 
futurity. 
 In their methodological relation between social futurity and education, 
rehabilitative Shakespeares echo the long-held cultural aphorism, “knowledge is power.” 
Education is propped up as that which may be leveraged by divergent marginalized 
communities to combat modes of cultural deprivation and foster social inclusion. In 
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previous chapters I have argued that rehabilitative Shakespeares assert the analogical 
principle that knowledge of Shakespeare produces self-knowledge, a formula that neatly 
encapsulates their investments in the belief that dramatic mimesis can effect real 
psychological and social change. As subjects learn Shakespeare, they are also imagined 
to gain self-knowledge of they ways in which they engage with the social and to better 
understand the socio-cultural systems in which they are situated as subjects. 
Understanding conditions the possibility for upward mobility, or so it is claimed. To this 
end, facilitators work with subjects to look up the meanings of unfamiliar words and to 
teach basic reading skills so that subjects may understand anachronisms in the playtexts 
and come to terms with Shakespearean themes that bridge early modern and 
contemporary historical moments. Facilitators also historically situate the playtexts in the 
early modern period by informing subjects about cultural dynamics like early modern 
associations of actors with criminals, anti-theatrical prejudices that led to the closing of 
the theaters, and the early modern theatrical convention of using all male actors—modes 
of historical contextualization many of us who teach Shakespeare also use in our own 
educational programs. 
 Perhaps one of the most troubling implications of rehabilitative Shakespeares is 
that they dramatize not only utopian fantasies of what it means to be a good person, but 
that they operate all too similarly to our own performances. It is my contention here that 
the a priori presumption that knowledge initiates a performative, and thus potentially 
transformative, effect effaces the distinction between these cultural artifacts and the 
educational processes that many of us support in the Shakespeare classroom. Do we not 
educate our students with the hope that they alter in some way, that they will understand 
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social or aesthetic systems differently, more clearly, in ways we imagine as better, and 
perhaps necessary, for successful social survival? As educational facilitators and course 
designers, we structure our process of educating students with particular goals in mind, 
whether we want them to understand what the university demands of them (as may be the 
case in courses geared toward first-year college students), or conventions used in 
academic settings and specific disciplines to structure an effective argument (as tends to 
be the case in courses that count toward major or minor requirements). Perhaps one of 
our goals is to teach students discourses that people who study literature use to talk about 
literature; some of us may want to teach students a “hermeneutics of suspicion,” or 
persuade them to understand the necessity of questioning cultural “truths,” how those 
truths are produced, and how they can develop critical thinking skills they may take with 
them beyond the college years. Toward these ends, we structure our syllabi by 
subdividing them into units which, taken together, illustrate a development of thought we 
believe most appropriate for students to achieve. We offer information on Shakespeare’s 
works, from vocabulary and analytical reading techniques, to important dates and the 
names of historical or literary figures evoked in his works. Ideally this informational 
basis will offer our students the capacity to perform the development of their thought. We 
demand that students perform various tasks, from attendance and participation, to 
presentations and writing assignments, and we evaluate them based on these 
performances. And the act of evaluation affords us the opportunity to offer feedback on 
how students might improve in the future.  
 Foucault reminds us that the social spaces in which we find Shakespeare, like 
prisons and schools, are not so disparate when we consider the mechanisms of discipline 
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and social reproduction that both institutions employ; he writes, “The prison is like a 
rather disciplined barracks, a strict school, a dark workshop, but not qualitatively 
different.”1 Both education and imprisonment work to correctly train individual subjects 
in mass, and in the process both become localized institutions of power that produce 
culture by reproducing individuality through communal morality and ethics. In 
“Discourse on Language,” he writes, “Education may well be, as of right, the instrument 
whereby every individual, in a society like our own, can gain access to any kind of 
discourse.”2 However, power is internally contradictory, always that which creates and 
also subjugates; he elaborates: “But we well know that in its distribution, in what it 
permits and what it prevents, it follows well-trodden battle-lines of social conflict. Every 
educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation 
of discourse, with the knowledge and powers it carries with it.”3  
 The process by which education is received and transmitted becomes the point at 
which the disciplining function of rehabilitation intersects with the discipline of 
Shakespeare studies and its function in the social institution of the university. In other 
words, our performances in the classroom follow the structural demands of the 
rehabilitative projects I have examined throughout this project. We educate to 
rehabilitate: we teach student-subjects about Shakespeare, and in the process we also 
teach our students to internalize modes of performing their role as student. And we use 
the mechanisms of evaluation, ideally, to create more knowledgeable subjects. These 
mechanisms allows us to exercise our power of judgment in a way that disciplines 
                                                
1 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979), 233. 
2 Foucault, “Discourse on Language,” in The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 
trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1972) 215-37. 227. 
3 Ibid. 
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students to understand, which is to say internalize, systems of normalization—how a 
successful student/subject behaves. But as I have demonstrated throughout this project, 
rehabilitation is a performative process, and as such doubles back on itself in the 
conceptual space of its reiterative quality. Rather than producing properly disciplined 
subjects—subjects who inhabit normative identity positions—rehabilitation, as I argue, 
instills in the subject a queer subjectivity, or sense of self that never quite fully inhabits a 
normative identity position precisely because that sense of self is performative.  
 To frame education as a performance of rehabilitation is to call attention to the 
disciplining functions we reproduce in the process of teaching our student-subjects 
appropriate methods whereby they might successfully navigate the academic institution. 
It is to question the ideological systems that structure the enduring understanding we 
hope students will take with them once they have graduated. The audiovisual artifacts I 
explore here suggest that it’s time for us to take a pedagogical pause to question the 
effects of our performances. In this chapter I examine a collection of rehabilitative 
Shakespeares concerned with critiquing the systems of education within which 
Shakespeare is taught today.  
 In Search of Shakespeare (dir. David Wallace, 2003), Shakespeare’s Happy 
Endings (dir. Stephen, Leslie, 2005), William Shakespeare: A Life of Drama (A&E 
Biography, 1996), The Shakespeare Mystery (dir. Kevin Sim, 1989): the titles of these 
documentary projects transparently suggest their cinematic concerns. These are 
unapologetically revisionist media biographies of Shakespeare. Taken together, they 
suggest that his life and works have become dangerously reified in the present because of 
dominant cultural understanding of history as built upon systems of alterity; the 
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implication here is that historical alterity ascribes to Shakespeare an identity of otherness 
that forecloses the possibility of affective relating to his works today. While biographical 
criticism has fallen somewhat out of vogue since Foucault’s theorization of the “author-
function” as always working at a remove from the reality of the writer,4 the desire for 
historical authenticity remains a dominant component in critical discourses in the twenty-
first century, famously illustrated by Stephen Greenblatt’s “desire to speak with the 
dead.”5 These documentaries also desire to speak with the dead. In fact, they flaunt this 
desire by calling attention to their performance of history-telling as a fantastical and 
contingent construct built upon affect rather than event, identificatory sameness rather 
than temporal difference, or what Carla Freccero calls “queer historiography.”6 More 
important to their multimedia projects, they work to understand what produces this desire 
to speak with Shakespeare across historical lines and the identity-effects that such 
conversations may, however inadvertently, produce in the student-subject. While all 
rehabilitative Shakespeares document educational projects, this specific collection is 
produced primarily for classroom consumption. Most are accompanied by lesson plans 
designed for instructors to supplement in-class viewing and listening. They are divided 
into thirty- to fifty-minute segments to fall within the time frames that structure the 
classroom experience. And they are intended not only to, in the words of Sir Philip 
Sidney, “teach and delight,” but also to offer educators a model of teaching the history of 
Shakespeare. Their primary desire is to reinstill the pleasure of engaging with 
Shakespeare that we seem to have lost. The website for In Search of Shakespeare, for 
                                                
4 Foucault, “What is an Author” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interview, 
ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 113-38. 
5 Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance 
England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 1.  
6 Carla Freccero, Queer/Early Modern (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 
 181 
instance, offers a section for educators that outlines ways to “teach Shakespeare without 
the drowsiness.”7 To paraphrase Foucault, the creation of knowledge, which is always 
bound within systems of delineating truth and organizing proper acts of truth telling, 
produces pleasure.8 The lesson plans that accompany In Search of Shakespeare suggest 
that the consumption of received systems of knowledge, in this case the historical alterity 
of Shakespeare, creates apathy, or what we might think of as the reduction of pleasure. It 
is the drowsiness of historical difference, its ability to lull students into a dazed and 
numbed state, which becomes the point against which these bio-projects resist. And 
within this resistance, the film suggests, lies the pedagogical pleasure.  
 In their belief that the pleasure of education depends upon a resistance to received 
systems of history, this collection of rehabilitative educational Shakespeares echoes the 
very historical discourse that they work to understand and make understandable. Like 
these artifacts, early modern theatrical and anti-theatrical debates were concerned with 
the types of education that dramatic mimesis performs, and the forms that such education 
might take outside of the theatrical space. For instance, in The Defence of Poesy (1595), 
Sir Philip Sidney counters popular early modern anti-theatrical sentiments that condemn 
public theater as an imitative art that leads to social depravity.9 Stephen Gosson 
epitomizes this stance in his polemic Playes Confuted in Five Actions (1582), which 
argues, “Playes are no Images of trueth, because sometime they handle such thinges as 
never were, sometime they runne upon truethes, but make them seeme longer, or shorter, 
                                                
7 see: http://www.pbs.org/shakespeare/ 
8 Foucault argues that modern society has come to desire the act of knowing desire: “We have at least 
invented a different kind of pleasure: pleasure in the truth of pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of 
discovering and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and telling it, of captivating and capturing others by 
it, of confiding it in secret, of luring it out in the open—the specific pleasure of the true discourse on 
pleasure.” See History of Sexuality. Volume One. An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1990), 71. 
9 Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie (London: James Roberts, 1595). 
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or greater, or lesse then they were, according as the Poet blowes them up with his 
quill.”10 Because theater alters history for entertainment purposes by stretching, 
condensing, or altogether fictionalizing “actual” events, the argument goes, theatrical 
representation is a corruption of truth. More damning, Gosson argues that the theater 
teaches the spectator to engage in other forms of corruption, most notably apostasy. For 
Sidney, history acts less as a problem in the design of theatrical representation than it 
does to anti-theatricalist understandings of the social work that theatrical representation 
performs. The crux of his Defence lies not in its resistance to critiques of theater as 
imitative, but rather in his retort that theatrical representation performs the most efficient 
means of educating mass communities on cultural imperatives precisely because it resists 
easy delineation of history as constructed on actuality, factuality, or inevitability. He 
explains that “right Poets….be they which most properly do imitate to teach and delight; 
and to imitate, borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range only, reined 
with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be, and should be” 
(sig.C2r-v).11  
 As Jonathan Goldberg has argued, when the question of the future is at stake, the 
“history that will be” is momentarily arrested or taken out of a linear temporal structure 
of inevitability, and is subsequently opened up to an endless number of potential 
                                                
10 Gosson, Playes Confuted in Five Actions (London: Imprinted for Thomas Gosson, 1582), sig.D5r-v. 
Gosson dedicated his later tract, Teares of the Muses (1591), to Sidney. Scholars have suggested that 
Gosson’s works directly inspired Sidney’s retorts in the Defense. See: Jean E. Howard, The Stage and 
Social Struggle in Early Modern England (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) 42; and Arthur F. 
Kinney, Markets of Bawdrie: The Dramatic Criticism of Stephen Gosson (Salzburg: University of Salzburg 
Press, 1974) 44. 
11 Sidney’s aphorism “teach and delight” also works within a historicized discourse of the cultural work of 
education. The phrase evokes Horace’s Ars Poetica and works within an Aristotelian model of mimesis. 
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interpretations and outcomes.12 What Goldberg describes here as the queering of history 
finds affinity with Sidney’s understanding of the relation between history and the 
educational power of theater. For Sidney, the break between historical alterity and 
representation imbues poesy—and by extension here, drama—with a potentially 
transformative pedagogical power. “Right poets”—those who would understand and 
perform through their poetry the transformative potential of their craft—work within 
fantastical imperatives of futurity, notions of how life might be if only the spectator could 
learn to interpret theatrical spectacle as possibility rather than historical event, that which 
might be rather than that which has indeed happened before. The distance between 
representing what is and what should be, then, offers a more palatable mode of social 
education. Poesy “is the food for the tenderest of stomacks” (sig.Ev), he writes, and it 
teaches the spectator how to embody virtuous action and behavior, how to perform proper 
subjecthood. The distance opens a space of mediation in which the spectator may 
question what transformations are necessary for such possibility to be realized.  
 The revisionist biographies I examine here document the pleasures of resisting 
dominant modes of historical alterity and the identificatory possibilities that emerge in 
the performance of resisting difference. But they also document the political implications 
of working to identify across historical boundaries, implications worth attending to as we 
evaluate the pedagogical models they offer. I take In Search of Shakespeare as my 
primary point of analysis, as it most aggressively articulates the gratification and danger 
of identifying across historical boundaries. In its search for the pleasures of historical 
sameness, what emerges is what I call here a mode of “excitable pedagogy,” or the 
                                                
12 Johnathan Goldberg, “The History That Will Be” in Premodern Sexualities, eds. Louise Fradenburg and 
Carla Freccero (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 1-22. 
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performance of educational method and practice that exceeds the deliberate effects that 
instruction intends. For In Search of Shakespeare intends to remind us of the pleasure 
that can be found in historical aporia, those moments in which we cannot know the past 
but we can revel in our state of not-knowing and the identificatory possibilities it opens. 
But in framing its search within decidedly presentist terms, it carries with it, rather 
uncritically, the baggage of cultural imperative, or current ideologies of what 
identification should look like. Time and again, when the film confronts moments of 
unknowability it sutures over the perversity of its own project by representing 
Shakespeare as hopelessly “straightened out,” made palatable for classroom and cultural 
consumption. What emerges by the project’s end is an image of Shakespeare as 
unyieldingly heterosexual and paternal, the father figure of the contemporary moment, an 
identity with which we are all encouraged to identify.  
 In Search of Shakespeare offers a metacritical opportunity for us to rethink the 
ways we teach Shakespeare, how we position him in history, and how this may in turn 
serve to authorize and deauthorize identity positions in the present which our students 
inhabit. Might we identify at times with either the historical methodology proposed in 
this film, or the desires that drive this methodology? Might it mirror back to us an image, 
however fractured or incomplete, of our professional selves and the personal desires by 
which that self is constituted? And if so, how possibly do we image it is to transform 
ourselves by resisting the mimetic images on screen that dramatize how the life and work 
of Shakespeare should be taught? 
 
The Problem with History 
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 Linda Charnes has argued that the signifier Shakespeare has experienced a radical 
displacement over the past two decades, at least in part because of the expansive 
adaptational uses his name has been made to authorize. She notes that the cultural 
function of Shakespeare today “has become a general equivalent, a medium of exchange, 
pure (that is, so saturated with itself as to signify nothing but ‘itself’) ideological value 
available to authorize whatever ‘structures of feelings’ are being 
promoted….Shakespeare the playwright is superceded by Shakespeare the paradigm.”13 
Certainly the larger body of rehabilitative Shakespeares supports Charnes’s claim. But it 
also dramatizes the social consequences of our modern mode of Bardolatry. The BBC 
spoof-documentary Shakespeare’s Happy Endings, part of the “Shakespeare Re-Told” 
series, hyperbolically responds to what Charnes describes as Shakespeare’s function 
today. The film concludes with a scene in which Professor Simon Starkman (Patrick 
Barlow) welcomes Shakespeare to a celebration of his works. At this celebration, 
Shakespeare will be bestowed with the title “the man of the millennium,” for his works 
offer the contemporary moment a living legacy unsurpassed by another other writer. 
Appropriately enough, the celebration is to take place at Holy Trinity Church; however, 
the two arrive to find the church closed. Presumably, the vicar has forgotten about the 
celebration, as have all the guests. In a foreboding vision of anti-Bardolatry, the film 
demonstrates that the contemporary moment has reduced Shakespeare to the image of an 
embarrassingly unsophisticated and confused relic of the past. The dramatist is left 
unable to make a connection with his renowned place of nativity or to take his place at 
the head of the table as man of the millennium. Ultimately, history is the party crasher 
                                                
13 Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity: Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 155.  
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that ruins the celebration. The stakes of positioning history and historical figures within a 
system of difference and otherness, it is suggested, foreclose an affective connection with 
the past in the present. Structured along the lines of alterity, history in this formulation 
becomes a project of forgetting and misrecognition that threatens to erase our affective 
connection to the past, which is shaped by and in turn shapes the contemporary moment.  
 As rehabilitative Shakespeares remind us, rather painfully at times, Shakespeare 
has indeed become a medium of ideological exchange, an overloaded signifier; however, 
this should not imply that, as a signifier, Shakespeare easily or even effectively contains 
all possible significations associated with his name and the cultural myths revolving 
around it. Juliet’s rhetorical question “What’s in a name?” becomes almost laughable 
when we consider the ways in which the name of her author authorizes precisely because 
of his name. What’s in a name, then? Everything, and too much. It is because the name 
has been made to accommodate any number of ideological imperatives being promoted 
by various institutions that Shakespeare as a signifier subverts localized ideological value 
systems. For instance, because Shakespeare is imagined to make pornography more 
socially acceptable, this troubles our ability to imagine that he is an appropriate resource 
for children. Can we easily hold in mind the conflicting idea that Shakespeare can help 
keep kids out of prison, while also aiding prisons in disciplining inmates? Of course we 
can, and we do; this is the receptive demand that rehabilitative Shakespeares place on the 
spectator. And conflicting performances of Shakespeare situate him comfortably in the 
space of their transformative projects by evoking his place in history. Shakespeare works 
on some level in prisons because, as program facilitators remind us, actors were linked 
with criminals in early modern imaginations, as we see in the coney-catching pamphlets 
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of Robert Green.14 Shakespeare also works on some level in pornography because the 
numerous puns in his works allows for perverse play, a possibility that pornographic 
adaptations of Shakespeare take to mean that early modern understandings of sexuality 
and deviance were more polymorphous and experimental than today’s.  
 Rehabilitative Shakespeares may indeed treat Shakespeare as a medium for 
conflicting ideological exchange, but they displace the conflicts of their ideological 
projects onto historical difference. This suggests, then, that “Shakespeare, the paradigm” 
fails to supersede “Shakespeare, the playwright.” Christy Desmet and Robert Sawyer 
have astutely noted that the performance of “Bardolatry necessarily produces 
‘bardography,’” or what they explain as “the assertion of Shakespeare’s continuing 
presence in English, North American, European, and finally, world culture as a story, a 
narrative governed by the trope of hyperbole but conditioned by a rhetorical concession 
of its own limitation.”15 Shakespeare’s place in history becomes the displaced point of 
ideological conflict and limitation, that which supplements rather than supplants 
Shakespearean instrumentality in the contemporary moment. Like any supplement, 
historical difference becomes both arbitrary and essential to the rehabilitative projects; 
and as supplements tend to do, as Derrida reminds us, historical difference contains an 
ambiguity that ensures what it is supplementing—in this case, Shakespearean ideologies, 
in whatever forms they might take—can always be interpreted in different ways: as 
arbitrary or essential. In rehabilitation, history is a problem precisely because it can be 
interpreted in different ways, for power cannot properly discipline if it is received by 
                                                
14 For an analysis of Green’s coney-catching pamphlets and how they are evoked in prison Shakespeare, 
see chapter three.  
15 Christy Desmet and Robert Sawyer, “Introduction” in Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare, eds. Christy Desmet 
and Robert Sawyer (London: Palgrave, 2002), 1-16 (5-6). 
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subjects as arbitrary. And yet history understood as different, other, and as a temporal 
space of mystery cannot essentially or adequately account for the ways in which the 
present moment subjects and is subjected by its desires to identify with Shakespeare.  
 William Shakespeare: A Life in Drama (1996), part of A&E’s Biography series, 
suggests that demystifying the early modern period not only renews and reminds us of the 
pleasures of identifying with Shakespeare, but that this demystification is necessary for 
our sense of selves as social beings. The biography is produced both as a narrative audio 
program and as an historical documentary film, presumably to accommodate the 
resources of different classroom spaces and teaching styles. And both open with the same 
structure: a spectacularly grandiose claim by narrator Charles Glass interspliced with 
audio-bites from Macbeth. “William Shakespeare is without a doubt the greatest 
playwright the English language has ever known,” Glass begins. “His plays, poetry, his 
every word have become the very essence of our culture. Shakespeare lives on today 
through the words of his plays. 400 years later his genius has never been surpassed.” This 
claim may be grandiose but it is hardly new. In fact, it’s formulaically asserted in all 
rehabilitative Shakespeare. But the proof Glass offers to support the claim, which comes 
in the form of Macbeth’s lament on the loss of Lady Macbeth, implicitly signals what the 
project poses as the stakes of leaving unquestioned historical difference, while 
undercutting these stakes at the same time. A voiceover recites: 
She should have died hereafter; 
There would have been a time for such a word. 
To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow, 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
To the last syllable of recorded time, 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! 
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player 
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That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more: it is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing. (V.v.17-28) 
 
Back to Glass: “Shakespeare’s writing shows an extraordinary level of insight into the 
human experience, our innermost thoughts. Yet his own life remains an enigma shrouded 
in the mysteries and complexities of Elizabethan England.”  
 The stylization of juxtaposing Macbeth’s soliloquy with the claim of the 
complexities of historical difference poses the primary problem with an understanding of 
what Shakespeare signifies in the contemporary moment as one contingent on ways in 
which we understand our relation to the past. What is at stake here is, in the words of 
Macbeth, is “tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow.” If Shakespeare retains a special 
relation to the understanding of the human experience, then understanding the socio-
cultural influences that drove Shakespeare might offer us today a similar sense of 
understanding, a more direct access to Shakespeare’s brilliance. First, however, the 
complexities surrounding the differentiated time “Elizabethan England” must be worked 
through, analogized to events in the present in a familiar tone. Otherwise, like Macbeth, 
we post-moderns might slip into a fatalistic belief that history is a meaningless and 
impotent narrative. For it could be that the mysterious truth-effects constructed around 
Shakespeare might just prove nothing more than tales “Told by an idiot, full of sound and 
fury,/Signifying nothing.” Fortunately the film and audio narrative offer numerous 
interview sequences with scholars like Stanley Wells, Andrew Gurr, J.R. Mulryne, Mark 
Honan and former Artistic Director for the Globe Theater Adrian Noble to make the early 
modern pleasurable and thus meaningful again.  
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The PBS mini-series In Search of Shakespeare (dir. David Wallace, 2003) takes a 
different approach to the problem of historical difference by attempting to demystify 
Shakespeare’s life and times in a way that resists placing the pedagogue in the position of 
expert. The introductory sequence of the documentary defines the stylistics and 
programmatic investments of the larger series, an epic bio-project spanning four episodes 
in as many hours. As the camera opens on a panoramic cityscape of modern day London, 
a narrative voiceover announces, “Like all stories from history, this is a search for ghosts, 
a quest for the people who made us who we are, and for one man in particular.” While 
standing center stage at the rebuilt Globe Theater, historian and television personality 
Michael Wood explains, “William Shakespeare is the most famous writer of all time, and 
yet his life is still shrouded in mystery, so much so that a vast web of conspiracy theories 
has grown up over whether he even wrote his own plays or not. This is an historical 
detective story, an Elizabethan whodunit, searching for the life of William Shakespeare 
of Stratford-upon-Avon set against the turbulent times in which he lived.” Abruptly, the 
credits roll. The following sequence features flash images of the Grafton and Chandos 
portraits thought to represent Shakespeare, and an inverted image of the Rainbow Portrait 
of Queen Elizabeth I, as though reflected back to the viewer. These flashing images 
combine to form the authorial stamp of Shakespeare, indelibly marked in red wax and 
impressed on the screen to doubly authorize the documentary venture.  
On one hand, “Shakespeare’s” seal marks the film’s distance from other 
Shakespeare bio-projects, like PBS’s Much Ado About Something (PBS, 2001), 
Frontline: The Shakespeare Mystery (PBS, 1989), and journalist Mark Anderson’s 
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streaming narrative radio segments “Shakespeare upon Ipod” (2006-07),16 which explore 
the possibility that Shakespeare’s works were actually written by Christopher Marlowe, 
Francis Bacon, Edward de Vere, and other possible candidates. In Search of Shakespeare, 
like all other rehabilitative Shakespeares, desires an egalitarian version of the Bard, one 
who speaks to mass audiences, without the intervention of scholars, researchers, or even 
archival documents. Wood suggests that pedagogues have effaced Shakespeare’s 
authorship in order to make reading “Shakespeare” exciting for students, and in the 
process have propagated the conspiracy theories surrounding Shakespearean authorship.  
According to this stance, we as a field are culpable, though perhaps some, like 
Jeffrey Masten and Leah Marcus, more than others. In putting to rest these tiring and 
tireless debates on Shakespeare’s authorship, the film also registers its disavowal of the 
collaborative process of early modern authorship and modern editorial processes. Jeffrey 
Masten has argued that present critical formulations, along with well-established editorial 
and bibliographic traditions, situate early modern dramatic texts within a regime of the 
single author that is, properly speaking, more appropriate to the post-Enlightenment 
world than to sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century Europe.17 Masten maintains that a 
dominant strategy of dramatic authorship in Shakespeare's England was collaboration, 
and the obsession with establishing authorship among plays that were collaboratively 
produced risks imposing an ahistorical modern understanding of the singularity of the 
author onto plays that were not produced within this regime of knowledge. Leah S. 
                                                
16 “Shakespeare Upon Ipod” follows Anderson’s argument in ‘Shakespeare’ By Another Name: The Life of 
Edward de Vere, Earl of Oxford, the Man Who Was Shakespeare (New York: Gotham, 2005) that de Vere 
wrote the plays we attribute today to “Shakespeare.” For audio samplings, see: 
http://www.shakespearebyanothername.com. 
17 Jeffrey Masten, Textual Intercourse: Collaboration, Authorship, and Sexualities in Renaissance Drama 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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Marcus has likewise troubled our understandings of what we might think of as the reality 
of the Shakespearean playtext and the persona it creates.18 She reveals that the degree to 
which we come to know Shakespeare through modern editions is always already a 
supplemented knowledge, one filtered through eighteenth-century and Victorian editorial 
practices and the sensibilities on which those practices are built. Ultimately, the persona 
of Shakespeare we understand from the playtexts reflects a collaborative process of 
making Shakespeare, one constructed and therefore (if not necessarily) open to question 
and speculation.19   
On the other hand, the film’s use of a technological simulacrum of Shakespeare’s 
authorial stamp rather than a material recreation of it marks the documentary’s handling 
of the subject of history. The stamp marks historiography as a creative enterprise and the 
act of searching for origins as always already mediated by technologies of knowledge in 
the present. Immediately following the opening credits, the film documents Wood as he 
excitedly marches along a woody lane somewhere in England. Part of his search for 
Shakespeare includes a journey through the English countryside, a methodology he 
tirelessly repeats throughout the film. Along the way he has an apparently unscripted 
encounter. A curious young boy emerges from an RV parked along the road to ask Wood 
where he is going, to which Wood replies, “We’re walking up the ancient road. It’s one 
of the oldest roads of England.” The boy is left clearly confused as Wood marches on his 
                                                
18 Leah S. Marcus, Unediting the Renaissance: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton (New York: Routledge, 
1997). 
19 Several other scholars, of course, are implicated in what Wood considers the academic conspiracy of 
questioning Shakespearean authorship. For discussions on the importance of the printed text, for instance, 
in creating the authorial persona of Shakespeare, see: Douglas A. Brooks, From Playhouse to Printing 
House: Drama and Authorship in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
David Scott-Kastan, Shakespeare and the Book (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and 
Shakespeare After Theory (New York: Routledge, 1999); and Leah Marcus, Puzzling Shakespeare: Local 
Readings and Its Discontents (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), ch. 1. 
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symbolic path up the long and winding road as it reaches forward toward history—a road 
that also doubles as a local vacation spot. This sequence sets the cinematic tone of the 
remaining four hours to come: we are always unmistakably in the here-and-now. Wood 
brings us along with him on what becomes our shared educational and historical journey; 
but this search for Shakespeare is aggressively grounded in the present, to which the 
ancient road and flash images attest. These material artifacts may derive from the past, 
but the film clearly reminds us that they have an identity in the present. The ancient road 
evokes a real-life Shakespearean “green world,” a modern day the Forest of Arden, but it 
does not pretend to be, or even represent, them. Nor does Wood pretend to represent an 
academic or pedagogue in the traditional sense. Unlike the tweed-clad figures of Wells 
and Gurr in William Shakespeare: A Life in Drama, Wood, who regularly dons a very hip 
black leather jacket, discovers history along with us, makes meaning of the past along 
with his spectator.  
The series will end with Shakespeare being described as “a man whose works are 
a bridge between the world we have lost and the world we have become,” a formulation 
that succinctly encapsulates the series’ own handling of history as a process of seeking 
out and discovering bridging moments between the past and the present.  The notable 
absence of reenactment footage or fictive dramatization sequences in Wood’s Search 
further underscores the presentist view of history to which the film ascribes. Perhaps the 
most well known Shakespeare biopic, Shakespeare in Love (dir. John Madden, 1998), 
offers us glimpses of dashing Joseph Fiennes as Shakespeare, whose Romantically ink-
stained fingers toil over blank pages in the hope of working through writer’s block. Fresh 
off the heels of Rocky Horror Picture Show (dir. Jim Sharman, 1975), Tim Curry plays a 
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sexually experimental Shakespeare in The Life of Shakespeare (aka William Shakespeare, 
dirs. Mark Cullingham and Robert Knights, 1978), and offers us an image of the Bard 
whose sexual proclivities nearly parallel those of the sweet transvestite Dr. Frank-N-
Furter, also played by Curry. In Search of Shakespeare also refrains from the use of still 
shots of Renaissance woodcuts or images of the First Folio Droeshout portrait of 
Shakespeare, which are regularly represented in the film version of William Shakespeare: 
A Life in Drama. Standing in for the ubiquitous use of reenactment footage and 
dramatization, In Search of Shakespeare calls upon the theatrical professionals of the 
Royal Shakespeare Company to perform notable scenes for live audiences. Early in the 
first episode, Wood emphasizes the early modern tradition of using only male actors. At 
one point, he follows a troupe of schoolboy actors from Shakespeare’s alma mater the 
King Edward VI School as they perform Ralph Roister Doister. If the spectator needs 
reminding that the actorly presence initiates the historical journey in the here and now, he 
or she need simply look as far as the RSC female actresses for such assurance. 
The assumption driving Wood’s Search is one of historiographic methodology: if 
genealogy traces the descent of current practices, it can also turn into an investigation and 
analysis of their mutation and their processes of becoming. The mode of historiography 
performed by the film and the figure of Wood finds affinity with emergent attempts to 
rethink the relation between the past and present in premodern studies. The film’s quest 
for the ghost of Shakespeare is always oriented in the present moment, and in this way 
performs a mode of what Carla Freccero has called hauntology, or the study of the 
discursive processes that create and shape conditions of what Derrida calls spectrality, or 
what Freccero describes as “a non-living present in the living present” that is no longer 
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with us but somehow continually and hauntingly appears.20 As Freccero writes, 
“Thinking historicity through haunting thus combines both the seeming objectivity of 
events and the subjectivity of their affective afterlife.”21 It’s worth questioning what 
we’re finding as we follow Wood, for he is undeniably a man on his own personal search. 
From In Search of the Dark Ages (1981) and In Search of the Trojan War (1985), to 
Domesday: A Search for the Roots of England (1988) and Legacy: A Search for the 
Origins of Civilization (1992), Wood, like a modern day Odysseus, longs for nostos, a 
homecoming, a sublime return to the past in the present moment. We learn that Wood has 
been searching for Shakespeare for over twenty years, which marks this particular project 
as the culmination of all his televisual journeys, the pinnacle homecoming of all his 
searches combined. As Feste claims in Twelfth Night: “Journeys end in lovers 
meeting,/Every wise man's son doth know” (II.iii.44-5). This journey is no exception. It 
is one propelled by the force of affect rather than the authenticity of historical event; this 
search is a project of love, a longing to be inhabited from within by the ghost of forgotten 
Shakespeare, to remember that however Shakespeare is positioned today will (re)write 
his past and thus history to come.  
The film’s reliance on systems of historical sameness rather than what it considers 
normative ideologies of historical difference places stress on the ways in which history 
operates in the cinematic imagination, and how such an operation affects the process of 
rehabilitating Shakespeare. Wood’s longing to identify with and by Shakespeare, his 
desires to find bridging moments between the past and the present—what Carolyn 
                                                
20 Freccero, 70. 
21 Freccero, 76. 
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Dinshaw would call the “queer touch” of history22—functions somewhat like homo-love, 
that is, the desire for similitude, likeness, resemblance. In their polemical article 
“Queering History,” Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon set forth a methodological 
call to action for those who would consider the relationship among history, desire, and 
identity: 
We must never presume to know in advance how questions of sexuality 
will intersect with or run aslant the prevailing forms of sociality marked 
by gender or status or the relation of such questions to the objects of a 
more literary investigation, whether tied to the traditional objects of 
literary study or a broader sense of the discursive. Equally, we need to 
question the premise of a historicism that privileges difference over 
similarity, recognizing that it is the peculiarity of our current historical 
moment that such a privileging takes place at all.23 
 
Here the figure of the historian likens to Sidney’s “right Poet.” In Goldberg and Menon’s 
formulation, an ethico-politically concerned engagement with history would debunk it as 
the discourse of fact or actuality and instead treat the subject of history more as an access 
point to multiplicity, possibility, and indeterminacy. This model of queer historiography, 
which Goldberg and Menon also call “unhistoricism,” would engender a process of 
queering history into “homo-history”: “Instead of being the history of homos,” they 
explain, “this history would be invested in suspending determinate sexual and 
chronological differences while expanding the possibilities of the nonhetero, with all its 
connotations of sameness, similarity, proximity, and anachronism.”24 An attention to the 
ways in which the past lives on and through the present offers a moment to consider 
erotic investments always already operating in the construction of the past, and the 
                                                
22 Carolyn Dinsahw, Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre-Modern and Postmodern 
(Durham, Duke University Press, 1999). 
23 Jonathan Goldberg and Madhavi Menon, “Queering History,” in PMLA (120.5, Oct. 2005), 1608-1617 
(1609). 
24 Ibid. 
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systems of meaning that the present sutures onto those historical constructions. For as 
they note, the teleological, cause-and-effect conception of time that informs historicist 
difference also underwrites institutionalized action and political agendas that marginalize 
contemporary communities based on their distance from the hetero- (as opposed to homo-
), and thus normative, lifestyles.  
In each of these queer theories of temporality and historicity, the indeterminacy of 
the term queer works as a utilitarian tool. Here are a few (understandably qualified) 
definitions of queer and queerness as they operate in such theories: If Freccero’s 
Queer/Early/Modern “can be said to have a position on queer, it would be to urge 
resistance to its hypostatization, reification, into normal status as designating an entity, 
and identity, a thing, and to allow it to continue its outlaw work as a verb and sometimes 
an adjective;”25 Quoting Foucault, Judith Halberstam makes the claim, “If we try to think 
about queerness as an outcome of strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules, and 
eccentric economies, we detach queerness from sexual identity and come closer to 
understanding Foucault’s comment in ‘Friendship as a Way of Life’ that ‘homosexuality 
threatens people as a “way of life” rather than as a way of having sex;”26 and in Lee 
Edelman’s No Future, “the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, 
the resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure….queerness can never 
define an identity; it can only ever disturb one.”27 It is precisely the indeterminacy of 
queer as an identificatory category and the imperative within queer theories of history to 
resist the reification of the term to systems of identification that imbues the term with 
                                                
25 Freccero, 5.  
26 Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 1. 
27 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 17. 
 198 
utility. The queer operation of queer, in other words, enables such shifts in its strategies 
of subversion. In part, the usefulness of the term lies in its relational dynamic. For 
Carolyn Dinshaw, exploring the operation of history within a queer theoretical 
framework would potentially “collaps[e] time through affective contact,”28 because 
“[q]ueerness articulates not a determinate thing but a relation to existent structures of 
power.”29 Similarly, for David Halperin, “[q]ueer is by definition whatever is at odds 
with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. . . . [I]t demarcates not a positivity but a 
positionality vis-à-vis the normative.”30  
The historicist project of In Search of Shakespeare registers as distinctly homo in 
its desire, propelled by Wood’s longing to identify with and by Shakespeare, to resist 
conventional investments in temporal difference. Yet, as I will argue, the very drive 
toward what operates as a queer historicism unyieldingly returns to the reification of 
normative identity, or the very normativity that Wood’s queering of early modern history 
would resist. Such a move necessitates the questioning of the relationship between the 
indeterminacy of queer and the normative and nonnormative relations that such 
negativity produces, with or against Wood’s consent.  
 
The Father of an Age 
 In his reading of In Search, Richard Dutton argues that throughout the film there 
are two distinct Michael Woods: the educator and the television entertainer. To 
supplement the film, PBS released a scholarly book in which Wood offers more historical 
                                                
28 Dinshaw et all, “Theorizing Queer Temporalities: A Roundtable Discussion,” in GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies (13, 2007), 177-95 (178). 
29 Dinshaw, “Chaucer’s Queer Touches/A Queer Touches Chaucer,” in Exemplaria (7.1, 1995), 75-92 (77).  
30 David Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 62. 
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detail and archival information to support some of the claims he makes in the film. 
Bridging the book and film projects, Dutton finds, is a lamentable contemporary need to 
render Shakespeare as the brilliant poet of the masses whose life is imagined to parallel 
those lived out in the contemporary moment. Of the film’s treatment of history, Dutton 
argues: “This is a stylization that has little place for historical reconstruction or 
pastiche….No, this is not history by fictional or technological reconstruction. Nor does it 
have any truck with postmodern musings about the medium and the message, or the 
complicities of representation. It stands by the idea of actuality, of empirical knowable 
truth.”31 Dutton is right to note the film’s reliance on documented visits to archival 
libraries and interviews with scholars in the field of Shakespeare studies. Certainly the 
film (almost embarrassingly) fetishizes the academic archive and the archivable 
document. These moments are so few and far between in the four-hour project that they 
become incredibly conspicuous. When Woods comes face-to-face with the record of 
Shakespeare’s christening, for instance, he barely manages to giggle aloud, “This is it! 
This is the document itself!” When putting on the protective gloves before handling 
Shakespeare’s will, it looks as though he might keel over in ecstasy. To read these 
moments of archive-combing bliss as indicative of the film’s treatment of history is to 
underestimate the entertainment and educational value of the moments in which Wood 
works through the limits of the archive, those moments of undocumented event and 
impossible knowledge. 
To be fair, much of the over-the-top fetishism seems to come from Wood’s 
inexhaustible excitement, which he relays onto archival documentation as well as 
                                                
31 Richard Dutton, “’If I’m Right’: Michael Wood’s In Search of Shakespeare” in Screening Shakespeare 
in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Mark Thornton Burnett and Ramona Wray (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2006), 13-30 (16). 
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moments in which the archive fails to produce any sense of historical authenticity. When 
exploring Shakespeare’s marriage license, for instance, Wood explains, “as with so many 
Shakespeare documents, there’s a twist.” The film discusses the registration of the name 
Anne Whatley, not Anne Hathaway, on the marriage license. In excited horror, Wood 
wonders aloud, “Could Shakespeare really have promised himself to two different 
women?” He refuses to answer the question definitely, instead speculating that what 
might sound like a sexy mystery could have simply been the error performed by an 
overworked clerk. Unlike The Life of William Shakespeare and A Waste of Shame (dir 
John McKay, 2005), In Search refuses to claim that Whatley was Shakespeare’s true 
love, or that he couldn’t have loved a simple farmer’s daughter like Hathaway. This 
doesn’t impede Wood from debunking his previous claim that “Whatley” might simply 
be a clerical error. As the segment ends he begins to fantasize aloud about a young 
pregnant woman (Whatley) turned away just before her wedding day, another and older 
woman fighting for her man (Hathaway), and how pitiable the situation must have been 
for all involved, Shakespeare included. His speculation rivals the plots of historical 
romance novels, recently resituated in the contemporary imagination with Philippa 
Gregory’s Tudor series, which includes The Other Boleyn Girl (2001), The Virgin’s 
Lover (2004), and The Constant Princess (2005), to name a few. Woods repeatedly works 
against the problem of calling upon the archive to make a system of Shakespearean truth. 
The excavation and examination of historical documentation fails to act as the privileged 
or even primary means of extracting truth. What Foucault would call “the pleasure of 
analysis” is not half as exciting as the pleasure of impossible speculation.32 Wood 
performs the role of fetishistic archive-comber who achieves an exorbitant sense of 
                                                
32 Foucault, History of Sexuality.  
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jouissance at the touch of history, the feel of undocumented Shakespeare, and his own 
hyperbolic fantasies that suture over the inadequacies of historical narrative. 
The moments of avowed indeterminacy, while acting as the aphrodisiac that 
drives Wood further on his search, lead to hauntingly normative orientations of 
Shakespeare’s positionality for the contemporary moment. If the film traces Wood’s 
fantasies of who Shakespeare was, based upon a contemporary understanding of what he 
signifies today, the image is anything but the liberatory cry that some queer historians 
would presume. What emerges in Wood’s Search is a Shakespeare done straight, an 
image of the Bard as the ultimate patriarch. While examining archival materials that 
document a figure know as “Shakes-shaft” in Lancashire during Shakespeare’s lost years, 
Wood refrains from drawing an easy metonymic line between the two. He acknowledges 
that we will never know whether or not Shakespeare spent the lost years farming or 
tutoring, as has been argued by scholars for decades. Yet avowal acts as a disavowal. 
Concluding the second episode, Wood definitively declares:  
whether William was Shakeshafte or not, Lancashire is an important part 
of the story. But it can’t be the whole story. Like any young man, I’d 
guess he did several jobs to earn money. But remember, the trail always 
leads back to Warwickshire. Back in Stratford-upon-Avon Shakespeare 
has a family to support, and he’s always loyal to the family. 
 
Adopting a mode of what Judith Halberstam has called “perverse presentism”—“an 
application of what we do not know in the present to what we cannot know in the 
past”33—leads seamlessly here to the representation of Shakespeare as the ultimate 
family man. He may have indulged in youthful boyish trysts and tried out different jobs 
in search of self-discovery, but he always remained loyal to his family once he was 
married and had children. As a faithful and familial man, he knew there comes a time in 
                                                
33 Judith Halberstam, Female Masculinity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 1998), 53. 
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every man’s life to put away childish things. A patriarch with a sense of responsibility, 
then, Shakespeare is made contemporary through an Oedipal evocation of the dutiful 
father. Wood’s capitulation to Shakespeare as the ideal father recapitulates contemporary 
cultural imperatives of paternity, how a father should act. And his recapitalization 
positions Wood as a sort of modern Oedipus figure himself, one who works to resist the 
prescribed narratives of the history that will be—in this case how history should be taught 
and performed—while also embodying this prescribed narrative. 
The most troublingly inconclusive conclusion pushed by the documentary 
concerns Shakespeare’s non-dramatic works. Wood presents Shakespeare as a man of 
both expediency and defiance, asserting: “For him the goal of poetry is not to glorify God 
but to earn a living. He’s got a wife and children in Stratford, and his duty is to support 
them.” With the plagues and the closing of the theaters in 1593, Wood summarizes, 
Shakespeare was forced to make a living however he could. Thus necessity and a sense of 
patriarchal obligation explain why he wrote his first published work, the epyllion Venus 
and Adonis. Writing the poem, we are to believe, allowed Shakespeare to indulge in 
nostalgia for his lost school days and his love of Ovid which was tragically cut short 
because of financial hardship, while also offering Shakespeare the proactivity of ensuring 
that his family never had to endure the financial suffering he did as a child. At least one 
quarter of the first segment details Shakespeare’s experience at school as a young boy 
and how Ovid’s Metamorphosis was surely his favorite book; tragically, the film 
supposes, Shakespeare was pulled from school by his father at an early age because the 
family fell upon financial difficulties. As Wood surmises in his coolly authoritative 
fashion, “his father took him out of school early. At the age of fourteen he found himself 
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cut off from the chance of higher education and the chances of going to university.” This 
is in fact considerably more than we know or might guess. Archival documents suggest 
that John Shakespeare did fall on hard times, and that Shakespeare did not attend 
university; however, Wood’s fantasy of Shakespeare as the self-taught street scholar who 
never completed his grammar school humanist curriculum cannot be supported by these 
archival documents. In fact, it is to play into the hands of  Baconians, Marlovians, and 
Oxfordians who support the theory that Shakespeare’s works were penned by someone 
else precisely because Shakespeare, the historical figure, never completed university.  
Framing Shakespeare’s act of writing Venus and Adonis in terms of expediency 
and familial duty likewise casts his non-dramatic works in de-eroticisized terms. If 
Shakespeare’s narrative poem about the Goddess of Love and her unyielding and violent 
pursuit of a young boy can be cast in purely practical economic grounds, it is hardly 
surprising—though no doubt shocking—that In Search of Shakespeare treats the 
homoerotics of the sonnets in a similar fashion. It is striking how often Wood moves 
from the assertion that we cannot know who Shakespeare was as an historical figure, to a 
claim of Shakespeare’s sense of paternal obligation. Wood offers a narrative voiceover to 
explain the film’s treatment of the Sonnets: “Are the Sonnets autobiographical? There’s 
still a furious debate, but I think they are.” Wood is in good company with this belief.34 
He continues, “And in some of them, Shakespeare lets us share in his deepest feelings of 
love and loss: the death of his own child.” Wood’s exploration of the mystery of 
Shakespeare’s marriage license may result in a fantastical love triangle, but the erotic 
structure is strikingly absent when In Search of Shakespeare confronts the content of the 
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(London: Picador, 1997) and Soul of the Age: A Biography of the Mind of William Shakespeare (New 
York: Random House, 2009). 
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sonnets. A narrative voice recites Sonnet 33 to compel the spectator into the possibility 
that the sonnets were written as a lament of a grieving father: 
Even so my sun one early morn did shine 
With all triumphant splendor on my brow; 
But out, alack! he was but one hour mine; 
The region cloud hath mask'd him from me now. 
Yet him for this my love no whit disdaineth; 
Suns of the world may stain when heaven's sun staineth. 
 
Again in narrative voiceover, Wood makes the grandiose claim: “If that’s not written 
from the heart, it’s hard to imagine what is. And if it’s not really about his own son then 
words surely have no meaning. William’s sonnets are about his love for the boy, but 
they’re also about a father’s grief for his dead child.” Hamnet’s death becomes the 
primary spring of inspiration from which Shakespeare’s poetry followed. This declaration 
works against contemporary criticism, which would position Southampton as the young 
boy in the early Sonnets.35 Wood’s work is more in line, though certainly not referential, 
with Katherine Duncan-Jones’s preface to the Arden edition of the sonnets, which 
reconsiders other likely candidates, such as William Herbert, the third Earl of Pembroke, 
in the desire to work against a homophobic reading tradition: “And as for the 
compromising or ‘disgraceful’ elements of the sonnets: their homoeroticism is here 
confronted positively, and is newly conceptualized within the powerfully ‘homosocial’ 
world of James I’s court. The case for their association with Southampton largely 
collapses, but the case for their connection with William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, 
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becomes newly plausible.”36 Most grandiose, however, is the implication that 
signification fails completely if we question whether or not the young boy of the sonnets 
is Hamnet. This, of course, means that we must abject a consideration of the sonnets as 
homoerotic, which we are also and stealthy asked to do in the presentist use of female 
actresses in the RSC reenactments of the playtexts.  
The problem of history in Wood’s Search involves systems of differentiation that 
foreclose our ability to understand ourselves in the present and acknowledge the ways in 
which history constructs the present as much as it is constructed by it. This dramatization 
of the rehabilitation of historicity, however, suggest that the pre-oedipal desire for non-
differentiation in the pursuit of history—of discovering bridging moments between the 
past and the present—always already depends upon an oedipal relation to the present, to 
name and thus fix what has been lost in the present as a means of suturing over the 
trauma of difference. Because the easy slide between past and present is presented here as 
a pedagogical corrective, the films offer a valuable opportunity to question the systems of 
rehabilitation in our classrooms. It would seem, then, that in grieving our loss of 
Shakespeare, of never knowing the truth behind the author of the texts that have fathered 
our contemporary consciousness, Shakespeare becomes the grieving father who works 
through the traumatic loss of his son in a way that predetermines our contemporary 
consciousness.  
 
Excitable Pedagogy 
                                                
36 Katherine Duncan-Jones, ed., “Preface” in The Arden Shakespeare: Shakespeare’s Sonnets (London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1997), xiii. 
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The lines of performative rehabilitation at this point are as dizzying as they are 
multiple. In Search of Shakespeare purports to be a rehabilitation of the ways in which 
we teach Shakespeare in the classroom. It works to dramatize for students and educators 
alike the pleasures of mimetically identifying with Shakespeare across systems of 
historical alterity, systems that the film suggests have become the dominant mode of 
pedagogy. Homohistory, as it operates in the film, desires to seduce: the film would have 
us follow the model of historical engagement in which it plays with Shakespeare. In the 
process of rehabilitating the student-teacher subject, the film likewise rehabilitates 
systems of historicity, as well as the subject of Shakespeare. As I have discussed, 
however, these homo lines of rehabilitation intersect to transform Shakespeare into a 
homogeneously normative and culturally identifiable if not wholly uninhabitable figure 
of perfect paternity. The implication here is that to disidentify with Shakespeare as the 
father of the age is to occupy the position of the prodigal child. The demands that this 
film places on us are completely unreasonable. That is, the demands are between reasons: 
if we seek the pleasures of mimetically identifying with Shakespeare—which the film 
frames as a radical mode of defying dominant cultural demands placed on us—then what 
we get in our mode of defiance is a mandated and politically troubling Shakespeare 
identity position. In positioning Shakespeare as the ultimately heterosexual father, the 
film likewise carries with it the ideological baggage of that position, which includes 
heteronormative social and sexual reproductivity as the appropriate position of 
performing subjecthood in our present moment.  
Queer desire, however, explicitly challenges such claims. As the queer theorists I 
discussed earlier point out time and again, ideologies of temporality and futurity depend 
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upon notions of appropriate social and sexual reproductivity and the forms this takes. The 
indeterminacy of queer certainly calls attention to these forms and their manifestation in 
systems of social power. Social power is always constructed along the lines of inclusion 
and exclusion, and the performance queering educational practices, as we see in In 
Search of Shakespeare, has the power to exclude even as it works toward a model of 
education built upon temporal inclusion: to unite us all through the egalitarian pleasures 
of identifying across boundaries of history. While the project would have us believe in 
the old adage that education is the great equalizer, queer theory’s attendance to the power 
of social reproductivity would likewise urge us to be skeptical of such fantasies of 
sameness. For education’s equalizing force obscures the operations of social reproduction 
that attend the social institution of education behind the veiling fantasy of a subject’s 
ability to willfully transform his or her social position. The process of equalization, built 
upon sameness, uniformity, and compensation, works to cordon off and abject systems of 
difference in its desire for utopian idealism. As I argued in chapter two, for instance, in 
the process of offering underprivileged, inner city youth a chance to take part in cultural 
resources traditionally foreclosed to them, like attending college, their struggle to become 
something more socially recognized depends upon the erasure of the socioeconomic and 
cultural differences that contribute to their marginalized social status.  
One of the primary problems the film experiences in fulfilling its project of 
performing a mode of history-making resists dominant ideologies of alterity is that this is 
one man’s search. Wood would have us believe that history needs to be reconsidered as a 
mode of erotic engagement with the past, and many early modern theorists likewise 
follow this call, myself included. The film suggests that through an affective 
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identification that crosses historical boundaries, we both discover and embody 
Shakespeare’s transcendental understanding of humanity; thus we can become better 
citizens of our world. And yet the call of Shakespeare appears to be the voice of Wood, 
both ventriloquizing questions and answers through a Shakespeare mouthpiece. We see 
this most clearly in the first segment, just before Wood discovers the ancient road. At this 
point, the film weaves voiceover narration with expository and speculative speeches 
delivered by Wood to the student-spectator audience. However, the narrative voice, 
which takes on the performative mode of omnipotent Voice-of-God perspective, also 
belongs to Wood. The excitable educator asks and answers: 
 
WOOD (as omnipotent narrator): Why go in search of Shakespeare? Can 
the life of a writer ever be as interesting as a conqueror, an inventor, or an 
explore, a Napoleon, a Columbus, an Alexander the Great? 
 
WOOD (as speculative lover): Well, yes! Yes, it can, more so, because the 
writers and the poets are the explorers of the human heart, and long after 
the conquerors are forgotten, their legacy will be the most valuable to us 
as human beings. And Shakespeare’s one of the greatest writers who ever 
lived! Who wouldn’t want to know what made him tick? That’s what I 
want to try to do on this journey. 
 
 
This scene demonstrates the way in which the performance of rehabilitation creates a 
fractured subject, in this case Wood as the desiring pedagogue. Wood bifurcates his 
performance of identification along the lines both of sameness and difference. He stages 
himself at different moments as the “traditional” historian he implicates in today’s 
miseducation of Shakespeare, and as the pedagogue who channels the pleasurable space 
of historical indeterminacy. While the Narrator Wood poses what initially sounds like a 
rhetorical question, the excitable pedagogue Wood answers the question with a 
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determination to prove his answer correct. And this staging repeats throughout the film. 
Sometimes it succeeds, sometimes it fails; but he always answers his own questions by 
framing them in terms of his own personal and unyielding desire, rather than historical 
fact or a sense of documented accuracy.  
 In fracturing Wood as authoritative purveyor of the search as well as the 
searching pedagogue, the film stages the self-encounter of the rehabilitated subject. It is 
not so much that this doubled performance coalesces into a singular performance at any 
point in the film; nor does Wood’s performance of the normative historian give way to 
the nonnormative one, or vise versa. These performances exist together in the film, 
sharing cinematic time within a sort of fort-da game. And it is within this tension of 
performing both normative and non-normative that we witness both the “o-o-o” pleasure 
and threat of rehabilitation as a queer performance. In Wood’s pedagogy, Shakespeare 
becomes a transcendental signifier that allows for a multitude of pleasurable 
identificatory positions; but we also see that in asserting the truth of Shakespeare’s 
transcendental position, the signifier Shakespeare becomes an alibi for ideologies of 
normative gender and sexuality. In searching for Shakespeare in order to rehabilitate the 
ways Shakespeare is taught, Wood must first establish both the normative and non-
normative modes of this performance; this is the foundational move of rehabilitative as a 
performance, the way in which transformation can be evaluated. And by evoking the 
normative as a point of resistance again and again in order to perform its distance from 
that point, Wood’s would-be mode of pedagogical resistance always already carries with 
it the point of normative resistance. My point here is that in the desire to rehabilitate 
pedagogy and in the process be a rehabilitated pedagogue, Wood’s very performance of 
 210 
rehabilitation constitutes or brings into existence both the normative and the non-
normative. Both normative and non-normative become byproducts of rehabilitation, or 
what Judith Butler has called modes of “constitutive constraint”: practices of identity as 
sites of agency that avoid easy delineations of the subject as either wholly subjected or 
subjecting.37 To read this back on theories of queer history, it would seem that 
instrumentality of queer lies not so much in its indeterminacy, but rather in its tendency 
toward overdetermination: queer as a performative sense of self determines normative 
and nonnormative and flirts with the inhabitation of these positions, without ever 
faithfully inhabiting one in particular.  
 Just as Wood’s performance between models of pedagogy splits his identity, his 
process of becoming—that is, of rehabilitating—likewise fractures the model of 
pedagogy he offers us. It repeatedly sets its own limits only to exceed them, for 
rehabilitation is always evaluated on the performance of going beyond, or inciting the 
subject to the excitement and excitability of transformation. Wood’s performance 
represents a mode of excitable pedagogy: a consideration of how teaching should be 
performed that exceeds imperatives while constituting them. I take a cue in my 
understanding of excitability here from Butler.38 In her theorization of mechanisms of 
censorship and their unexpected effects, Butler explains that “excitable speech” is a legal 
term that refers to utterances deemed by the state apparatus to perform beyond the 
speaker’s intended aim; but since utterances take place within discursive contexts that 
precede and exceed the speaker, all speech is excitable. In this way, the performative 
speaker always exists within a sense of “belated metalepsis,” or a system of substitutions 
                                                
37 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), esp. 
ch. 3.  
38 Butler, Excitable Speech (New York and Routledge, 1997). 
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that, rather than preceding discourse, become the effect of discourses that precede it. In 
Search of Shakespeare represents the excitable state of the pedagogue who doubly 
engages with the discourse of the truth, actuality, and authenticity of history. The mode 
of pedagogy Wood adopts in the film mixes education and entertainment, or learning and 
pleasure, with the goal of making the study of history more engaging by teaching the 
spectator-student ways of working within the limitations of discourse. This is 
“edutainment” at its finest. Most exciting, Wood’s pedagogy is the point at which the 
discourse of historical difference and sameness fails to register as either normative or 
non-normative. As a rehabilitative project, In Search of Shakespeare likewise fails to 
deliver on its promises of transformation. And yet, there is a lesson to be learned: if a 
discourse cannot faithfully account for an actual event, it is not that the event never 
preceded the present; rather, our understanding of how we connect to history today can 
be understood as a discourse predicated on the question of how we know not what we 
know; more importantly, the film demonstrates the ways in which the failures of 
discourse to make absolute meaning represent, rather than moments of traumatic 
epistemological crisis, strategic opportunities whereby we witness overlapping and 
multiplicitous cultural imperatives whose very plurality can be negotiated, or perhaps 
even exploited.   
The performance of excitable pedagogy operating in the film resonates with 
theoretical and practical questions that have come to establish the study of queer 
pedagogy. While theories of queer history take a predominantly anti-identitarian stance, 
theories of queer pedagogy continue to mark the use of queer as a qualifier dependent 
upon a discussion of identification and its relation to systems both of sameness and 
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difference. Is queer pedagogy a mode of pedagogy of or about queers, by queers and for 
queers? Or does queer stand in relation to a pedagogy of diverse contents, contexts, and 
constellations of subjects? These are questions that theories continue to work through. 
Many of the earlier writings on the subject of queer pedagogy take an autobiographical 
approach and offer first-hand discussions primarily by instructors who identify as lesbian 
and gay on the trials of teaching within heteronormative systems of education. These 
projects act as explorations on being queer (which reads as an umbrella term here 
primarily for gay and lesbian) in the classroom and do the important work of 
documenting the damaging effects that heterosexism and homophobia have on non-hetero 
teachers and students alike.39  
My concept here of excitable pedagogy and the queer effects it produces, while 
sympathetic to these projects, takes a different turn. As Mary Bryson and Suzanne de 
Castell have explored, a mode of pedagogy based upon queer as a system of sexual 
identification, or even academic identification, cannot operate as a fantastical structure of 
oppositionality that would throw the effects of heterosexism and homophobia into 
relief.40 Even in designated queer studies classrooms, systems of normativity and their 
referents outside of the classroom reemerge and threaten the fantasies of pedagogical 
liberation that a queer “safe space” would promise. The efficacy in a system of queer 
pedagogy, rather, exists in the ways in which queer is deployed in a way that positions 
                                                
39 See for example: Debbie Epstein and Richard Johnson, “On the Straight and Narrow: The Heterosexual 
Presumption, Homophobias, and Schools” in Challenging Lesbian and Gay Inequities in Education, ed. 
Debbie Epstein (Buckingham, England: Open University Press, 1994), 197-230); and Karen M. Harbeck, 
Coming Out of the Classroom Closet: Gay and Lesbian Students, Teachers, and Curricula (Binghampton, 
NY: Hawthorn Press,1992). 
40 Mary Bryson and Suzanne de Castell, “Telling Tales out of School: Modernist, Critical, and Postmodern 
‘True Stories’ about Education Computing” in Education/Technology/Power: Education Computing as a 
Social Practice, eds. H. Bromley and M. W. Apple. (Albany: New York Press, 1998) 65-84. 
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cultural practices in a strange relation to themselves, to (irreverently) change the stakes of 
the practice. Studies of pedagogy, for instance, which would supplement pedagogy with 
monikers like feminist, anti-racist, and radical, or qualify with suffixes of the oppressed 
or of multiliteracies, are critical of the roles that dominant educational systems play out 
as sites for the reproduction of unequal power relations.  
In what I find to be the clearest articulation on the subject of pedagogy’s 
subjection to the resistance of queer, Susanne Luhmann’s work explains the queering of 
pedagogy becomes the querying of pedagogy. A queer pedagogy would question received 
models of instruction. Rather than focusing on traditional question of teaching, like what 
texts should be learned and how should we teach this knowledge, pedagogy might begin 
with the questions: How is knowledge created in the relationship among teacher, text, and 
student? And in what ways does the creation of knowledge depend upon the 
understanding of the student or the teacher as a text, and the text as a student to be taught 
or disciplined? Luhmann writes: “Although few progressive educators would agree with 
such a transmission model of learning and teaching, I suggest that it returns like the 
repressed in the prevalent preoccupation of teachers with methods, or the how-to of 
teaching. The rationale behind this search for an adequate method is that the teacher’s 
pedagogical skills…will reflect in the students’ progress of learning.”41 Wood’s 
pedagogical performance defies the biographical tradition of situating Shakespeare within 
a more appropriate, and thus more understandable, historical context. His desire to revel 
in the indeterminacies of histories registers not only in the film’s stylistic investments 
(namely, the use of Wood as omnipotent narrator) but also in the ways in which the limits 
                                                
41 Susanne Luhmann, “Queering/Querying Pedagogy? Or, Pedagogy Is a Pretty Queer Thing” in Queer 
Theory in Education, ed. William F. Pinar (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 141-155, 
148. 
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of historical discourses of truth come to be mobilized into Wood’s self-critical and yet 
incredibly disturbing performance of unearthing of his affective investments in how the 
figure of Shakespeare signifies today. 
  
Reflections 
 Many of us, I hope, will find the final image of Wood’s Shakespeare as the 
hopelessly heterosexual and dutiful patriarch troubling—both politically and 
pedagogically—since, no doubt, supporting this image as an historical “truth” would 
make teaching the playtexts incredibly difficult given the numerous and conflicting 
ideologies of sexuality represented in the playtexts. But surely many of us find an affinity 
with Wood’s impulses to make Shakespeare enjoyable in the pedagogical setting. I must 
admit, I see little to no educational value in In Search of Shakespeare for my students, but 
this is not to say it doesn’t offer pedagogical value in its metacritical impulse. In Search 
of Shakespeare, along with the larger collection of bio-projects I have examined here, 
poses to us the question: What excites our pedagogical practices and through us performs 
in the classroom in a way that incites excitability in our students? Surely this in an 
impossible question to answer: performativity always exceeds intentions in ways that 
cannot be foreseen or foreknown. But we can look at the ways Shakespeare has been 
placed traditionally in institutions of education as a means of understanding the 
implications that such positionality plays out for our students. 
 Most of us would agree that today there exists in literature departments, 
regardless of the decade long canon wars, an emphasis on Shakespeare. At least, we 
might ask ourselves: can an undergraduate matriculate from our department without 
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studying Shakespeare in some form? Can the same be said of other literary figures? 
Barbara Bowden considers this an example of institutionally supported “Shakespearean 
exceptionalism,” and she urges us to move beyond it because it operates at the expense of 
other early modern texts, notably those authored by women.42 Bowden is not interested in 
striking Shakespeare from the academic canon—as if that were even a possible task, let 
alone a beneficial one; rather, she urges us to rethink how we might include in 
Shakespeare courses a consideration of the ways Shakespeare was and is shaped, made, 
and remade, in the early modern period and today, by female audiences.  
 Shakespeare in the postmodern classroom has become a multi-modal enterprise: 
many of us use recent technological adaptations of Shakespeare to supplement 
discussions on the playtexts and on early modern cultural imaginations. To some degree, 
the inclusion of screen Shakespeares, for instance, has confronted Bowden’s 
understandable displeasure with Shakespearean exceptionalism. In particular, vernacular 
adaptations of Shakespeare work to reimagine and recreate Shakespeare—either the 
cultural idea of Shakespeare as an historical figure or the playtexts—within cultural 
dialects that include not only specific communities of women but also a multiplicity of 
raced, classed, and sexed bodies not traditionally represented in conjunction with 
Shakespeare. The Street King (aka King Rikki, dir. James Gavin Bedford, 2002), for 
instance, revises Richard III in a specifically east Los Angeles Chicano tone; Scotland, 
PA (dir. Billy Moressette, 2001) adapts Macbeth in a way that displaces courtly power 
struggles onto conflicting working class sensibilities; and My Own Private Idaho (dir. 
Gus Van Sant, 1991) discontinuously samples the Henriad to represent the lives of gay 
                                                
42 Barbara Bowden, “Beyond Shakespearean Exceptionalism” in Shakespeare Matters: History, Teaching, 
Performance, ed. Lloyd Davis (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2003), 209-21. 
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and bisexual male sex workers.43 And the larger collection of rehabilitative Shakespeares 
document the attempts of marginalized communities to remake and in turn be remade by 
Shakespeare.  
The figure of Shakespeare has become as utilitarian in the larger body of screen 
adaptations as he has in the subgenre of rehabilitative Shakespeares. It is a foundational 
premise of this dissertation that the process of rehabilitation produces in the subject a 
queer subjectivity, that is a performative sense of self that operates in flirtatious 
opposition to both normative and nonnormative systems of identification. Queer, as I 
deploy the term, then, is less bound by the desire to disrupt the definition and ultimately 
the boundaries of identity; rather, the desire—and the performance of that desire—to 
identify across multiple identity boundaries offers the subject an oppositional strategy 
wherein systems of identificatory binaries converge in a way that overloads easy 
delineations of whether or not identity is performative or constitutive. Shakespeare 
operates as the ideal figure for the performance of identity ideals precisely because, as a 
signifier, it performs queerly. Shakespeare can mean oppression and/or liberation, that 
which must be overcome and that which can help one to overcome. As an historical 
figure, Shakespeare can operate both as the son of a glove maker and the man who 
applied for a family crest; he is the genius who penned compelling dramatic works for the 
groundlings as well as aristocratic patrons like the Earls of South Hampton and 
Pembrooke.  
And yet, in the desire for Shakespeare in this age of mechanical reproduction, 
consider the implication of the ways in which many of us use film in the classroom. 
                                                
43 For a discussion on vernacular screen Shakespeares, see: Thomas Cartelli and Katherine Rowe, New 
Wave Shakespeare on Screen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), esp. ch. 5. 
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Annalisa Castaldo has argued that many Shakespeare classes include media Shakespeare 
of some kind at this point, and film in particular.44 On some level, this is a response to the 
ways in which the love of Shakespeareplay in the contemporary moment comes to us in 
various mediatized forms, courtesy of video and various modes of digital technology. It 
has become increasingly clear that to teach Shakespeare today means teaching today’s 
Shakespeare. Yet she finds that many educators screen Shakespeare films as part of the 
syllabus without actually teaching the films. When I was in college, for instance, “film 
days” were essentially days off, gifted time from our instructor after we turned in papers 
or resentfully returned from breaks—days, in other words, when we were imagined to be 
too tired or unwilling to intellectually engage. I wonder how many of us screen films for 
this same reason. Or perhaps we screen film without critically engaging our students in 
discussion on, say, how the film reimagines, rejects, or reimplements particular themes, 
narrative structures, or cultural myths surrounding the playtexts. It is not often that 
instructors assign material without critically discussing it, but this tends to be the case 
quite frequently when screen or “entertainment” Shakespeares meet the literary 
Shakespeare classroom. Perhaps this is a result of the fact that many of us aren’t fluent in 
film studies, or, as Katherine Rowe has suggested, that this is part of the systemic 
ideologies within Shakespeare studies that entertainment and scholastic rigor should 
occupy a separate peace from one another.45 
Whatever the case, our use of film in the Shakespeare classroom, or rather our 
lack thereof, can lead to the ideological implication that historical boundaries are 
                                                
44 Annalisa Castaldo, “The Film’s the Thing: Using Shakespeare Film in the Classroom” in Spectacular 
Shakespeare: Critical Theory and Popular Cinema, eds. Courtney Lehmann and Lisa S. Stark (London: 
Associated University Presses, 2002), 187-204. 
45 Katherine Rowe, “Medium-Specificity and other Critical Scripts for Screen Shakespeare” in, Alternative 
Shakespeares 3, ed. Diana Henderson (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 34-53.  
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infallible, even when we try to subvert them; this by extension can serve to (re)install a 
belief in teleological concepts of time and social reproduction, backed by the institutional 
power within which we perform our roles as educators. For many of us, this might simply 
reinforce an already established Shakespearean teleology. In Shakespeare classes, his 
works are often organized to represent a teleological development of thought or genre. 
Conceding that Shakespeare haunts the present moment by screening Shakespeare in the 
classroom without critically discussing it reinforces the idea of the Shakespeare canon as 
hermetically sealed, impervious to intertexuality or the ways we construct him, the 
authority of his works, and the place of these works in history. He remains a discreet 
subject of inquiry in and of himself. Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor have 
explored the implications of such treatments of Shakespeare and the ideological effects 
they have on student bodies: “somewhat like a Dior suit, Shakespeare never ages and 
eludes all historical implication.”46  
Thus, transforming the pedagogical practices of teaching Shakespeare and how 
that signifier has come to be rehabilitated time and again requires a consideration of the 
ways in which our own performances may be inadvertently implicated in the effacement 
of both the historicity of the text at its moment of production as well as the subsequent 
cultural appropriations of those texts. Rehabilitative Shakespeares are appropriate aids 
both in a pedagogical and educational meditation on the ways in which a Shakespearean 
text is never outside of history or ideology; in fact, a consideration of the performances of 
rehabilitation that Shakespeare authorizes offers an opportunity to discuss with our 
students not only how meaning is made but also the historical and political means toward 
                                                
46 Jean E. Howard and Marion F. O’Connor, “Introduction” in Shakespeare Reproduced, eds. Jean E. 
Howard and Marion F. O’Connor (New York: Methuen, 1987), 3-17, 6.  
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which that meaning is used to create alternate meaning, fractured along the lines of 
disparate social bodies. For the deployment of Shakespeare as a privileged rehabilitative 
tool in the contemporary moment suggests that Shakespeare is anything but a Dior suit, 
but he is made to wear one at times to signal his place in certain contexts as a signifier of 
privilege. Rehabilitative Shakespeares suggest that Shakespeare owns a wardrobe of 
multiple suits and accessories, some Dior, some decidedly not name brand, but always 
“hand-me-downs.” He tends to wear well whatever articles we dress him in, from Dior to 
prison uniform. A problem arises, however, when Shakespeare is invited to an event with 
the unspecified instructions to dress appropriately. One cannot wear Dior to every event, 
however accessorized. And sometimes, when outfitted in prison scrubs over a Dior suit, 
Shakespeare appears too bulky to move freely in certain social spaces. 
The ability of Shakespeare to perform queerly across contexts suggests that, as a 
signifier, it comes to embody ideological values that serve to differentiate one context 
from another. That is, the utilitarian quality of Shakespeare lies in its ability to perform 
an authorizing function in a system of contextual difference. The fact that Shakespeare is 
deployed as an institutionally sanctioned rehabilitative tool in contexts as disparate as 
socio-economically challenged elementary school and high-security prison yards suggests 
that Shakespeare has come to embody embodiment itself, the tangible performance of 
ideals, values, qualities of feelings being promoted by the very institutions that subsidize 
the performance of Shakespeare. Shakespeare has become a paradigm—perhaps the 
paradigm—for ideologies of futurity, and all the socio-cultural politics they entail. And as 
we recapitulate this paradigm in our classes, not as truth but as constructed truth in the 
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historical moment, we might attend to the futures we imagine for our students, the futures 
we train and discipline, that is, rehabilitate, them into.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION: CONFRONTING INTERSECTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The cultural phenomenon of rehabilitating by Shakespeare suggests that the 
contemporary moment invests in a humanistic understanding of the subject as imbued 
with a relatively high-functioning level of personal and social agency. In many ways, 
rehabilitative Shakespeares point to a present moment coincidental with the early 
modern, which Stephen Greenblatt has famously characterized as preoccupied with the 
process of self-fashioning, or the act of constructing one’s public persona according to 
socially acceptable standards of identity and practice.1 Throughout this dissertation, 
however, I have traced the ways in which the process of rehabilitation produces both non-
normative and queer performances of identity as unintentional byproducts of the desire to 
normalize and “normativize” individuals into the ideal image of the socially successful 
subject. These byproductive elements of the normative subvert final claims of 
rehabilitative success, or a subject’s ability to ascend social hierarchies of privilege and 
resource and leave behind that which it once was.  
 Yet, rehabilitative Shakespeares programmatically close with a celebration of the 
subject’s effectual performance of self-determination.2 Even when rehabilitative aims are 
left glaringly unfulfilled—most clearly represented in the audio-visual artifacts 
                                                
1 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From Moore to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983). 
2 This is perhaps most apparent in the final scene of My Shakespeare (see chapter two). During first-person 
testimonials, rehabilitative subjects have little to say on the benefits of having performed Shakespeare; 
nonetheless, the program facilitator surprises them with a trip to Shakespeare’s Globe Theater, where they 
seem less than enthused.  
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documenting Shakespeare’s potential behind bars3—they formulaically end with a 
commemoratory nod to what they present as the ability of the subject to transcend 
systems of social inequality. With this transcendence, they imply, follows social 
ascension, or the rejection of a previously held identity deemed unsuccessful and non-
normative in favor of another, one promised access to increased resource and a more 
secure, normative future. Documentary and reality-based media artifacts generically 
present images and accounts of social activity as delivering simple, relatively unmediated 
meaning: what you see is what you get.4 Rehabilitative Shakespeares are no exception.5 
What we as spectators are imagined to gain is an opportunity to become knowledgeable 
subjects. Rehabilitative Shakespeares position spectators to learn both about the use value 
of Shakespeare today and the efficacy of self-determination. We may marvel at the ability 
of Shakespeare—the historical literary figure and the playtexts associated with that 
name—to find cultural purchase within divergent and marginalized communities and 
social spaces. Rehabilitative Shakespeares mark the fantastical point at which 
Shakespeare’s intrinsic value meets its use value. We learn (or at least, we are asked to 
learn) that the transformative power of Shakespeare can be found in some of the most 
                                                
3 As I discuss in the third chapter, none of the inmates in the Shakespeare Behind Bars program receive 
parole. On one level, the documentary uses this point to underscore its representation of the American 
prison industrial complex as detrimentally regulatory. On the other hand, the film pushes aside the parole 
board’s decisions in order to make the claim that the men, nonetheless, gain valuable insight into the 
“human condition” through their encounter with Shakespeare.  
4 Perhaps the most well-cited articulation of this point can be found in Bill Nichols earlier works, especially 
Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 
While several documentary theorists have successfully troubled this claim, of course, the genre at large, 
nonetheless, markets itself as offering the most unmediated representation of reality and truth possible. I 
discuss this point at length in chapter two. For more on critical works that trouble the documentary genre’s 
claim to the transmission of simple truth, see especially: Michael Renov, ed, Theorizing Documentary 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1993) and his monograph The Subject of Documentary (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004). 
5 Again, it’s worth making the distinction, though I problematize the claim that documentary film transmits 
unmediated truth, each of the rehabilitative Shakespeare I examine nonetheless make such a claim in their 
marketing or introductory sequences.  
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unlikely places, and that a subject’s desire for self-survival can overcome amazing social 
obstacles.  
 Operating much like the final scenes in Shakespearean romantic comedies, the 
celebrations offered at the ends of rehabilitative Shakespeares prompt moments of 
forgetting that threaten to suture over the ways in which attempts at teleological narrative 
closure often come at someone’s expense. The multiple marriages ending Twelfth Night 
tempt us to put Malvolio’s humiliation, torture, and imprisonment out of mind. Hymen’s 
nuptial blessing in As You Like It allows us to misremember that Rosalind dupes Phebe 
into marrying Silvius. Isabella’s silence on the Duke’s marriage proposal in Measure for 
Measure is often taken to signify consent or at least a lack of refusal, but notoriously 
cannot affirm it.6 Rehabilitative Shakespeares would have us rejoice in the union of two 
paradigms—Shakespeare’s contemporary and practical use value and the triumph of 
doggedly individual agency—at a great political expense. The cultural bodies upon which 
we are invited to celebrate Shakespeare’s use value are avowedly marginalized ones, as 
rehabilitative Shakespeares point to again and again. The representation of cross-cultural 
Shakespeare in these artifacts can too easily veil over the fact that rehabilitative 
Shakespeares celebrate Shakespeare as an intervening resource by propping up 
marginalized subjects as those in need.  It is worth asking what precisely “they” need 
according to these artifacts.  On one level, we witness that these rehabilitative subjects 
are indeed in need of some mode of social intervention. From immigrant youth and 
young adult communities who must navigate the daily violence of their current situations, 
                                                
6 The relation between rehabilitative Shakespeares and romantic comedy surfaces most clearly in the 
pornographic features films that I group under the title rehabilitative Shakespeares. In each of the various 
Romeo and Juliet adaptations, the sexual teleology of the Juliet figures move from lesbianism to romantic 
union, and in some cases marriage and children, a decidedly un-pornographic convention. For more on the 
relation between rehabilitative Shakespeares as romantic comedies, see chapter four.  
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to inmate populations whose daily existence comes to be structured by detached state 
regulations: the subjects of Shakespeare rehabilitation represent a diversely collective 
cultural body situated outside of dominant social consciousness. Systems of social 
resource are foreclosed for these subjects. However, rehabilitative Shakespeares 
programmatically confuse social intervention and the need for increased resource with 
self-determination and personal agency. To celebrate Shakespeare’s transformative 
potential is to position these marginalized cultural bodies as those who must take action 
on their own behalf, who must learn the transformative power of taking self-action. The 
implication here is that marginalized social status is not so much a product of particular 
ideologies of subjecthood—who counts as a subject, and who may access social 
resources—but a failure of particular bodies to take action in order to better their stations 
in life. Such an implication should be cause for alarm, not the reason for rejoicing.  
 I have examined rehabilitative Shakespeare through a queer theoretical lens 
because queer theory concerns itself with aporia, those modes of social and cultural 
forgetting that attend processes of normalization. In Barbara Freeman’s words, queer 
theory tends to expend the force of its critical energies in “understanding that what has 
not entered the historical records, and what is not yet culturally legible, is often 
encountered in embodied, nonrational forms: as ghosts, scars, gods.”7 In rehabilitative 
Shakespeares, the identity of the subject in process signifies that which is “not yet 
culturally legible.” To explicate the ways in which rehabilitative processes confound 
expectations of how particular identities can be performed—even in supposedly 
transformational or “inspirational” ways—I have deployed queer (and, along with it, 
queer subjectivity) in a way that doesn’t readily match up with many contemporary 
                                                
7 Barbara Freeman, “Introduction” in GLQ 13.2-3 (2007): 159-176, 159.  
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understandings of the term. Queer, as I deploy it in this project, signifies a processual and 
performative approach to identifying as a subject. It is a means of conceptualizing 
identity as a socially and politically constructed system of categorization through which 
institutions normalize particular modes of living as more or less appropriate or authentic. 
Many theorists have clearly articulated this point over the past two decades, to the point 
that understanding identity as socially and politically constructed has become a concept 
generally understood and accepted.8 Along with this understanding and acceptance, 
however, my understanding of queer also takes seriously the ways in which the non-
essence of identity nonetheless serves as a primary basis by which social institutions 
perform processes of regulation and socialization—processes dependent upon systems of 
ascension and oppression, and the distribution and withholding of particular socio-
cultural resources that signify success, authenticity, appropriateness, and, more generally, 
life. By extension, queer subjectivity signifies a mode of self-representation situated 
within multiple systems of identification at all moments. Queer subjectivity signifies a 
strategic sense of self, one in which a subject confounds systems of regulation and 
socialization by willfully engaging within social imperatives of how “successful subjects” 
should exist in various cultural spaces.  
 The emergence of queer subjectivity suggests that the circulation of 
Shakespeare’s cultural capital cannot easily reduce to either a sense of radical 
appropriation by marginalized subjects,9 nor can it exclusively signify Shakespeare’s 
                                                
8 Most often, cursory nods or brief quotes from Judith Butler establish this theoretical point. See: Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990) and Bodies That Matter: 
On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993).  
9 This stance is adopted most aggressively by Kate Chedgzoy in Shakespeare’s Queer Children 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) and Marianne Novy in the Introduction to Transforming 
Shakespeare: Contemporary Women’s Re-Visions in Literature and Performance, ed. Marianna Novy 
(New York: Palgrave, 1999) 1-12. 
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situation within a hopelessly hegemonic rubric.10 Rather, the process of rehabilitation 
demonstrates that Shakespeare has become a primary site of cultural negotiation, a mode 
of cultural capital through which ideologies of appropriateness intersect with concepts of 
identity and performance in such a way as to reflect back to us our cultural investments in 
individuation and personal agency. With this investment, however, comes a refusal to 
articulate differences among identities, and the ways in which some bodies must be 
abjected from narratives of possibility in order for our laudation of Shakespeare and 
social agency to continue on as an inspirational tale.  
 In this conclusion, I explore the benefits of juxtaposing my understanding of 
queer with representations of Shakespeare’s cultural capital from a different perspective. 
While the previous chapters have explored what queer can tell us about the cultural 
politics of Shakespeare today, here I examine what Shakespeare’s signification in the 
contemporary moment says on politics of queer theory.  
The emergence of queer subjectivity in rehabilitative Shakespeares remind us of 
the ever-entangled relationship between cultural capital and identity, a politicized 
relationship that has increasingly become either disavowed, undertheorized, or wholly 
neglected in recent queer theories of subjectivity and social power. It seems we have 
forgotten this dynamic in our understanding of the operation of queer as a theoretical 
tool.11 While the exhausted and exhausting debates over the political efficacy of queer as 
                                                
10 For Shakespeare scholars who consider Shakespeare appropriations little more than hegemonic 
recirculation, see: Michael Bristol, Big-Time Shakespeare (New York and London: Routledge, 2005); 
Kathleen McLuskie and Michael Bristol, Shakespeare and Modern Theatre: The Performance of Modernity 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001); and Denis Salter, “Acting Shakespeare in Colonial Space.” 
Shakespeare, Theory, and Performance, ed. J.C Bulman (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 113-32.  
11 Cindy Patton characterizes such forgetting as endemic in queer theory. She makes the claim that our 
ability to understand that the social “constitution of identities in the civil sphere lags behind the techniques 
for deconstructing them.” See: “Tremble, Hetero Swine!” in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and 
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either an intellectual or social method of understanding relations of power will no doubt 
wage on (as they have since the introduction of the term into academic vernacular), what 
has been lost in these debates is a reflection on the ability of queer theory to open new 
considerations on the concept of efficacy itself and the political baggage always already 
attendant to that concept as a rubric of evaluation.  
 To put it bluntly, considerations of the politics of queer theory have become stale 
if not disturbingly hegemonic. Lisa Duggan, for example, has identified this increasingly 
hegemonic turn as evidence of “the new homonormativity,” which she describes a mode 
of “politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions 
but upholds and sustains them.”12 The political has become the internal aporia of queer 
theory.13 That I had to reformulate my use of queer from dominant understandings of the 
term in this dissertation, so as to more effectively bring to the critical surface the 
ideological politics saturating the process of rehabilitating subjects into normative ideals, 
should give pause. That recent work on queer politics and its place in academic, 
theoretical communities singularly represents queer as built upon a sense of negativity 
and disbelonging that can be deployed against the political in strategic way should 
become the occasion for sustained reflection.  
                                                                                                                                            
Social Theory, ed. Michael Warner  (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 143-
77, 166.  
12 Lisa Duggan, “The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism” in Materializing  
Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics, eds. Russ Castronovo and Dana D. Nelson (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2002) 175-94, 179. 
13 Diana Fuss writes, “politics…represents the aporia in much of our current political theorizing” because 
“that which signifies activism is least actively interrogated” (105). Fuss, writing here in 1989, represents 
one of many theorists working to articulate the differences by which newly or recently re-politicized 
identity categories operate in the academic landscape and the activist one. I find today, however, that which 
signifies activism is too quickly dismissed in “intellectual” work, at least in part because of the desire to 
establishing such boundaries. While this dynamic may have shifted, understandings and interrogations of 
the political complexities of queer remain a central aporia in theoretical (and, as Fuss is right to point out, 
many activist) projects. See: Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature, and Difference (New York: 
Routledge, 1989). 
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 It is worth wondering, who has the potential of negating which modes of 
belonging? What sort of political past and future does this mode of negativity 
presuppose? It is time, in other words, to return to a consideration of the politics of 
identity and the role such politics play in the ideological circulation of cultural capital. As 
queer continues to operate as a critique on the operations of identity, it becomes crucial to 
question which identities fall outside of queer projects operating in various social spaces, 
in academia and beyond. In what follows, and as an attempt to synthesize the multiple 
ways in which queer subjectivity signifies in my previous chapters, I articulate a mode of 
re-politicizing queer theory by attending to the systems of exclusions and intersections 
upon which queer is critically imagined to perform politics.  
 At stake in the re-politicization of queer theory is the ability for it to continue to 
perform cultural work against normative thought, even as systems of normativity mutate 
and take on new forms. To frame this theoretical call, I want to consider two important 
visions of queer politics circulating today. The first, Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer 
Theory and the Death Drive (which I have variously cited throughout this dissertation) 
aggressively calls for both a rejection of identity politics as well as what Edelman deems 
the always normative concept of futurity.14 He argues that the concept of political hope 
fails queers because it signifies on the level of reproductive futurity, a concept itself 
structure around the rejection of queerness. The future, he maintains, simply was not 
made for queers. Thus, he proposes as a political reaction the radical self-exclusion of 
queers from not only reproductive politics but the very concept of the future. As I will 
argue, however, Edelman’s distopic utopia of calculated queer apathy, while built on a 
                                                
14 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2004). 
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sense of self-exclusion, itself excludes considerations of identity and difference, how 
differently identified subjects possess varying ranges of cultural capital. The future may 
fail queers, but it also performs its failure along lines of race, ethnicity, class, and 
geography, as well as sexuality. What we need in the present moment is a politically-
informed sense of queer performativity that takes into account the unavoidable 
intersections of sexuality with ranges of identity formations we can only yet imagine.  
 Second, I examine what I consider the most successful articulation of queer 
intersectionality and how concepts of intersectionality offers a means of rethinking the 
exclusionary tendencies within the politics of queer theory. In her article, “Punks, 
Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?” Cathy 
Cohen calls for a reconceptualization of how queer can be brought to bare and made 
more relevant to the lives and struggles of those marginalized subjects who fall within 
nonce taxonomies, those neither particularly normative nor non-normative, but who fall 
between binaries of thought and, consequential, outside of most queer theoretical 
projects.15 Attending to intersectionalities of queerness, as Cohen demonstrates, offers a 
means of performing queer theory that resists the privileging of already politically 
privileged subjects. As I will argue, however, Cohen maps the lines of intersectionality in 
a too geometrical way, one that potentially flattens political inequality in order to bring 
systems of social inequality into the future of queer theory.  
 Working with and against Edelman and Cohen’s provocative works, I suggest that 
if we are to move beyond the stalemate that has become queer politics in queer theory, 
we must understand that the challenge is not so much in the rejection of the inertia of 
                                                
15 Cathy Cohen, “Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics” in 
GLQ 3 (1997): 437-65. 
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normative ideologies to usher society into what is for some of an impossible vision of the 
future. As rehabilitative Shakespeares demonstrate, for some subjects the promise of a 
better future signifies as illogically as the promise of a future in the first place.16 For 
queer politics,  the challenge is to actively organize in aggressively visible, outspoken, 
and harassing ways against normative ideologies of futurity and betterment while also 
understanding that any concept of futurity—queer or otherwise—is always already 
framed in the identity politics of race, ethnicity, class, and geography, as well as 
sexuality. The ways in which these lines of identification intersect, wavering across the 
asymmetrical lines of cultural capital (who has it, and who can use it in which contexts) 
need to centrally factor into queer theories of social practice and power if queer theory is 
to have any political purchase beyond a critique of academic navel gazing. If we are to 
resist this tendency, then, the politics of exclusion offer a productive starting point.  
 
Exclusions 
 It has been over a decade since Annamarie Jagose posed the question, “Does 
queer become defunct the moment it is an intelligible and widely disseminated term?”17 
Almost as soon as queer gained recognizable diacritical usage in academia, critics were 
offering apocalyptic (and I would add premature) warnings that the term had lost political 
                                                
16 In Terrorist Assemblages Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 
Jasbir K. Puar similarly calls for a reconsideration of the overdetermined dynamic of the intersections of 
identity in queer politics. She argues that the challenge for queer politics is to “understand how the 
biopolitics of regenerative capacity already demarcate racialized and sexualized statistical population 
aggregates as those in decay, destined for no future, based not upon whether they can or cannot reproduce 
children but on what capacities they can or cannot regenerate and what kinds of assemblages they compel, 
repel, spur, deflate” (211). In my treatment of queer politics, I take a cue from Puar’s work, with the 
addendum that socio-economically underprivileged cultural bodies, as rehabilitative Shakespeares 
continually suggest, must also be understood in terms of class lines, which are themselves always already 
inflected by race, ethnicity, and geography, as well as sexuality.  
17 Annamarie Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 127.  
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valence. In 1995, for instance, David Halperin proclaimed, “queer politics may, by now, 
have outlived its political usefulness” because “the more it verges on becoming a 
normative academic discipline, the less queer ‘queer theory’ can plausibility claim to 
be.”18 That same year, Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner observed that “Queer is hot,” 
but that its appeal spoke more to critical fantasies of what queer theory is imagined to 
accomplish than how it tended to operate in various critical practices and disciplines.19 
They offer the caveat, “The critical mass of queer work is more a matter of perception 
than volume” (343). Teresa de Lauretis disagrees, slightly. De Lauretis, who is 
commonly credited with inaugurating the term “queer theory” into academic vernacular, 
similarly claimed that queer had lost, at least by 1994, what she articulated three years 
earlier as its intervening potential to “recast or reinvent the terms of our sexualities, to 
construct another discursive horizon, another way of thinking the sexual.”20 Within an 
incredibly short time, queer, she explains, had “quickly become a conceptually vacuous 
creature of the publishing industry.”21 It would seem, then, that many of the major figures 
of queer theory in the 1990s would affirm Jagose’s question in their claims that queer has 
lost its ability to perform the radical political ends for which it was intended.  
                                                
18 David Halperin, Saint Foucault: Toward a Gay Hagiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 112, 113.  
19 Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner, “What Does Queer Theory Teach us about X?” in PMLA 110.3 
(1995): 343-49, 343. 
20 Teresa de Lauretis, “Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities” in differences 1 (Summer 1991): vii-
xvii, iv. For de Lauretis, queer theory initially offered a potential means of repairing the rift between gay 
and lesbian communities, through what she explains as both a move of transcending and transgressing 
boundaries of difference. While she never offers a clear articulation of how queer theory would function, 
she does offer the following: “rather than marking the limits of the social space by designating a place at 
the edge of culture, gay sexuality in its specific female and male cultural (or subcultural) forms acts as an 
agent of social progress who mode of functioning is both interactive and yet resistant, both participatory 
and yet distinct, claiming at once equality and difference, demanding political representation while insisting 
on it material and historical specificity” (iii).  
21 de Lauretis, “Habit Changes” in differences 6:2-3 (1994): 296-313, 297.   
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 While dubious claims of the death of theory can account in some part for the 
quick turn against the political potential of queer, for the most part it seems that queer has 
been abandoned primarily for the ways in which it has moved from a once activist-
inflected term to a relatively disciplined rubric of thought.22 As Tavia Nyong’o warns, 
“that this perceived transformation of queer from ‘street’ to ‘straight’ theorizing…should 
come so rapidly—at times it seems as if queer theory was greeted at birth with 
castigations of academic insularity—ought to become the occasion for further 
reflection.”23 Queer political potential has not come under erasure because it has become 
a recognizable academic discipline, 24 but rather because its mode of thought has been 
disciplined around what are imagined to be “academic” interests. It has become apolitical 
in practice, not position or potential. The apolitics of queer theory results from tendency, 
in other words, not inevitability. Since the 1990s, queer theorists have worked to distance 
their intellectual pursuits from more colloquial and vernacular understandings of queer 
operating in lesbian and gay rights movements and grassroots activist projects.25 Many 
activist-based uses of queer, then and now, constitute a political rallying cry for 
liberation, a concept of which postmodern thought is particularly suspicious. In this 
dissertation, I am also incredibly suspicious (in fact, I reject the claim) that the cultural 
                                                
22 As Sue Ellen Case puts it so well, “Many ‘queer’ academics write this affluent, commodity 
fetishism.…Antiassimilationist in its move from pleading civil rights, the queer movement insinuates 
sexual citizenship through affluence in the market and the willing participation in national agendas” (31). 
See: “Toward a Butch-Feminist Retro-Future” in Queer Frontiers: Millennial Geographies, Genders, and 
Generations, eds. Joseph A. Boone, Martin Dupuis, Martin Meeker, Karin Quimby, Cindy Sarver, Debra 
Silverman, and Rosemary Weatherston (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000) 23-38. 
23 Tavia Nyong’o, “Punk’d Theory” in Social Text 23.3-4 (Winter 2005): 19-34, 19.  
24 In these years of the American economic crisis, for instance, I challenge anyone to scan the few available 
jobs open to junior scholars—or senior scholars for that matter—and find one that calls for a someone 
exploring or even utilizing queer theory. This challenge goes double for listing for scholars of Shakespeare 
and Renaissance literature.  
25 For an account of the tension between activist and academic understandings of queer, see: Annamarie 
Jagose, Queer Theory: An Introduction, and William B. Turner, A Genealogy of Queer Theory 
(Philadelphia, P.A.: Temple University Press, 2000). 
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iconicity of Shakespeare can liberate marginalized subjects from lower-class social 
status, but I do acknowledge that in most cases subjects are offered increased social 
resource as a result of their encounter with Shakespeare. That this encounter liberates 
them is an impossible claim; that it destabilizes political boundaries of identity, social 
power, and cultural capital is clear. That theorists need to acknowledge the intersection 
between queer and the social is crucial. 
 Edelman understands that queer always already evokes fantasies of the social. In 
his searing polemic, he defines and describes queer within a psychoanalytic optic of 
negativity. The coercively naturalized and naturalizing state of politics and its strategic 
deployment of heteronormative reproductivity serve as his primary critique, and his basis 
for alerting readers to the notion that “the structuring optimism of politics of which the 
order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching 
meaning through signification, is always…a negation of this primal, constitutive and 
negative act” (3). On the concept of queer negativity, he argues, “the embrace of queer 
negativity…can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive 
social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, 
and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself” (6). In Edelman’s 
terms, the political moment inevitably excludes particular bodies (specifically, queer 
bodies) to allow others to signify naturally, normally; politics excludes, just as 
signification negates. Both political exclusion and the negativity of signification, he 
explains, condense on the figure of the queer. 
Queerness plays out in the social and political sphere most clearly for Edelman 
through ideological investments in futurity and reproduction. In fact, in No Future, the 
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concepts of futurity and reproduction are tethered together by the political and to the 
political, hopelessly intertwined in such a way the forecloses political hope to those 
unable to signify within the normative—which is for Edelman, synonymous with 
heteronormative—ideology of reproduction. Since politics makes queerness unthinkable, 
the queer political response, then, would be a rejection of the political itself, a refusal to 
attempt to signify within ideologies of futurity at all. “Queerness,” he urges, “names the 
side outside the consensus by which all politics confirms the absolute value of 
reproductive futurism. The ups and downs of political fortune may measure the social 
order’s pulse, but queerness, by contrast, figures, outside and beyond its political 
symptoms” (3).  
This rallying statement against reproductive futurity, like so many to be found 
throughout No Future, offers a seductive stance, one which, I fully admit, hails me as 
forcefully as any “Hey you!” I might hear on the street. To be outside the political 
consensus, to just say no to the future and the social imperative to multiply and prosper, 
to displace social anger onto the figure of the Child: this is what political fantasies are 
made of. Whenever I attend conferences or workshops entitled some variation of 
“Women in Academe” and the conversation inevitably centers on how to make time for 
one’s children and family, I may commiserate with those concerns but want to, 
nonetheless, screamingly point out the presumptive and normativizing effect such 
conversations engender. Whenever I feel the back of my ankles clipped by an enormous 
stroller while I’m out shopping or running errands, or when I cannot walk at my own 
pace because I’m trapped behind the cue of one of those grandiose child carriages, I find 
affinity with Edelman’s angry calls to renunciation: 
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Queers must respond to the violent force of such constant provocations not 
only by insisting on our equal rights to the social order’s prerogatives, not 
only by avowing our capacity to promote that social order’s coherence and 
integrity, but also by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the 
whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyways in each 
and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social 
order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck 
Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; 
fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of 
Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (29) 
 
The degree to which No Future has been mobilized in myriads of re-articulations of the 
politics and cultural work of queer suggests its seductive quality, as well as the critical 
desire to authorize Edelman’s view of political resistance. 
 Less concerned with defining queer than describing the political conditions of 
queerness, he explains, “queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb 
one” (17) because queerness insistently resists the Symbolic order, that which “invests us 
as subjects insofar as we invest ourselves in it” (18). Edelman figures queerness as an 
embodiment of the psychoanalytic concept of the death drive: that destructive pull toward 
a jouissance that confounds sense of unity and cohesion. Edelman’s insistence on the 
negativity of queer, if it does nothing else, reminds us again and again, like continual 
thumps on the head throughout this book, that he “propos[es] no platform or position 
from which queer sexuality or any queer subject might finally and truly become itself, as 
if it could somehow manage thereby to achieve an essential queerness” (18). I 
sympathize and agree for the most part with Edelman’s dissatisfaction over the ways in 
which academic deployments have essentialized the term queer, either as a synonym for 
individuals who regularly engage in non-normative sexualities (primarily gays, lesbians, 
and sometimes bisexuals). I find the easy equation between queer and non-normative less 
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of a critical oversight than a habitual practice, one that, in my estimation, accounts for 
much of the intellectual inertia behind the reiteration that queer cannot describe an 
identity.26 
However, Edelman follows his description of queer as “anti-identitary” with a 
telling footnote, one that illustrates the degree to which the desire to resist essentializing 
queer as an identificatory marker continually rebounds, in No Future as well as in other 
seminal works on queer theory, with the refusal to engage the socio-political elements 
always already bound up with the term. Edelman anticipates objections to his 
methodology by writing: 
There are many types of resistance for which, in writing a book like this, it 
is best to be prepared. One will be the defiantly “political” rejection of 
what some will read as an “apolitical” formalism, an insufficiently 
“historicized” intervention into the materiality of politics as we know 
it….A variant will assail the bourgeois privilege (variously described, in 
identitarian terms, as “white,” “middle-class,” “academic,” or most 
tellingly, “gay male”) by which some will allege that my argument here is 
determined. That many of those proposing this reading will themselves be 
“white, “middle-class,” and “academic”—and, perhaps, not a few “gay 
males”—will not disturb the ease with which such “determination” is 
affirmed. I have somewhat greater sympathy for those who might be 
inclined to dismiss the book for its language (which they’ll call jargon), 
for its theoretical framework (which they’ll view as elitist), for its 
difficulty (which they’ll see as pretension), or for its style (which they’ll 
find to be tortuous). These objections at least have the virtue of 
acknowledging a frustration of desire in the face of what is experienced as 
overpresence of a drive. “Somewhat greater” though it may be, however, 
                                                
26 We can see a more recent example of the methodological homology between “queer” and “non-
normative” in Karin Quimby and Walter L. Williams’s contribution Queer Frontiers, a text which 
introduced, in many respects, the importance of intersectionality into contemporary queer thought. On their 
methodology, Quimby and Williams write: “We use queer in this context to refer to the myriad forms of 
same-sex and other nonnormative kinds of desire that have come to inform certain specific identity groups. 
At the same time, we acknowledge that many of those from the generation about which this chapter is 
written find this term offensive. Later in the chapter, we will use the term gay when we write about what 
was in fact a mostly male homosexual movement” (194). While they are willingly to take into account 
difference in generation, they leave queer and non-normative entirely synonymous, which demonstrates the 
degree to which the conceptual sameness between the terms has become dangerously normalized. See: 
“Unmasking the Homophile in 1950s Los Angeles: An Archival Record” in Queer Frontiers, 166-95. 
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my sympathy for even this form of response has its limits as well, I 
confess. (157-8) 
 
It is difficult not to admire Edelman’s tenacity here, even if it overdetermines both the 
reception of the book as well the relationship between theory and politics. He astutely 
points toward some of the major critique of queer theory in his defense and the 
exhausting if not disturbing ways in which it has been variously deemed elitist or based 
on jargon. (Admitting to what can be seen as an intellectual oversight on my part, I have 
never managed to see the elitism involved in introducing colloquial or vernacular 
descriptors into academic discourse.)27 It is difficult not to acknowledge that much queer 
theory is dedicated to explorations of gay male communities or practices, as several 
critics have noted.28 Less theorized, queer theory also tends to universally racialize and 
class their subjects and concerns, while also almost exclusively working within an urban 
context. Edelman’s theory of queer politics is no exception. He may anticipate my 
critique, but it makes it no less applicable, and more importantly, crucial to an 
understanding of the relationship between queer theory and queer politics.  
                                                
27 In one of the most illustrative examples of critical receptions of queer theory as based upon elitist and 
inaccessible vernacular, Stevi Jackie and Sue Scott make the claim, “Much of this theory is couched in 
language inaccessible to those outside the intellectual clique which produces it” (16). Emblematic of this 
argument, they turn toward a passage from Judith Butler. They cite her exploration of butch-femme 
dynamics in Gender Trouble, in which Butler write, “As one lesbian femme explained, she likes her boys 
to be girls, meaning that ‘being a girl’ contextualizes and resignifies ‘masculinity’ in butch identity. As a 
result, that masculinity, if it can be called, is always brought into relief against a culturally intelligible 
‘female body’” (156). Jackie and Scott follow this citation with the claim, “It is doubtful whether those 
depicted here would recognize themselves” (17). While there are many means into a critique of Butler’s 
argument here, to asses this passage as elitist based on its use of concepts like girl boys and female 
masculinity seem to speak more to critical desire to uphold intelligible distinctions of identity and 
boundaries of “intellectual” thought than inaccessibility of language. See: Feminism and Sexuality 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).  
28 This claim was posed early on by Sheila Jeffreys and extended into a new direction by Judith 
Halberstam. See: Jeffreys, “The Queer Disappearance of Lesbian Sexuality in the Academy” in Women's 
Studies International Forum 17.5 (1994): 459-472; and Halberstam’s Female Masculinity (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 1998).  
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Like many others, I, too, deploy the term queer as a non-identity, in that it 
signifies the ways in which subjects are read between and across multiple identities, from 
categories of sexual orientation and gender, to those denoting specific ethnic, racial, and 
class affiliations. This should not imply, however, that the ability of queer to disrupt and 
potential rupture the boundaries by which we perceive identity equates an anti-
identitarian stance. Queer subjectivity, as I describe it here, emerges through an 
understanding of the strategic ways in which regulatory and disciplining powers deploy 
concepts of identity for social effect, but also by subjects as they navigate these different 
powers. Queer is not against identity; it stands in opposition to both the wholesale 
prescription of identity along with the fantasy that we can ever rid ourselves of the 
politics that attend acts of identification. There is no getting beyond identity, just as there 
is no point at which we can engage the social without also confronting the politics of 
identities. Deploy queer as an anti-identitarian paradigm forecloses considerations of how 
specific identities carry varying degrees of cultural capital and social resource in various 
contexts; it threatens to universalize identification as a singular process while promoting 
a rather delusional belief that subjects can overcome the ways in which they signify and 
are made to signify politically based on how they perform their particular modes of being 
across multiple identities. Politics are built upon debates of identity and resource; anti-
identitarianism misremembers that.   
 If political queerness depends upon a radical renunciation of the figure of the 
Child as a socio-symbolic gesture of rejecting the future, such a political move 
presupposes a high degree of social agency on the part of the (queer) subject. To reject 
the future, one must possess the future. One must first have a future to reject. More to the 
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point, the politically queer subject Edelman naturalized throughout his polemic must 
possess the future to such a degree that the gesture of rejection would signify as a 
radically departure—which is to say, noticeably resistant, recognizably oppositional, and 
spectacular in its own right. José Esteban Muñoz similarly critiques Edelman, claiming 
that “[h]e all but ignores the point that other modes of particularity within the social are 
constitutive of subjecthood beyond the kind of jouissance that refuses both narratological 
meaning and what he understands as the fantasy of futurity.”29 Just as not all subjects find 
themselves reflected in the privileging ideologies of reproductive futurity, not all subjects 
possess the privileged ability to signify within Edelman’s queer politic. Also, not all 
figures of the Child, after all, evoke the powerless political sway of Edelman’s Child. 
 
Intersectionalities 
  William B. Turner warned in 2000, if it remains unmarked by the politics of 
identity in critical theory, “‘queer’ could become gender- and race-blind utopia of white 
males.”30 Nine years later, Edelman’s No Future, what I see as the most politically-
inflected recent exploration of the relation between queer theory and the social, suggests 
it already has. Other queer theorists have noticed as much, and present as a means of 
reclaiming for queer theory its once promising opposition to more rarified operations of 
theory a critical refocusing on the concept of intersectionality.31 Cathy Cohen expresses 
                                                
29 José Esteban Muñoz, “Cruising the Toilet: LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka, Radical Black Traditions and 
Queer Futurity” in GLQ 13.2-3 (2007): 353-67, 364. 
30 William B. Turner, A Genealogy of Queer Theory, 168. 
31 In what follows, I call upon Cohen’s work as emblematic of the critical call for intersectionality as an 
organizing rubric in queer theory, but several other theorists have contributed to this movement. See: Sara 
Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); 
Arnaldo Cruz and Martin F. Manalansan, eds. Queer Globalization: Citizenship and the Afterlife of 
Colonialism (New York and London: New York University Press, 2002); José Esteban Muñoz, 
Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics (London and Minneapolis: University 
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similar dissatisfaction with the inability of queer theory to account for (or even make 
room for) considerations of queerness beyond binaristic understandings of heterosexual 
and “everything else.” She identifies that “one of the greatest failing of queer theory and 
especially queer politics has been their inability to incorporate into analysis of the world 
and strategies for political mobilization the roles that race, class, and gender play in 
defining people’s differing relations to dominant and normalizing power” (457). Cohen 
recommends that theorists conceptualize categories of identity based on sexual 
reproductivity along the points at which they collide with other categories of identity, 
namely race. People of color, she testifies, often voice distance (or at the very least 
unease) with queer politics because the very term queer has been historically rooted in 
gender, class, and racial privilege. Thus, as intersectional political strategy of theorizing 
sexuality would allow queer politics to rethink the bases upon which social inequality and 
oppression come to rest.  
 With Cohen’s call for political and theoretical intersectionality in mind, we can 
rethink the perversely privileged system of politics operating in Edelman’s No Future. 
For Cohen, intersectionality—theoretically framed or otherwise—enables a mode of 
alternative coalition building, or working against universalizing systems of politics that 
situate certain cultural bodies as allies and others as enemies. Applying this approach to 
Edelman, we see that the Child he scarifies to the new queer political order may not be 
the enemy after all—the name by which queerness comes to be terrorized—but yet 
another fetishized socio-symbolic figure abjected from the homonormative social 
                                                                                                                                            
of Minnesota Press, 1999); and John C. Hawley, ed., Postcolonial, Queer: Theoretical Intersections 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).  
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consensus to the effect that privileged white, middle-class, gay male populations may 
perform an unquestioning form of politics under the banner of radical action. 
 By the same token, Cohen’s testimonial of gays and lesbians of color and the 
understandable skepticism of queer as a radical mode of coalition building evokes a host 
of conceptual problems as well. We must wonder if introducing another binaristic 
paradigm (of color and not) can conceptually spin the already binaristic axis of “queer” 
and “not queer” in a productive direction.32 Again, we return to the threat of 
essentializing queer as a stable and privileged identity, against which Cohen herself 
attempts to work. By all means, theorists need to confront the ways in which race and 
sexuality form mutually constitutive identity categories if queer is to perform its political 
potential. However, re-conceptualizing difference outside of singular focused systems of 
socialization and regulation becomes equally crucial. We might think here, for example, 
of the tensions between the local and the national or the global represented in The Hobart 
Shakespeareans. The documentary racializes its representation of Los Angeles as 
specifically Latino and Korean, to the point that its claim that Latino, Korean, and 
Korean-American youth must dissociate from their local environment in order to 
capitalize upon social resource becomes an ambivalent one. On one level, the film 
fetishizes these youth communities to make a social commentary on race and social 
privilege; on the other hand, it uses this social commentary in order to refashion these 
youth communities into an image of the white, non-violent, educated-class American 
                                                
32 For instance, Cohen writes, “Despite the possibility of the idea of queerness and the practice of queer 
politics, I argue that a truly radical or transformative politics has not resulted from queer activism. In many 
instances, instead of destabilizing the assumed categories and binaries of sexual identity, queer politics has 
served to reinforce simple dichotomies between heterosexual and everything ‘queer’” (438). Her 
understanding of the politics of race, equally represented within an either/or framework, seems to extend 
the problem to another axis rather than destabilizing the larger structure of the problem.  
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ideal. Such refashioning, however, takes different forms. The film offers though first-
person testimonials images of Korean-American youth who fight to access systems of 
higher education, while it represents Latino youth as the identity category that primarily 
struggles to avoid gang life. By taking into account the different modes of racialization 
between the local and the national, we witness the ways in which social power and 
cultural capital take various and sometimes unexpected forms.  
 The Hobart Shakespeareans also demonstrates that, if we understand queer as 
performance of identity, an event that occurs at the point of multiple intersections without 
following any one line of identity through to its expected endpoint, then it is not always 
necessary take sexuality or sexual orientation as the primary rubric of questioning or 
evaluation. If we think of identity as an intersectional and contingent phenomenon, 
always emerging and mutating in different and unforeseeable directions, then privileging 
sexuality as a theoretical concern is little more than that: a mode of conceptual privilege, 
one that, so far, has by and large produced theoretical work that follow the lines of social 
privilege it would question. As one collective article puts it, emergent work in the field 
“demands a renewed queer studies ever vigilant to the fact that sexuality is intersectional, 
not extraneous to other modes of difference, and calibrated to a firm understanding of 
queer as a political metaphor without a fixed referent” (my italics).33 
 Let me be clear here: though I insist on a reconsideration of the politics of identity 
operation within queer theory, I am not calling for a return to an understanding of queer 
as an umbrella term for lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities. As activists and theoretical 
                                                
33 David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz, “Introduction: What’s Queer about Queer 
Studies Now?” in Social Text 23.3-4 (Winter 2005): 1-17, 1. This introduction remains one of the most 
important representations of the emergent critical turn toward assessing the social and political dynamics 
that inflect the term queer, across multiple geographies, including but not reducible to academia. 
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projects on intersex and transgender communities has demonstrated,34 attempting to 
stretch the signification of queer toward an all-encompassing paradigm tears at the very 
coalition-building potential such a move usually intends by covering over notable 
differences in the ways in which some “queer” subjects are made to move in various 
social spaces. Acknowledging these limitations, however, should not presuppose an 
abandoning of the political potential of queer to bring together variously marginalized 
subjects while also testifying to difference of marginalization. In calling out the political 
limitations of the use of queer as an umbrella term, or in questioning the possibilities of 
liberation, I am signaling my refusal to forego the activist ethos with which queer 
continues to circulate, even if these circulations fail to register in seminal works on queer 
theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 See, for instance: Judith Kegan Gardiner, Masculinity Studies & Feminist Theory: New Directions (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Joan Nestle, Clare Howell, and Riki Wilchins, eds. GenderQueer: 
Voices from Beyond the Sexual Binary (Los Angeles: Aylson Books, 2002); and Susan Stryker and Stephen 
White, eds. The Transgender Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
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